Response

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-155
Author(s):  
Alfred L. Ivry
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Informed Reader

Herbert Davidson's critique of my thesis regarding the relation between Averroes' Middle and Long commentaries on De anima contrasts my reading and translation of Middle Commentary passages with his own. I leave it to the informed reader to judge whether one translation is more “neutral” than the other, excluding the specific denotation which I give to sharh, which is the point at issue.

The Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Pure Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Distinct Features ◽  
Physical Type

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

scholarly journals “The universal being is either nothing or posterior”: an inquiry into the constitution and priority of being as being in Peripatetic metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-516
Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
I 11 ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

As a subject of the first philosophy, the being as being is defined as the most universal and primary one. However, Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics that neither One nor being are substances, therefore they do not exist separately. Furthermore, in the De Anima he claims that those that are said to be universal are "either nothing or posterior", because they cannot be on its own in separation from the particular things. How, then, the universal being which can be named nothing or posterior postulated as the subject of first philosophy that is most worthy of knowing? And, on the other hand, if the being as universal is not a substance, on what ground it has it's unity? In order to answer these questions, I will consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and also the Quaestio I.3 and I.11 of his Quaestiones.

AL-ANṬĀKĪ'S USE OF THE LOST ARABIC VERSION OF PHILOPONUS'CONTRA PROCLUM

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elvira Wakelnig
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Greek Text ◽  
Arabic Version ◽  
De Anima

AbstractIbn al-Faḍl al-Anṭākī'sKitāb Bahjat al-muʾmin, theBook of the Delight of the Believerpreserves, in the first part, in at least three of its 100 philosophical and theological problems, passages from the hitherto lost Arabic version of Philoponus'De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. All quotations are taken from the refutation of the first proof, one of them from the beginning which is also lost in Greek. For this latter passage a parallel is found in al-Isfizārī who draws on the same Philoponus source in hisKitāb fī Masāʾil al-umūr al-ilāhiyya(Book on Metaphysical Questions). A comparison of the other passages to the extant Greek text suggests that al-Anṭākī quotes Philoponus faithfully, but with some omissions and occasional re-arrangement of his source. Additional evidence for al-Anṭākī's overall accurate use of sources can be gained from his quotations of the extant Arabic versions of theDe Anima-paraphrase, Nemesius'De Natura hominisand ʿAlī b. Rabban al-Ṭabarī'sFirdaws al-ḥikma(Paradise of Wisdom).

Materialism in Ancient Greek Philosophy and in the Writings of the Young Marx

2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Burns
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Ancient Greek Philosophy ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractWhat is the young Marx's attitude towards questions of psychology? More precisely, what is his attitude towards the human mind and its relationship to the body? To deal adequately with this issue requires a consideration of the relationship between Marx and Feuerbach. It also requires some discussion of the thought of Aristotle. For the views of Feuerbach and the young Marx are (in some respects) not at all original. Rather, they represent a continuation of a long tradition which derives ultimately from ancient Greek philosophy, and especially from the philosophy of Aristotle. As is well known, Aristotle's thought with respect to questions of psychology are mostly presented, by way of a critique of the doctrines of the other philosophers of his day, in his De Anima. W.H. Walsh has made the perceptive observation that Aristotle's views might be seen as an attempt to develop a third approach which avoids the pitfalls usually associated with the idealism of Plato, on the one hand, and the materialism of Democritus on the other. It might be argued that there is an analogy between the situation in which Aristotle found himself in relation to the idealists and materialists of his own day and that which confronted Marx in the very early 1840s. For, like Aristotle, Marx also might be seen as attempting to develop such a third approach. The difference is simply that, in the case of Marx, the idealism in question is that of Hegel rather than that of Plato, and the materialism is the ‘mechanical materialism’ of the eighteenth century rather than that of Democritus. This obvious parallel might well explain why Marx took such a great interest in Aristotle's De Anima both during and shortly after doing the preparatory work for his doctoral dissertation – the subject matter of which, of course, is precisely the materialist philosophy of the ancient Greek atomists Democritus and Epicurus.

The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima, III, 3–8

Dialogue ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin White
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
The Other ◽  
Preliminary Treatment ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Critical Juncture ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Complex Dependency

Aristotle's account of phantasia in De anima, III, 3, occurs at a critical juncture of his inquiry into the nature and properties of the soul. Having just completed a long discussion of sensation (II, 5-III, 2), and wishing now to turn to a consideration of the power of thought (nous), which he regards both as distinct from and as analogous to sensation, he suggests that an explanation of phantasia is necessary at this point, since there is no thought without phantasia, just as there is no phantasia without sensation.1 But while this sketch of a complex dependency among the soul's cognitive powers makes clear the importance of phantasia and the need for some explanation of it, the intermediate place of phantasia in the discussion and the incidental way in which it is introduced are indications that Aristotle does not treat it for its own sake, but rather is compelled to turn to a consideration of it by the exigencies of the subject-matter at hand. The analysis of sensation, the characteristic power of animals, could, it seems, be adequately carried out with little reference to phantasia, even though Aristotle is elsewhere led to stress the closeness, and even, in some respect, the identity of these two powers; the discussion of thought, on the other hand, and specifically of the human thought which is Aristotle's concern in De anima, III, 4–8, apparently requires a special preliminary treatment of phantasia.

Kepler’s Theory of Force and His Medical Sources

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Regier
Keyword(s):  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Johannes Kepler

Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) makes extensive use of souls and spiritus in his natural philosophy. Recent studies have highlighted their importance in his accounts of celestial generation and astrology. In this study, I would like to address two pressing issues. The first is Kepler’s context. The biological side of his natural philosophy is not naively Aristotelian. Instead, he is up to date with contemporary discussions in medically flavored natural philosophy. I will examine his relationship to Melanchthon’s anatomical-theological Liber de anima (1552) and to Jean Fernel’s very popular Physiologia (1567), two Galenic sources with a noticeable impact on how he understands the functions of life. The other issue that will direct my article is force at a distance. Medical ideas deeply inform Kepler’s theories of light and solar force (virtus motrix). It will become clear that they are not a hindrance even to the hardcore of his celestial physics. Instead, he makes use of soul and spiritus in order to develop a fully mathematized dynamics.


The Relation Between Averroes' Middle and long commentaries on the De Anima

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert A. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Human Material ◽  
The Subject

Where Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle can be dated, the Middle Commentary on a given work can be seen to predate the Long Commentary. As an accompaniment to his fine edition of Averroes' Middle Commentary on the De anima, A. Ivry has maintained that in this instance matters are reversed and the Middle Commentary on the De anima is “an abridged and revised version” of the Long Commentary on the same work. Ivry develops his thesis most fully in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 5. There he argues that two passages in the Middle Commentary on the De anima refer to the Long Commentary by name, that a third passage alludes to the Long Commentary, and that in other passages the Middle and Long Commentaries use similar phraseology and the former can be seen to have abridged the latter. The present article replies as follows: The pair of passages in the Middle Commentary which Ivry reads as referring explicitly to the Long Commentary can plausibly be read as cross-references within the Middle Commentary itself. The passage that he takes as alluding to the Long Commentary does not in fact allude to that work, but is an unambiguous reference to a later section of the Middle Commentary. And there is no justification for regarding the passages in the Middle Commentary cited by Ivry which use phraseology similar to that of the Long Commentary as borrowings from the latter. In the course of his arguments, Ivry refers to Averroes' position on the nature of the human material intellect, the issue that gave Averroes the most trouble in his commentaries on Aristotle's De anima and that has most intrigued students of Averroes ever since. The present article points out that on the subject of the human material intellect, neither the Middle nor the Long Commentary on the De anima borrows from the other, for the conceptions of the material intellect which they espouse are different and incompatible.

scholarly journals Hand Over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric

1988 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 392-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Atherton
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Stoic Philosophy

Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to swallow. Virtues and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and constitutes happiness, while vice is the only evil; emotions are judgements (in Chrysippus' Stoa); all sins are equal; and everyone bar the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their own philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the Stoa to which these gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the paradoxes and puzzles under attack – but they may be, often are, better documented, less provocatively attention-begging, or simply more familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or distorted by modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' theory of a unitary soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a theory could not satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad – excessive and irrational – emotions, the πάθη (Galen, PHP 2.246.36ff., 314. 15ff. De Lacy). Posidonius' own Platonising, tripartite soul feels more familiar to us because the Republic tends to be a set text rather more often than do the fragments of Chrysippus' de anima; and the balance in Plato's favour is unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the Chrysippean soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing in radical chic.

Gersonides on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Agent Intellect

AJS Review ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 99-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seymour Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Active Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Active Factor ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Agent Intellect

In De anima 3. 5 Aristotle distinguished two aspects in the activity of intellection or knowing: one active, the other passive. His remarks are notoriously obscure, and they have occasioned an enormous exegetical literature from antiquity to our own day. Besides laying the foundations of an epistemological edifice that remained intact for many centuries, Aristotle also suggested that the active factor in knowing is eternal and immortal. Thus, he retained in some form Plato's belief that there is a link between knowledge and immortality. Several of the leading ancient and medieval interpreters of Aristotle developed this suggestion into a complex doctrine of immortality, the main thesis of which was the idea that human perfection consists in union or conjunction with the active power in knowledge. This essay intends to examine Levi ben Gerson's (Gersonides) critique of the theory of immortality as conjunction. We begin with the psychological presuppositions of the theory.

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