scholarly journals CAPABILITIES FOR THE MISERABLE; HAPPINESS FOR THE SATISFIED

2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSÉ M. EDWARDS ◽  
SOPHIE PELLÉ

The aim of this paper is to explain the process of diversification of normative economics by presenting the work of two authors—Tibor Scitovsky (1910–2002) and Amartya Sen (1933–). While these two authors first contributed to traditional welfare analysis from within, they were subsequently involved in the development of two different, and even opposed, programs: the economics of happiness; and the capability approach. They focused on different concepts of well-being: the “joy” of satisfied consumers for Scitovsky; and the “capabilities” of deprived individuals for Sen. In imposing new theoretical frameworks and applications, as well as new concepts of well-being, which are measureable, the capability approach and the economics of happiness represent two major attempts to renew normative economic analysis.

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 83-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash

Philosophical accounts of human well-being face a number of significant challenges. In this paper, I shall be primarily concerned with one of these. It relates to the possibility, noted by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen amongst others, that people’s desires and attitudes are malleable and can ‘adapt’ in various ways to the straitened circumstances in which they live. If attitudes or desires adapt in this way it can be argued that the relevant desires or attitudes fail to provide a reliable basis for evaluating well-being. This is, what I shall call the ‘adaptation problem’. Nussbaum and Sen have—in different ways used this argument to motivate their versions of the ‘capability approach’. However, questions remain about the implications of adaptation for philosophical accounts of well-being.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 83-109
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash

Philosophical accounts of human well-being face a number of significant challenges. In this paper, I shall be primarily concerned with one of these. It relates to the possibility, noted by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen amongst others, that people's desires and attitudes are malleable and can ‘adapt’ in various ways to the straitened circumstances in which they live. If attitudes or desires adapt in this way it can be argued that the relevant desires or attitudes fail to provide a reliable basis for evaluating well-being. This is, what I shall call the ‘adaptation problem’. Nussbaum and Sen have—in different ways used this argument to motivate their versions of the ‘capability approach’. However, questions remain about the implications of adaptation for philosophical accounts of well-being.


Utilitas ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilabash

This paper considers three sorts of account of the quality of life. These are (1) capability views, due to Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, (2) desire accounts and (3) the prudential value list theory of James Griffin. Each approach is evaluated in the context of a tale of cannibalism and moral decay: the story of Count Ugolino in Dante's The Divine Comedy. It is argued that the example causes difficulties for Sen's version of the capability approach, as well as for desire accounts. Nussbaum's version of the capability approach deals withthe example better than Sen's. However, it fails adequately to accommodate pluralism. I suggest that James Griffin's account of well-being deals well with this example and accommodates pluralism. I suggest that, of the views considered, Griffin's is the best account of the quality of life.


Author(s):  
Flavio Comim

AbstractThe paper introduces a poset-generalizability perspective for analysing human development indicators. It suggests a new method for identifying admissibility of different informational spaces and criteria in human development analysis. From its inception, the Capability Approach has argued for informational pluralism in normative evaluations. But in practice, it has turned its back to other (non-capability) informational spaces for being imperfect, biased or incomplete and providing a mere evidential role in normative evaluations. This paper offers the construction of a proper method to overcome this shortcoming. It combines tools from poset analysis and generalizability theory to put forward a systematic categorization of cases with different informational spaces. It provides illustrations by using key informational spaces, namely, resources, rights, subjective well-being and capabilities. The offered method is simpler and more concrete than mere human development guidelines and at the same time it avoids results based on automatic calculations. The paper concludes with implications for human development policies and an agenda for further work.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

In normative economic analysis, it is conventional to treat each person’s preferences as that person’s own standard of value, and as the standard by which the effects of public policies on that person should be valued. The proposal that preferences should be treated in this way is usually qualified by two apparently natural conditions—that preferences are internally coherent, and that they reflect the considered judgements of the person concerned. However, there is now a great deal of evidence suggesting that, in many economic environments, preferences of the required kind simply do not exist. It seems that the preferences that govern people’s actual behaviour are often incoherent and unstable. This prompts the following question: Is there a defensible form of normative economics which respects each individual’s actual preferences, whatever form they take? I shall try to show that there is.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Adams ◽  
Emma Kavanagh

High performance athletes participate and function in sports systems where exploitative behaviours may become manifest. These behaviours potentially violate an individual athlete’s human rights. Using the Capability Approach first outlined by Amartya Sen the paper details how a more precise analysis of human rights, in the context of high performance sport, may be achieved. Using in-depth narrative accounts from high performance athletes, data illustrate how athlete maltreatment is related to individual capabilities and functionings: the loss of individual freedoms infringes accepted notions of human rights. The implications for practice concern how human rights may be protected within and for systems of high performance production.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafaela Hillerbrand

This paper reflects on criticisms raised in the literature on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These have been criticized as creating a dichotomy between the environment and human beings that fails to address the multiple interconnections between the two. This paper focuses on SDG7—“affordable and clean energy”—and suggests that there is in fact a tripartite distinction between the environment, human beings and technology underlying the SDGs. This distinction, we argue, does not adequately represent the multiple interconnections among the various SDGs and hampers their implementation. We contend that the formulation of SDG7 produces a circular definition of sustainability, a difficulty that is currently resolved at the level of the targets and indicators in a way that regards energy technologies primarily as artifacts. By contrast, the literature on ethical aspects of energy systems largely agrees that energy is a paradigmatic example of a sociotechnical system. We contend that, by not considering this sociotechnical nature, the SDGs run the risk of implicitly defending a certain variant of technological optimism and determinism. We argue that this is disadvantageous to the environment, human well-being and technological development. In line with recent critical evaluations of the SDGs, we argue that these (and other) shortcomings can be addressed by better connecting the SDGs to human well-being. Building on recent literature that expands the scope of the Capability Approach as an alternative measure of well-being so as to include considerations of sustainability, we articulate a framework that allows us to elucidate this connection and thus to take advantage of synergies between human well-being and the environment. On the basis of the Capability Approach, we argue that equating sustainable energy with renewable energy—as is done in the transition from SDG7’s goal to its targets—is indefensible because, as part of the overarching energy systems, energy technologies cannot be classified as simply right or wrong. Rather, the indicators and targets within a framework focused on sustainability need to be (more) context sensitive, meaning that, among other things, they may vary by country and with the available technology.


2009 ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
Gianluca Busilacchi

- Over the last year the capability approach has been widely used by social scientist. Its success is mainly due to the richness of its theoretical framework and the possibility to enrich the interdisciplinary researches also at the empirical level. However the empirical applications in the field of public policy, especially social policy, are still very limited: what is the reason? And which is the role of economic sociology in contributing to the analysis of social policy endorsing the capability approach? The first part of the paper concerns the explanation of the theoretical framework of the capability approach, through an analysis of its main concepts and empirical applications. Then we will try to see why the capability approach can be especially used by economic sociology, and why this social science can be enriched by the capability approach to analyse social policy with a richer toolbox.Keywords: social policy, capability approach, economic sociology, public policy, Amartya Sen, poverty


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