Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

Liberal international order—both its ideas and real-world political formations—is not embodied in a fixed set of principles or practices. Open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, the rule of law—these are aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the last century. I argue that it is possible to identify three versions or models of liberal international order—versions 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the second is the Cold War liberal internationalism of the post-1945 decades, and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. I develop a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of liberal international order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.

Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

Liberal order is not embodied in a fixed set of principles or practices. Instead, aspects of the liberal vision have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the last century. This chapter argues that it is possible to identify three versions of liberal order. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson; the second is the liberal internationalism of the post-1945 decades; and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. The chapter develops a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of liberal order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-79
Author(s):  
V. T. Yungblud

The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, established by culmination of World War II, was created to maintain the security and cooperation of states in the post-war world. Leaders of the Big Three, who ensured the Victory over the fascist-militarist bloc in 1945, made decisive contribution to its creation. This system cemented the world order during the Cold War years until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the destruction of the bipolar structure of the organization of international relations. Post-Cold War changes stimulated the search for new structures of the international order. Article purpose is to characterize circumstances of foundations formation of postwar world and to show how the historical decisions made by the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition powers in 1945 are projected onto modern political processes. Study focuses on interrelated questions: what was the post-war world order and how integral it was? How did the political decisions of 1945 affect the origins of the Cold War? Does the American-centrist international order, that prevailed at the end of the 20th century, genetically linked to the Atlantic Charter and the goals of the anti- Hitler coalition in the war, have a future?Many elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations in the 1990s survived and proved their viability. The end of the Cold War and globalization created conditions for widespread democracy in the world. The liberal system of international relations, which expanded in the late XX - early XXI century, is currently experiencing a crisis. It will be necessary to strengthen existing international institutions that ensure stability and security, primarily to create barriers to the spread of national egoism, radicalism and international terrorism, for have a chance to continue the liberal principles based world order (not necessarily within a unipolar system). Prerequisite for promoting idea of a liberal system of international relations is the adjustment of liberalism as such, refusal to unilaterally impose its principles on peoples with a different set of values. This will also require that all main participants in modern in-ternational life be able to develop a unilateral agenda for common problems and interstate relations, interact in a dialogue mode, delving into the arguments of opponents and taking into account their vital interests.


Author(s):  
Beate Jahn

Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding operations have become an integral part of world politics—despite their continuing failures. This chapter provides an account of peacebuilding operations in practice and identifies cycles of failure and reform, namely the successful integration of peacebuilding into the fabric of the world order despite its continuing failures. It traces these dynamics back to the internal contradictions of liberalism and argues that the main function of peacebuilding operations lies in managing the tensions and contradictions inherent in a liberal world order. Peacebuilding—in one form or another—is therefore likely to persist for the duration of a liberal world order.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Wunderlich ◽  
Harald Müller ◽  
Una Jakob

The regimes for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are essential ingredients of the global order. Yet this order is currently in transition: the bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a more complex, multipolar world order characterized by conflicts of interest and great power competition rather than cooperative security. This competition brings with it rising strategic uncertainties which endanger stability and have far reaching implications for WMD-related agreements. To better understand the implications of this changing global context for WMD arms control and disarmament measures this report looks at the past, present and future prospects for WMD-related treaties. The report begins by outlining four broad yet interlinked approaches to arms control and disarmament before considering how these have been applied to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the past and how these measures could be applied in the future.


1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Barnett

The end of the cold war and the attendant security vacuum unleashed aflurryof intellectual activity and international commissions that reflected on the world that was being left behind and the world that should be created in its place. The reports under review are among the best and most influential of the lot. This article focuses on three issues raised by these reports. First, the portrait of the new international order offered by these reports is a liberal international order. Second, the concept of legitimacy appears in various guises, and the UN is considered the site for the legitimation of a particular order. Few international orders are ever founded or sustained by force alone, something well understood by the policymakers who drafted these reports and wisely heeded by international relations theorists who attempt to understand their actions and the international orders that they construct and sustain. Third, these reports envision the UN as an agent of normative integration. As such, it contributes to the development and maintenance of a liberal international order by increasing the number of actors who identify with and uphold its values.


Author(s):  
Alessandro Brogi ◽  
Giles Scott-Smith ◽  
David J. Snyder

While the ideological inspiration of Woodrow Wilson on American liberal internationalism has been well investigated, less well understood are subsequent influences within the defining ideology of the years of American global ascendancy. Liberal internationalism during the Cold War is often portrayed as a kind of default that arose from idealistic high-mindedness, the novelty of American global experience during World War II, and the bipartisan consensus of sustained anticommunism. However, new scholarship on the career of J. William Fulbright, as well as fresh research on the influence of the Fulbright exchange program overseas, shows the ongoing role of American culture and American political institutions as powerful fashioners of the ideological consensus that defined US foreign policy in these years. These cultural and political influences include a key racial dimension and a prevailing faith in the wisdom of political elites as makers of US foreign policy. Other dimensions of liberal internationalism, including prevailing American gender notions, modernization impulses, and a later critique of American militarism, are evident in Fulbright’s evolving public career, which originated in idealistic support of the United Nations, came to embrace the special mission of the United States in a world of bipolarity, and ended with the senator one of the most vocal critics of a misguided American militarism in Vietnam. The Fulbright exchange program likewise shifted over time in response to many of the same impulses, though, unlike the senator, whose political influence was for long shielded by his electoral invulnerability, it has been vulnerable to shifting political forces both at home and abroad.


Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This chapter discusses democracy promotion in America, which is the dominant theme of the Wilsonian tradition. The institutions and character that the spirit of democracy calls forth assure that the good functioning of the other aspects of liberal internationalism is reinforced. Woodrow Wilson's guiding concern from a young age was not simply to understand the historical origins of democratic life as a scholar, but as an activist to promote the well-being of democratic society and institutions at home and to do as best he could for the sake of world order to foster such ideals and practices elsewhere around the globe. In order to pursue his life's calling of explaining democracy to his fellow Americans so that its promise would be strengthened, Wilson turned himself to the complex and difficult task of laying out analytically the foundations of this way of life.


Author(s):  
David Martin Jones

The end of the Cold War announced a new world order. Liberal democracy prevailed, ideological conflict abated, and world politics set off for the promised land of a secular, cosmopolitan, market-friendly end of history. Or so it seemed. Thirty years later, this unipolar worldview— premised on shared values, open markets, open borders and abstract social justice—lies in tatters. What happened? David Martin Jones examines the progressive ideas behind liberal Western practice since the end of the twentieth century, at home and abroad. This mentality, he argues, took an excessively long view of the future and a short view of the past, abandoning politics in favour of ideas, and failing to address or understand rejection of liberal norms by non-Western ‘others’. He explores the inevitable consequences of this liberal hubris: political and economic confusion, with the chaotic results we have seen. Finally, he advocates a return to more sceptical political thinking— with prudent statecraft abroad, and defence of political order at home—in order to rescue the West from its widely advertised demise.


Author(s):  
Johnson Singh Chandam

India’s limited partnership with the liberal international order (LIO) of the post-Second World War period had seen a substantial transformation after the end of the Cold War through its economic integration with the world economy. At this critical time of liberal internationalism triggered by the relative decline of American hegemony, rise of the non-Western powers and the tendency of populism in the West, India’s role in the emerging order has been a fundamental imperative. The rationale for its comprehensive partnership with liberal order rests on four main considerations: the looming threat on the liberal order and India’s role; consistency of India’s political principles with that of liberal order; the concern for national interest, identity and global role; and finally, the absence of any viable alternative order. In spite of these promising values and necessities, India’s deeper integration has been constrained by three major factors. The first reason relates to the very concept of the LIO, which is slightly Western-oriented. The second reason corresponds to India’s core identity and its governing view with regards to the world—of non-alignment, sovereign autonomy, non-interference and civilisational identity. Finally, its maximum assimilation within the liberal order continues to be hindered by ‘domestic setbacks’.


1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 57-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanne A.K. Hey

The end of the Cold War raises many questions about the role of Third World states in the emerging “New World Order.” During the “old” world order, however, Latin America played a crucial role in the US sphere of influence. This alone merits study of its recent foreign policy behavior, not only because the region is home to many of the newly industrializing states, but also because it will undoubtedly be an important player in regional and global politics into the 21st century (Brysk, 1992; Lowenthal, 1993). How will Latin Americans respond to a Hemisphere dominated by the United States? Will they resist or endorse the trend towards open markets and economies? This article investigates this question with regard to Ecuador, exploring whether Ecuador's foreign policymakers are in the process of shifting towards embrace of a US-dominated Hemisphere governed by free-market economic ideals or, rather, are developing policies in accordance with their own ideological predilections.


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