Kuhn on architectural style

2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
David Wang

By any measure Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a landmark in recent influential ideas. The very term ‘paradigm shift’, now common parlance, derives from this 1962 work. Structure redirected its own domain, the philosophy of science, from a logical positivist orientation in its evaluation of scientific progress to one that accommodates a complex mix of sociological, linguistic and psychological factors. Perhaps because of this interdisciplinary inclusiveness, Kuhn's insights have informed theory in many disciplines. A survey of the recent literature includes works in anthropology, comparative literature, criminal justice, art history, education and feminist studies.

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-43
Author(s):  
Kyle Cavagnini

The twentieth century saw extended development in the philosophy of science to incorporate contemporary expansions of scientific theory and investigation. Richard Rorty was a prominent and rather controversial thinker who maintained that all progress, from social change to scientific inquiry, was achieved through the redescription of existing vocabularies. However, this theory fails to describe revolutionary scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm change, as first described in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, better portray this process. I attempt to show this by applying Kuhn’s and Rorty’s views to examples of scientific progress and comparing the results.


Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

‘Scientific change and scientific revolutions’ discusses the work of Thomas Kuhn who, in 1963, published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the most influential work of philosophy of science in the last fifty years. Firstly, the logical positivist philosophy of science and structure of scientific revolutions are explained. Kuhn's doctrine of paradigm shifts, of incommensurability, and of the theory-ladenness of data are then examined. He argued that his aim was not to cast doubt on the rationality of science, but rather to offer a more realistic, historically accurate picture of how science actually develops. Kuhn's work also played a role in the rise of cultural relativism in the humanities and social sciences.


Author(s):  
Mark S. Massa

This chapter presents a more detailed examination of Thomas Kuhn’s structure than that provided in the Introduction. The chapter explains how and why Kuhn’s book permanently rejected the idea of scientific “progress.” The author notes that although most Catholics experienced the widespread critique of Pope Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical as a sudden (if welcome) rejection of the kind of theological argument that the Church had utilized in its moral teaching for several centuries, the cracks in the foundations of that older approach to natural law had appeared considerably before 1968. The emergence of a historicist approach to moral theology in the decades before the promulgation of the encyclical contextualized the rocky reception accorded it within a much larger historical framework. Further, even the guild of moral theologians had come to a much more nuanced understanding of what could be (and what could not be) “unchangeable” in Christian ethics.


1989 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry E. Cushing

Distinct parallels exist between the historical evolution of scientific disciplines, as explained in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and the historical evolution of the accounting discipline. These parallels become apparent when accounting's dominant paradigm is interpreted to be the double-entry bookkeeping model. Following this interpretation, the extensive articulation of the double-entry model over the past four centuries may be seen to closely resemble the “normal science” of Kuhn's theory. Further parallels become apparent when Kuhn's concept of the disciplinary crises that precede scientific revolutions is compared to developments in the accounting discipline over the past 25 years. This portrayal of accounting's evolution suggests an uncertain future for the accounting discipline.


1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilana Löwy

O médico e epistemologista Ludwik Fleck desenvolveu, nas décadas de 1920-30, uma abordagem bastante original para o estudo das ciências. Ele apoiou sua epistemologia em duas bases: por um lado, em sua própria experiência profissional de bacteriologista e imunologista; por outro, na reflexão da Escola Polonesa de Filosofia da Medicina sobre as práticas dos médicos. Tal escola julga que os 'fatos científicos' são construídos por comunidades de pesquisadores - segundo os termos de Fleck, "coletivos de pensamento". Cada coletivo de pensamento elabora um "estilo de pensamento" único, composto pelo conjunto de normas, saberes e práticas partilhados por tal coletivo. Os recém-chegados são socializados em seu estilo de pensamento particular e adotam, portanto, seu olhar específico sobre o mundo. Os fatos científicos produzidos pelos membros de um dado coletivo de pensamento trazem sempre a marca de seu estilo de pensamento. Graças a isso, eles são incomensuráveis com os 'fatos' produzidos por outros coletivos de pensamento. A incomensurabilidade dos fatos científicos, aumentadas pela necessidade de 'traduzi-los' em outro estilo de pensamento para sua utilização pelas outras comunidades profissionais é, aos olhos de Fleck, uma fonte importante de inovação nas ciências e na sociedade. Por muito tempo esquecidas, as idéias de Fleck foram redescobertas nas décadas de 1960-70, em primeiro lugar por Thomas Kuhn (que, na introdução de The structure of scientific revolutions presta uma homenagem explícita à sua obra), depois pelos sociólogos das ciências. Além de sua influência diretamente perceptível, a epistemologia de Fleck mostra profundas afinidades com as novas tendências que se afirmam no estudo das ciências: a consideração das práticas dos pesquisadores e o interesse por suas técnicas materiais, discursivas e sociais.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEBORAH R. COEN

Bilingualism was Kuhn's solution to the problem of relativism, the problem raised by his own theory of incommensurability. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argued that scientific theories are separated by gulfs of mutual incomprehension. There is no neutral ground from which to judge one theory fitter than another. Each is formulated in its own language and cannot be translated into the idiom of another. Yet, like many Americans, Kuhn never had the experience of moving comfortably between languages. “I've never been any good really at foreign languages,” he admitted in an interview soon before his death. “I can read French, I can read German, if I'm dropped into one of those countries I can stammer along for a while, but my command of foreign languages is not good, and never has been, which makes it somewhat ironic that much of my thought these days goes to language.” Kuhn may have been confessing to more than a personal weakness. His linguistic ineptitude seems to be a clue to his overweening emphasis on the difficulty of “transworld travel.” Multilingualism remained for him an abstraction. In this respect, I will argue, Kuhn engendered a peculiarly American turn in the history of science. Kuhn's argument for the dependence of science on the norms of particular communities has been central to the development of studies of science in and as culture since the 1980s. Recent work on the mutual construction of science and nationalism, for instance, is undeniably in Kuhn's debt. Nonetheless, the Kuhnian revolution cut off other avenues of research. In this essay, I draw on the counterexample of the physician–historian Ludwik Fleck, as well as on critiques by Steve Fuller and Ted Porter, to suggest one way to situate Kuhn within the broader history of the history of science. To echo Kuhn's own visual metaphors, one of the profound effects of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions on the field of history of science was to render certain modes of knowledge production virtually invisible.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (5) ◽  
pp. 2584-2588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cláudio José de Souza ◽  
Zenith Rosa Silvino

ABSTRACT Objective: To reflect on the key concepts of the book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its applicability in professional master's in nursing. Method: This is a theoretical-reflective study that uses the philosophical and epistemological conceptions of the philosopher Thomas Samuel Kuhn to consider its applicability on the paradigm shift of stricto sensu graduate courses in nursing. The main concepts of Kuhn were used as support: paradigm, anomaly, scientific community and scientific revolution. Results: The propositions of this philosopher are applied to and support the theoretical reflection on professional master's programs, contributing to clarify what would be a paradigmatic visionary perspective in stricto sensu master's models in nursing. Conclusion: From Kuhn's propositions it was possible to conclude that professional master's programs in nursing can break away from the dominant paradigm, strengthening a scientific revolution within the academia.


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