Syrian Views on Obama's Red Line: The Ethical Case for Strikes against Assad

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy Pearlman

AbstractMuch ink has been spilled on the pros and cons of U.S. president Barack Obama's decision not to strike the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad after that regime launched a deadly chemical weapons attack in 2013. Often missing from those debates, however, are the perspectives of Syrians themselves. While not all Syrians oppose Assad, and not all opponents endorsed intervention, many Syrian oppositionists resolutely called for Obama to uphold his “red line” militarily. As part of the roundtable “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this essay analyzes diverse expressions of such opinion and finds that they highlight three dimensions of the ethical case for limited strikes against Assad. First, they remind us that the ethical context of the red line question was many Syrians’ sense of abandonment by the international community. Second, they emphasize the ethical stakes of the limited strikes; namely an opportunity to hold the Syrian regime accountable, weaken it from within, and thus change the equation of the war. Third, they make sense of the ethical consequences of the nonintervention outcome, and especially its effect in deepening civilians’ despair, accelerating extremism, and convincing Assad and his allies that they could kill with impunity. These views controvert both legalistic arguments precluding military intervention and assumptions that U.S. intervention is always imperialist and warmongering. In this case, consideration of the case for military intervention from the viewpoint of those on whose behalf the intervention would have taken place challenges us to think deeply about circumstances in which limited strikes might be not only ethically justified but also imperative.

2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (906) ◽  
pp. 959-993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Naqvi

AbstractThe use of chemical weapons in the armed conflict in Syria has attracted universal and widespread condemnation and has led to unified responses by various international bodies. This article examines the international community's responses to chemical weapons use in Syria from the perspective of international law. It also analyzes the potential options for accountability that are available for chemical weapons-related crimes. The intention is ultimately to make the case that the special status the international community has ascribed to chemical weapons crimes could be harnessed to create an accountability mechanism, such as an ad hoc tribunal, that could help pave the complex road towards a negotiated peace.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Wallace Brown ◽  
Alexandra Bohm

Cosmopolitans often argue that the international community has a humanitarian responsibility to intervene militarily in order to protect vulnerable individuals from violent threats and to pursue the establishment of a condition of cosmopolitan justice based on the notion of a ‘global rule of law’. The purpose of this article is to argue that many of these cosmopolitan claims are incomplete and untenable on cosmopolitan grounds because they ignore the systemic and chronic structural factors that underwrite the root causes of these humanitarian threats. By way of examining cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian military intervention and how systemic problems are further ignored in iterations of the Responsibility to Protect, this article suggests that many contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are guilty of focusing too narrowly on justifying a responsibility to respond to the symptoms of crisis versus demanding a similarly robust justification for a responsibility to alleviate persistent structural causes. Although this article recognizes that immediate principles of humanitarian intervention will, at times, be necessary, the article seeks to draw attention to what we are calling principles of Jus ante Bellum (right before war) and to stress that current cosmopolitan arguments about humanitarian intervention will remain insufficient without the incorporation of robust principles of distributive global justice that can provide secure foundations for a more thoroughgoing cosmopolitan condition of public right.


Author(s):  
Michelle Bentley

OBAMA’S FOREIGN policy on Syria put the chemical weapons taboo front and centre of international politics. This has always been a prominent feature of international discourse. But now, where the taboo constituted (a) an imperative for, and justification of, US foreign policy, and (b) the basis of key diplomatic negotiations, so the norm came to dominate the entire crisis. As such, this would seem to substantiate the inherent claim behind the taboo, i.e. that chemical weapons are so offensive that possession and use cannot be tolerated. Furthermore, that violation cannot take place without a significant and norm-driven response from the international community, and especially from its hegemon. This view, however, is far too simplistic. Specifically, it ignores two core dynamics of the taboo’s use (where these map onto the two parts to this book):...


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-505
Author(s):  
Rayeheh Alitavoli

This study identifies the dominant frames presented in opinion articles published from 20 August to 17 September 2013 on the alternative website – antiwar.com – and the mainstream website – cnn.com; this timeframe includes articles published a week before and a week after the US administration’s decision to attack and withdraw from Syria. The article employs qualitative content analysis and Entman’s framing theory to code the data and extract the themes and dominant frames present in a total of 87 opinion articles. The study concludes that cnn.com provided frames that presented Bashar al-Assad as a ‘brutal villain’ who uses chemical weapons on his own people, while providing frames that stress Barack Obama’s incompetency in carrying out a strategic plan and highlight the negative consequences of a strike. However, antiwar.com articles are more resonant and consistent than cnn.com articles, and provide frames that encourage readers to protest against engaging in another war, reminding them of the failures of similar past wars such as the Iraq War and its negative consequences, as well as stressing the major players that benefited from a military intervention.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmine Nahlawi

The 21 August 2013 chemical attack on Ghouta led to the mobilisation of the international community after long international paralysis towards the ongoing conflict in Syria. It is unclear, however, why or under what legal basis states chose to react to Syria’s use of chemical weapons in exclusion to other mass atrocity crimes committed within the country. This article evaluates the legal underpinnings of President Obama’s ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons in Syria in the context of R2P. It notes that while all states condemned the Ghouta attack and called for accountability in this regard, only a minority of states shared the United States’ position that chemical weapons constituted a red line in their own right. Overall, it is maintained that the ‘red line’ phenomenon was case-specific to the Syrian conflict, reflecting geopolitical interests of world powers rather than signifying a new precedent for R2P’s application.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 1080-1102
Author(s):  
Robin Dunford ◽  
Michael Neu

In the face of humanitarian crises, members of the international community are often presented with a choice: engage in forms of action, including military intervention, or stand by and watch. This framing ignores practices of intervention that are already taking place and contributing to the emergence and perpetuation of humanitarian crises. Despite calling for more attention to be paid to already existing intervention, literature on the Responsibility to Protect has not adequately understood its implications for the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of military intervention. To redress this gap, we argue, first, that a focus on already existing intervention complicates the moral calculus on which defences of military intervention as part of the Responsibility to Protect are based. Second, we claim that actors already engaged in damaging practices of intervention are bad international citizens who are not fit for the purpose of humanitarian military intervention. Third, we argue that in both ignoring already existing intervention and calling for additional military intervention under its third pillar, the Responsibility to Protect legitimises a moralistic form of militarism. These three arguments show that it is a mistake to follow recent literature in responding to already existing intervention by simply adding to the Responsibility to Protect, for instance, duties to engage in structural prevention and to support refugees. Rather, what is needed is a more fundamental rethink that departs from the Responsibility to Protect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cherine Foty

The creation of the responsibility to protect doctrine reformulated the historical notion of humanitarian intervention. The new doctrine was centered around the principle of nonintervention, a basic precept of the u.n. Charter system, with its initial report explicitly excluding regime change disguised as humanitarian intervention as external to the scope of the doctrine. Military intervention was only to be the means of last resort after the exhaustion of several preliminary mechanisms. In its implementation, the broad mandate of the responsibility to protect has been harshly criticized because it opens the possibility for powerful States, often seeking regime change, to interfere in the domestic affairs of weaker States. This article will first discuss (i) the chronology and evolution of the doctrine, (ii) situating it in the context of the u.n. Charter prohibition on the use of force and articulating its nonbinding nature. It will then examine (iii) the cases of Libya and Syria, focusing on the initial decision to intervene and how the dissemination of misinformation has served to promote military interventions where they would otherwise be considered illegitimate. The article will conclude with a brief discussion of (iv) how the international community can move beyond misapplication and seek to limit its abuse.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 117-133
Author(s):  
Gary Sick

In this analysis of the Iran-Iraq war, Sick asserts that two major naturally wealthy regional powers consciously chose to forego diplomatic means to resolve their disputes. Moreover, by blatantly miscalculating and underestimating the damage of armed engagement, the leaders exhibited utter negligence and disobedience of the international code of conduct. With glaring lack of consideration for human anguish in the military attacks, they used children in battle, launched bombing and missile attacks on civilian targets and neutral shipping, and deployed chemical weapons. Implicated as well is the international community, which did little to stem the bloodshed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

AbstractHow should the international community respond when states commit atrocity crimes against sections of their own population? In practice, international responses are rarely timely or decisive. To make matters worse, half-hearted or self-interested interventions can prolong crises and contribute to the growing toll of casualties. Recognizing these brutal realities, it is tempting to adopt the fatalist view that the best that can be done is to minimize harm by letting the state win, allowing the status quo power structure to persist. Indeed, this is how many commentators and states have responded to the tide of human misery in Syria. Could a policy of letting the state perpetrator prevail be a viable alternative to other options, including military intervention? This essay suggests not. It explains the logic behind the fatalist approach and shows that problems of recurrence, precedence, and rights mean that such an approach cannot offer a plausible alternative to measures designed to resist and increase the costs of committing atrocity crimes.


Author(s):  
Asher Orkaby

Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign that included poison gas was used to target the vast royalist cave network in North Yemen. Despite Egypt’s violation of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the international community failed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, demonstrating the tenacity of the poison gas taboo. Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody’s fierce campaign against UN Secretary General U Thant’s inaction failed to persuade the UN to act. The ICRC, NATO, United States, and UK refused to openly criticize Egypt, as they did not want to fall out of favor with Nasser and suffer economic or political repercussions.


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