The Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
David Charles

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

Philosophy ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 49 (187) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sorabji

Interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relation between body and soul have been widely divergent. At one extreme, Thomas Slakey has said that in the De Anima ‘Aristotle tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’. Wallace Matson has generalized the point. Of the Greeks in general he says, ‘Mind–body identity was taken for granted.… Indeed, in the whole classical corpus there exists no denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout’. At the opposite extreme, Friedrich Solmsen has said of Aristotle's theory, ‘it is doubtful whether the movement or the actualization occurring when the eye sees or the ear hears has any physical or physiological aspect.’ Similarly, Jonathan Barnes has described Aristotle as leaning hesitantly towards the view that desire and thought are wholly non-physical. But on the emotions and sense-perception, Barnes takes an intermediate position. Aristotle treats these, he says, as including physical and non-physical components. Other writers too have sought a position somewhere in the middle. Thus G. R. T. Ross concedes that we find in Aristotle ‘what looks like the crudest materialism’. It appears that objects produce changes in an organism, ‘and the reception of these changes in the sense organ is perception’. But, he maintains, this gives us only half the picture. The complete theory ‘may in a way be designated as a doctrine of psychophysical parallelism’. W. D. Ross also seeks a middle position. He thinks that Aristotle sometimes brings out ‘the distinctively mental, non-corporeal nature of the act [of sensation].… But Aristotle cannot be said to hold successfully to the notion of sensation as a purely mental activity having nothing in common with anything physical. He is still under the influence of earlier materialism’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1055-1076
Author(s):  
Pierre Guenancia

Descartes e a ideia de homem. Imperfeição e perfeição do homem Resumo: O autor nota, por um lado, que Descartes se refere a uma compreensão muito larga, mas também comum e corrente, do homem e, por outro, que o homem não pode ser identificado nem ao corpo, nem à alma, nem mesmo à união do corpo e da alma. Quando falamos da natureza humana, ela evoca o caráter de uma perfeição limitada, cuja particularidade é sua capacidade de ter o livre-arbítrio. A noção do homem enquanto sujeito de (não) perfeição é baseada sobre uma ideia que se define por uma relação à ideia do infinito sob a forma da aspiração a ser mais perfeito. O exercício do livre-arbítrio se articula concretamente a um esforço de atenção e de vigilância que permite evitar um juízo errôneo. A tese exposta se desenvolve, em seguida, em três tópicos. Primeiramente, a razão se apresenta como um instrumento universal do homem, que, por sua vez, aparece como ser polivalente que o utiliza, sendo capaz de se adaptar às situações as mais diversas. Em segundo lugar, a perfeição especificamente humana significará a capacidade de exercer a dúvida e de recorrer às suposições e probabilidades no plano cognitivo. Isso significa, entre outros, que, para a aquisição da perfeição, é preciso reconhecer a sua própria imperfeição. Enfim, em terceiro lugar, a capacidade de usar propriamente o livre-arbítrio conduz à definição de homem como generoso, em que o homem é compreendido no sentido moral mais que no metafísico. Palavras-chave: Homem; Perfeição; Finitude; Atenção ; Livre arbítrio; Generosidade. Descartes et l’idée de l’homme. Imperfection et perfection de l’homme. Résumé: L'auteur note que, d'une part, Descartes se réfère à une compréhension très large, mais aussi commune et courante de l'homme, et de l'autre que l'homme ne peut pas être identifié ni au corps, ni à l'âme, ni même à l'union du corps et de l'âme. Lorsqu’on parle de la nature humaine, elle porte le caractère d'une perfection limitée, dont la particularité est sa capacité d'avoir le libre arbitre. La notion de l'homme en tant que sujet de (non) perfection est basée sur une idée qui se définit par rapport à l'idée de l'infini sous la forme de l'aspiration à être plus parfait. L’exercice du libre arbitre se joint concrètement à un effort d'attention et de vigilance qui permet d’éviter un jugement erroné. La thèse ci-dessus se développe ensuite en trois points. Premièrement, la raison se présente comme un instrument universel de l'homme qui à son tour apparait comme être polyvalent l'utilisant et étant capable de s'adapter aux situations les plus diverses. Deuxièmement, la perfection spécifiquement humaine signifiera la capacité d’exercer le doute et de recourir aux suppositions et probabilités sur le plan cognitif. Cela signifie entre autres que pour l'acquisition de la perfection, il faut reconnaître sa propre imperfection. Enfin, troisièmement, la capacité d'user proprement le libre arbitre conduit à la définition de l'homme comme généreux, où l'homme est compris au sens moral plus que métaphysique. Mots clé: Homme; La Perfection; Finitude; Attention ; Libre arbitre ; La Générosité. Descartes and the idea of man. Imperfection and perfection of man Abstract: The author notes that, on the one hand, Descartes refers to a very broad, but also common and current understanding of man, and on the other that man cannot be identified nor with the body , neither to the soul, nor even to the union of body and soul. When we speak of human nature, it carries the character of a limited perfection, the particularity of which is the ability to have free will. The notion of man as the subject of (non) perfection is based on an idea which is defined in relation to the idea of ​​infinity in the form of the aspiration to be more perfect. The exercise of free will is joined concretely to an effort of attention and vigilance which makes it possible to avoid erroneous judgment. The thesis above then develops in three points. First, reason presents itself as a universal instrument of man who in turn appears to be versatile, using it and being able to adapt to the most diverse situations. Second, specifically human perfection will mean the ability to exercise doubt and use cognitive assumptions and probabilities. Among other things, this means that in order to acquire perfection, you have to recognize your own imperfection. Finally, thirdly, the ability to use free will properly leads to the definition of man as generous, where man is understood more in the moral sense than in the metaphysical sense. Keywords: Man; Perfection; Finitude; Attention ; Free will ; Generosity. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020  


Author(s):  
K. T. Tokuyasu

During the past investigations of immunoferritin localization of intracellular antigens in ultrathin frozen sections, we found that the degree of negative staining required to delineate u1trastructural details was often too dense for the recognition of ferritin particles. The quality of positive staining of ultrathin frozen sections, on the other hand, has generally been far inferior to that attainable in conventional plastic embedded sections, particularly in the definition of membranes. As we discussed before, a main cause of this difficulty seemed to be the vulnerability of frozen sections to the damaging effects of air-water surface tension at the time of drying of the sections.Indeed, we found that the quality of positive staining is greatly improved when positively stained frozen sections are protected against the effects of surface tension by embedding them in thin layers of mechanically stable materials at the time of drying (unpublished).


Author(s):  
Isabella Image

This chapter discusses Hilary’s dichotomous body–soul anthropology. Although past scholars have tried to categorize Hilary as ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’, these categories do not fully summarize fourth-century thought, not least because two-way as well as three-way expressions of the human person are also found in Scripture. The influence of Origen is demonstrated with particular reference to the commentary on Ps. 118.73, informed by parallels in Ambrose and the Palestinian Catena. As a result, it is possible to ascribe differences between Hilary’s commentaries to the fact that one is more reliant on Origen than the other. Nevertheless, Hilary’s position always seems to be that the body and soul should be at harmony until the body takes on the spiritual nature of the soul.


Author(s):  
Juan de Lara ◽  
Esther Guerra

AbstractModelling is an essential activity in software engineering. It typically involves two meta-levels: one includes meta-models that describe modelling languages, and the other contains models built by instantiating those meta-models. Multi-level modelling generalizes this approach by allowing models to span an arbitrary number of meta-levels. A scenario that profits from multi-level modelling is the definition of language families that can be specialized (e.g., for different domains) by successive refinements at subsequent meta-levels, hence promoting language reuse. This enables an open set of variability options given by all possible specializations of the language family. However, multi-level modelling lacks the ability to express closed variability regarding the availability of language primitives or the possibility to opt between alternative primitive realizations. This limits the reuse opportunities of a language family. To improve this situation, we propose a novel combination of product lines with multi-level modelling to cover both open and closed variability. Our proposal is backed by a formal theory that guarantees correctness, enables top-down and bottom-up language variability design, and is implemented atop the MetaDepth multi-level modelling tool.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-428
Author(s):  
Miriam R. Lowi

Studies of identity and belonging in Gulf monarchies tend to privilege tribal or religious affiliation, if not the protective role of the ruler as paterfamilias. I focus instead on the ubiquitous foreigner and explore ways in which s/he contributes to the definition of national community in contemporary gcc states. Building upon and moving beyond the scholarly literature on imported labor in the Gulf, I suggest that the different ‘categories’ of foreigners impact identity and the consolidation of a community of privilege, in keeping with the national project of ruling families. Furthermore, I argue that the ‘European,’ the non-gcc Arab, and the predominantly Asian (and increasingly African) laborer play similar, but also distinct roles in the delineation of national community: while they are differentially incorporated in ways that protect the ‘nation’ and appease the citizen-subject, varying degrees of marginality reflect Gulf society’s perceptions or aspirations of the difference between itself and ‘the other(s).’


The vapour pressure theory regards osmotic pressure as the pressure required to produce equilibrium between the pure solvent and the solution. Pressure applied to a solution increases its internal vapour pressure. If the compressed solution be on one aide of a semi-permeable partition and the pure solvent on the other, there is osmotic equilibrium when the com-pression of the solution brings its vapour pressure to equality with that of the solvent. So long ago as 1894 Ramsay* found that with a partition of palladium, permeable to hydrogen but not to nitrogen, the hydrogen pressures on each side tended to equality, notwithstanding the presence of nitrogen under pressure on one side, which it might have been supposed would have resisted tin- transpiration of the hydrogen. The bearing of this experiment on the problem of osmotic pressure was recognised by van’t Hoff, who observes that "it is very instructive as regards the means by which osmotic pressure is produced." But it was not till 1908 that the vapour pressure theory of osmotic pressure was developed on a finu foundation by Calendar. He demonstrated, by the method of the "vapour sieve" piston, the proposition that “any two solutions in equilibrium through any kind of membrane or capillary surface must have the same vapour pressures in respect of each of their constituents which is capable of diffusing through their surface of separation"—a generalisation of great importance for the theory of solutions. Findlay, in his admirable monograph, gives a very complete account of the contending theories of osmotic pressure, a review of which leaves no doubt that at the present moment the vapour pressure theory stands without a serious rival Some confusion of ideas still arises from the want of adherence to a strict definition of osmotic pressure to which numerical data from experimental measurements should he reduced. Tire following definitions appear to be tire outcome of tire vapour pressure theory :— Definition I.—The vapour pressure of a solution is the pressure of the vapour with which it is in equilibrium when under pressure of its own vapour only.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel W. Smith

This paper examines the intersecting of the themes of temporality and truth in Deleuze's philosophy. For the ancients, truth was something eternal: what was true was true in all times and in all places. Temporality (coming to be and passing away) was the realm of the mutable, not the eternal. In the seventeenth century, change began to be seen in a positive light (progress, evolution, and so on), but this change was seen to be possible only because of the immutable laws of nature that govern change. It was not until philosophers such as Bergson, James, Whitehead – and then Deleuze – that time began to be taken seriously on its own account. On the one hand, in Deleuze, time, freed from its subordination to movement, now becomes autonomous: it is the pure form of change (continuous variation) that lies at the basis of Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition (and is explored more thematically in The Time-Image). As a result, on the other hand, the false, freed from its subordination to the form of the true, assumes a power of its own (the power of the false), which in turn implies a new ‘analytic of the concept’ that Deleuze develops in What Is Philosophy?


1994 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bijan Vahabzadeh

Euclid's definition of proportional magnitudes in the Fifth Book of the Elements gave rise to many commentaries. We examine closely two of these commentaries, one by al-Jayyānī (11th century) and the other by Saunderson (18th century). Both al-Jayyānī and Saunderson attempted to defend Euclid's definition by making explicit what Euclid had only implied. We show that the two authors explain Euclid's position in a virtually identical manner.


1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

In [3] a definition of negation was presented for the system K′ of extended basic logic [1], but it has since been shown by Peter Päppinghaus (personal communication) that this definition fails to give rise to the law of double negation as I claimed it did. The purpose of this note is to revise this defective definition in such a way that it clearly does give rise to the law of double negation, as well as to the other negation rules of K′.Although Päppinghaus's original letter to me was dated September 19, 1972, the matter has remained unresolved all this time. Only recently have I seen that there is a simple way to correct the definition. I am of course very grateful to Päppinghaus for pointing out my error in claiming to be able to derive the rule of double negation from the original form of the definition.The corrected definition will, as before, use fixed-point operators to give the effect of the required kind of transfinite induction, but this time a double transfinite induction will be used, somewhat like the double transfinite induction used in [5] to define simultaneously the theorems and antitheorems of system CΓ.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document