‘The Fetishes of So-Called International Bankers’: Central Bank Co-operation for the World Economic Conference, 1932–3

1992 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Clavin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
International Economy ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Economic Conference ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
The World ◽  
World Economic

With his sharp denunciation of the ‘old fetishes of so-called international bankers’ for fixed exchange rates on the gold-exchange standard, President Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly consigned the World Economic and Monetary Conference to failure.1The conference had been convened in June 1933 to tackle the crippling levels of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ economic policies which were strangling the international economy during the Great Depression; its brief was so appealing and its concerns so broad, that sixty-five nations came to London that summer. But from the outset of conference preparations, which began in the autumn of 1932, the issue of central banking co-operation was to highlight many of the difficulties which plagued not only co-operative central bank efforts to revive the international economy but also dilemmas which faced central banks in their relations with their domestic governments.

Half a Century of Economic and Social Development Policies of the UN and Bretton Woods Institutions (The Iqbal Memorial Lecture)

1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4I) ◽  
pp. 375-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans W. Singer
Keyword(s):  
International Economic Order ◽  
Memorial Lecture ◽  
Economic Conference ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Multilateral Institutions ◽  
Development Policies ◽  
The World ◽  
World Economic ◽  
Bretton Woods Institutions

It is customary to date the origin of the Bretton Woods system back to 1942 when Keynes, and his associates in London, prepared the three famous memoranda on the International Clearing Union, on Commodity Buffer Stocks and Plans for Relief and Reconstruction. To these three memoranda we may add the Beveridge Report which appeared in the same year, 1942. Keynes had taken a great interest in the Beveridge Report and this model of a national social welfare state was readily capable of international extension and application. However, in this historical perspective, we may well go a little further back. The Great Depression of the 1930s had shown that in the absence of multilateral agreements and multilateral institutions, the economic system was in danger of degenerating into beggar-my-neighbour policies leading to general immiserisation. The World Economic Conference of 1931 had been a first attempt to create an international economic order to prevent this condition from continuing. Although this attempt ended in failure, yet the ideas then brought forward had continued to reverberate in Keynes’s mind. His vision underlying the 1942 documents was governed by the overarching principle of “Never Again!” -never again back to the conditions of the 1930s which were seen as having brought about not only mass misery and mass unemployment but also Hitlerism and war. Also never again a failure like that of the 1931 World Economic Conference!

Central Banks and Gold

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
World War I ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
The World ◽  
The Moment

In recent decades, Tokyo, London, and New York have been the sites of credit bubbles of historically unprecedented magnitude. Central bankers have enjoyed almost unparalleled power and autonomy. They have cooperated to construct and preserve towering structures of debt, reshaping relations of power and ownership around the world. This book explores how this financialized form of globalism took shape a century ago, when Tokyo joined London and New York as a major financial center. This book shows that close cooperation between central banks began along an unexpected axis, between London and Tokyo, around the year 1900, with the Bank of England's secret use of large Bank of Japan funds to intervene in the London markets. Central-bank cooperation became multilateral during World War I—the moment when Japan first emerged as a creditor country. In 1919 and 1920, as Japan, Great Britain, and the United States adopted deflation policies, the results of cooperation were realized in the world's first globally coordinated program of monetary policy. It was also in 1920 that Wall Street bankers moved to establish closer ties with Tokyo. The text tells the story of how the first age of central-bank power and pride ended in the disaster of the Great Depression, when a rush for gold brought the system crashing down. In all of this, we see also the quiet but surprisingly central place of Japan. We see it again today, in the way that Japan has unwillingly led the world into a new age of post-bubble economics.

Foreign Private Investment in India 1920–1950

1978 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. R. Tomlinson
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Major Part ◽  
Private Investment ◽  
International Economy ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign Private Investment ◽  
World Economic ◽  
Overseas Investment ◽  
Developed Nations

Overseas investment by developed nations in the less industrialized economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America is an important part of modern international economic history. Such investment has long been recognized as a potent force in integrating the international economy. It has also been placed at the heart of most theories of the expansion of European empires in the nineteenth century and it is seen as a major part of the ‘neo-colonialism’ that is widely thought to have characterized the world economic and political structure since 1945. This article will examine private foreign investment in India in the first half of the twentieth century, spanning the gap between the ‘imperial’ and the ‘neo-colonial’ epochs.

scholarly journals RISK MITIGATION FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMES) IN THE MIDDLE OF VOLATILITY IN THE WORLD’S ECONOMY CONDITION

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-39
Author(s):  
Gresika Bunga Sylvana
Keyword(s):  
Business Processes ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
The World ◽  
National Leaders ◽  
World Economic ◽  
Economy Condition ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT Indonesia's economic growth in the first quarter of 2020 of 2.97% was released by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS). It is undeniable, that number is the lowest growth rate in the last 19 years. We understand that the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic did occur in various parts of the world. A significant economic slowdown is a big task for many national leaders. Some world economic experts even mention that the disruption of the economy due to this pandemic can resemble the effects of the Great Depression of 1930 ago. If we review the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic which has caused extraordinary disruption in the economic field, it is seen that Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are a sector that is quite severe. Basically, the concept of risk management is not commonly used in SMEs business processes. This is because, in general, the resources owned by SMEs are quite limited. However, in this paper I want to illustrate at least there are simple concepts that can be applied by SMEs.

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Aggregate Index ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Considerable Impact ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.

Private Networks and the Public Interest

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Capital City ◽  
World City ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World ◽  
Hierarchical Nature

This concluding chapter examines the hierarchical nature of the markets in capital, which constitute the peak markets of the world capitalist system. It also reconsiders the central-bank connections between Tokyo, London, and New York as vital inner links within a larger set of world-city geographies. In a century of violent changes, these “capital city” geographies have been remarkably persistent. The great Tokyo bubble of 1989–90 was the greatest yet of its kind, but it now seems relatively modest next to the New York and London bubbles of 2007–8. Each of these “capital city” bubbles showed a mix of classic and novel features. Each also revealed, again, the centrality of the central banks themselves.

Financial and Monetary Stability Aspects of Global Stablecoins

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-185
Author(s):  
Stefan Schäfer ◽  
Oliver Read
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Monetary Stability ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
National Currencies ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Abstract Global stablecoins (GSCs) like Facebook’s Libra could prove much more instable than they might appear at first sight. Not only can their exchange rates against individual fiat currencies fluctuate substantially; theoretically, they also have the potential to replace national currencies, constitute “digital currency areas” and become the basis of a two-tier banking system with one and more GSC issuers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, commercial banks that can create GSC deposit money. Against that background, all steps taken so far by supervisors and central banks can only be the starting point of what is necessary to effectively regulate the new normal of the world of money that is emerging. JEL Classification: E42, F65, G28, K24

The Over-Burdened Central Bank and the Shift Away from Autonomy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Self Assessments ◽  
Crisis Conditions ◽  
Central Bankers ◽  
Influence Behavior

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.

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