5. Scientific change and scientific revolutions

Author(s):  
Samir Okasha

‘Scientific change and scientific revolutions’ discusses the work of Thomas Kuhn who, in 1963, published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the most influential work of philosophy of science in the last fifty years. Firstly, the logical positivist philosophy of science and structure of scientific revolutions are explained. Kuhn's doctrine of paradigm shifts, of incommensurability, and of the theory-ladenness of data are then examined. He argued that his aim was not to cast doubt on the rationality of science, but rather to offer a more realistic, historically accurate picture of how science actually develops. Kuhn's work also played a role in the rise of cultural relativism in the humanities and social sciences.

2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
David Wang

By any measure Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a landmark in recent influential ideas. The very term ‘paradigm shift’, now common parlance, derives from this 1962 work. Structure redirected its own domain, the philosophy of science, from a logical positivist orientation in its evaluation of scientific progress to one that accommodates a complex mix of sociological, linguistic and psychological factors. Perhaps because of this interdisciplinary inclusiveness, Kuhn's insights have informed theory in many disciplines. A survey of the recent literature includes works in anthropology, comparative literature, criminal justice, art history, education and feminist studies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-413
Author(s):  
Lorraine Daston

Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is the bestselling and most-cited book ever published in the history and philosophy of science. Yet very few scholars in those fields would now endorse the book’s main claims, and many are critical of its central premise: namely, that major changes in different disciplines and diverse historical contexts conform to a single “structure.” Key Kuhnian concepts such as “paradigm shift” have become part of everyday language but all but disappeared from specialist publications. Nonetheless, the book still galvanizes readers encountering it for the first time—or even scholars who haven’t reread it since their own student days. Kuhn’s description of allencompassing and incommensurable mental worlds inhabited by scientists who practice in different paradigms resonates with the experience of readers who have experienced seismic changes in moral and political intuitions.


1988 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 126-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Elena

Historians and philosophers of science have usually followed Kuhn in his appraisal of Lyell's contribution to geology as a major scientific revolution. Nevertheless a detailed analysis of the historical evidence rather support a different view: Lyell's work did not establish any paradigm to be unanimously accepted by his colleagues. Thus Kuhn's model of scientific change does not authorize us to speak of a Lyellian revolution in geology. On the contrary such an interpretation is a recent historiographic myth, originated with Gillispie's Genesis and Geology and promptly prevailing as a result of Kuhn's highly influential The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-43
Author(s):  
Kyle Cavagnini

The twentieth century saw extended development in the philosophy of science to incorporate contemporary expansions of scientific theory and investigation. Richard Rorty was a prominent and rather controversial thinker who maintained that all progress, from social change to scientific inquiry, was achieved through the redescription of existing vocabularies. However, this theory fails to describe revolutionary scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm change, as first described in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, better portray this process. I attempt to show this by applying Kuhn’s and Rorty’s views to examples of scientific progress and comparing the results.


Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
Albinas Plėšnys

Normatyvinėje mokslo filosofijoje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kas yra mokslas. Tiek Carnapas, tiek Popperis pasiūlo savus mokslo apibūdinimus, remdamiesi logine pažinimo turinio analize. Tie apibrėžimai yra universalūs ir laikui bėgant nekintantys. Jais remdamasis tyrinėtojas gali atskirti mokslines teorijas nuo nemokslinių ir nuspręsti, kada atsiranda mokslas. Kitokia padėtis susiklosto istorinėje mokslo filosofijos mokykloje, kuri siekia atskleisti įvaizdžius, pasaulio suvokimo būdus ir mokslinio tyrimo praktiką, vyravusią tam tikru istoriniu laikotarpiu, net ir tuos, kurie šiandien yra atmesti, primiršti ar laikomi klaidingais. Istorinis požiūris į mokslo raidą verčia klausti visai kitko – ne kas yra mokslas, o kaip vartojama ir kaip buvo vartota mokslo sąvoka. Tačiau Kuhnas to nedaro ir aiškinasi, kas yra mokslas. Matyt, tai yra viena iš jo nesėkmės kuriant naują mokslo filosofijos variantą priežasčių.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: falsifikacija, fizika, loginė analizė, menas, mokslas, patyrimas, verifikacija.Science as a Problem in the Philosophy of ScienceAlbinas Plėšnys SummaryThe question what is science arises in the normativephilosophy of science. Both Carnap and Popper proposed their own definitions of science. For this purpose they used the logical analysis of language in which the content of science was expressed. These definitions are universal and stable over time. On the basis of these definitions investigator can discern scientific theories from non-scientific ones and determine when the science started up. The issue was treated quite differently in historical school of philosophy of science where the historians of science attempted to display even those images, world-views and practices of scientific investigation which dominated in their own time and are now discarded. The new sort of questions arises to the followers of the historical school of philosophy of science: how was the concept of science used in their investigations but not what is this thing called science. However, Kuhn still attempts to answer the old question in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In our opinion the failure of his theory was determined by this fault.Keywords: falsification, physics, logical analysis, art, science, experience, verification.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen

Abstract Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a classic, and it is certainly not forgotten. However, an essential aspect about it has been neglected. That is, Kuhn’s Structure is a book in philosophy of history in the sense that Structure attempts gives an account of historical events, focuses on the whole of the history of science and stipulates a structure of the history of science to explain historical events. Kuhn’s book and its contribution to the debates about the progress of science and the contingency and inevitability of the history of science shows why and how philosophy of history is relevant for the history and philosophy of science. Its successful integration of historical and philosophical aspects in one account makes it worthwhile reading also for philosophers of history in the twentieth-first century. In particular, it raises the question whether the historical record can justify philosophical views and comprehensive syntheses of the past.


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