scholarly journals The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques E. C. Hymans
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Weapons Proliferation ◽  
Reckless Behavior

Nuclear weapons proliferation is at the top of the news these days. Most recent reports have focused on the nuclear efforts of Iran and North Korea, but they also typically warn that those two acute diplomatic headaches may merely be the harbingers of a much darker future. Indeed, foreign policy sages often claim that what worries them most is not the small arsenals that Tehran and Pyongyang could build for themselves, but rather the potential that their reckless behavior could catalyze a process of runaway nuclear proliferation, international disorder, and, ultimately, nuclear war.

scholarly journals Asia Treads the Nuclear Path, Unaware That Self-Assured Destruction Would Result from Nuclear War

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen B. Toon ◽  
Alan Robock ◽  
Michael Mills ◽  
Lili Xia
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
The World ◽  
The Pacific Ocean

Of the nine countries known to have nuclear weapons, six are located in Asia and another, the United States, borders the Pacific Ocean. Russia and China were the first Asian nations with nuclear weapons, followed by Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Most of the world's nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals or maintaining them at historic levels, but several of those in Asia—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—continue to pursue relentless and expensive programs of nuclear weapons development and production. Hopefully, the nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 between Iran, the European Union, and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will be a step toward eliminating nuclear weapons throughout Asia and the rest of the world. As we will discuss below, any country possessing a nuclear arsenal is on a path leading toward self-assured destruction, and is a threat to people everywhere on Earth.

Nuclear Weapons in Foreign Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Berkemeier ◽  
Matthew Fuhrmann
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
World Politics ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Nuclear Strategy

This essay reviews academic research on the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. It begins by discussing the “Theory of the Nuclear Revolution,” which holds that nuclear weapons revolutionized world politics due to their overwhelming destructive capacity. The article then identifies several ways in which this theory has been challenged in scholarship. The article focuses in particular on four big debates in the literature on nuclear weapons and foreign policy: Does nuclear proliferation promote international peace and stability? Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Do nuclear weapons make countries more assertive? How does nuclear strategy influence deterrence and security? After discussing these debates, the article concludes by calling for more research on the implications of dual-use nuclear technology for foreign policy and international security.

Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status

2019 ◽  
pp. 126-150
Author(s):  
Rohan Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Policy Goal ◽  
Special Position ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Status ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
International Status

India’s abstinence from nuclear weapons through the 1960s continues to puzzle political scientists who study the causes of nuclear proliferation and historians who study India’s specific path to nuclear weapons. This chapter argues that India’s nuclear interregnum of the 1960s is best explained by understanding the status benefits that nuclear ambiguity as a component of a non-aligned foreign policy bestowed upon India. India’s best response to an external nuclear threat and internal domestic pressure to build the bomb was not to actually go nuclear but rather to publicly keep the option open while simultaneously pushing for disarmament as a serious foreign policy goal. This strategy gave India a special position in the international community as a scientifically advanced and potentially powerful yet essentially peaceful nation. Nowhere was this clearer than in India’s contribution to debates in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) convened by the United Nations between 1962 and 1969.

North Korea's Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter C. Clemens
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
International Support ◽  
East European ◽  
Self Reliance

Soviet and East European documents provide significant revelations about the interactions of North Korea and its allies. First, they show Pyongyang's longstanding interest in obtaining nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons. Second, they reveal that North Korea's leadership consistently evaded commitments to allies on nuclear matters—particularly constraints on its nuclear ambitions or even the provision of information. Third, North Korea's words and deeds evoked substantial concerns in Moscow and other communist capitals that Pyongyang, if it obtained nuclear weapons, might use them to blackmail its partners or risk provoking a nuclear war. When aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not forthcoming, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sought to bypass Moscow and obtain assistance from the Kremlin's East European clients and, when that proved fruitless, from Pakistan. The absence of international support reinforced the logic of self-reliance and “military first,” pushing North Korea to pursue an independent line with respect to its nuclear weapons. These patterns cannot be extrapolated in a linear way, but they surely suggest reasons for caution by those hoping to engage North Korea in a grand bargain.

Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions

2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L. Glaser ◽  
Steve Fetter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Damage Limitation ◽  
The Cold War

Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-which could include deterrence, damage limitation, and the continued ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives-are relatively small, because the United States possesses large nuclear forces and highly effective conventional forces. Finally, nuclear counterforce would bring a variety of costs, including an increased probability of accidental war and unnecessary preemptive attacks in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the case for nuclear counterforce is stronger than during the Cold War, when the enormous size and redundancy of U.S. and Soviet forces rendered counterforce useless. When facing a small nuclear force, the United States may decide to use counterforce to limit damage. Although complex trade-offs are involved, if there are critical targets that can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons, then under a narrow set of conditions the benefits of planning for damage limitation might exceed the dangers. The United States must not, however, rely on nuclear counterforce to support a more assertive foreign policy; doing so would unjustifiably increase the probability of nuclear war.

Congress disappoints hopes for change in North Korea

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Market Reforms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Korean Politics ◽  
Party Congress

Subject Developments in North Korean politics and foreign policy following the Party Congress. Significance On May 6-9, the ruling Workers' Party of Korea held its Seventh Congress, 36 years after the sixth in 1980. Kim Jong-un gained a new title as Party chairman; hitherto he was 'first secretary'. Stage-managed in typical Pyongyang fashion, the Congress reaffirmed pursuit of both nuclear weapons and economic development. A new five-year plan was announced, but no details were given, nor any hint of market reforms. Impacts Kim Jong-un's position as leader is now both fully formalised and more firmly secured. The Party's leading role has been reaffirmed, while the military's power is being reined in. Despite some promotions of new blood, North Korea remains a gerontocracy (Kim aside). Nuclear defiance apart, few concrete policy clues were offered in any direction.

Concern over Pakistan’s nuclear programme will grow

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Short Range ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type

Subject Pakistan's nuclear programme and links to North Korea. Significance Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj on September 18 implied that Pakistan had a role in North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, calling for an investigation into countries with links to Pyongyang’s programme. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi on September 20 revealed that his country had developed short-range nuclear weapons. Impacts Washington will raise the pressure on Islamabad to curb the militants it believes are active on Pakistani soil. India would reject any further calls from the United States to withdraw its embassy from North Korea. North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear programme.

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Worldview ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 9-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Russett
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Weapons Systems ◽  
Nuclear Arms

As a result of nuclear proliferation, new weapons systems, and new strategic doctrines, the danger of nuclear war is increasing. The very modest "arms control" agreements negotiated or in prospect under SALT are totally inadequate to contain this danger. According to Herbert Scoville, "Arms control negotiations have become a mechanism for promoting the arms race rather than controlling it." Even by a less skeptical evaluation the negotiations can at best slow Soviet and American acquisition of new weapons systems. Disarmament in the realm of strategic nuclear arms is nowhere in sight. Other countries, which have long demanded some degree of Soviet-American nuclear disarmament as the price of an effective nonproliferation agreement, can plainly see that their price will not be met.

North Korea in 2009: The Song Remains the Same

Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kongdan Oh ◽  
Ralph Hassig
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
International Community ◽  
Nuclear Test

During the first half of 2009, North Korea's relations with South Korea remained frozen, and its second nuclear test angered the entire international community. Beginning in August, the regime adopted a softer foreign policy line, while insisting that it would never give up its nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Proliferation: The Next Wave in 2020

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupal N. Mehta ◽  
Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Core Area ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Uranium Enrichment ◽  
Weapons Proliferation ◽  
Distinct Features

What will nuclear proliferation look like in the future? While the quest for nuclear weapons has largely quieted after the turn of the 21st century, states are still interested in acquiring nuclear technology. Nuclear latency, an earlier step on the proliferation pathway, and here defined as operational uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability, is increasingly likely to be the next phase of proliferation concern. The drivers of nuclear latency, namely security factors, including rivalries with neighboring adversaries and the existence of alliances, are especially consequential in an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment. Though poised to play a significant role in international politics moving forward, latency remains a core area of exploration and subject of debate within the nuclear weapons literature writ large. While in many ways similar to nuclear weapons’ proliferation, the pursuit of nuclear latency has distinct features that merit further attention from scholars and policymakers alike.

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