Presidential Elements in Government Experimenting with Constitutional Change: Direct Election of the Prime Minister in Israel

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

A constitutional experiment in which a parliamentary system of government under proportional representation was combined with the direct election of a prime minister — the system prior to 1992 — the political context of the 1992 reform — the unintended consequences of the reform in practice — the return to a pure parliamentary form of government, combined with a constructive vote of no-confidence and a prime-ministerial power to dissolve parliament.

1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

Political agreements are an integral part of the political system in Israel. For various reasons — mainly the proportional representation electoral system and the existence of a “third bloc” of religious parties that do no fit into the centre-right and centre-left political alliances — no political party has ever enjoyed an absolute majority in the Knesset. The dominant parties have therefore always had to rely on coalition agreements with smaller parties in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain, the parliamentary majority required for a government to rule under Israel's parliamentary system. A similar situation exists in many municipal councils and in other elected bodies, such as the Bar Council.


Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-129
Author(s):  
Karel Rimanque ◽  
Mark Wouters

In the Belgian constitutional order, there is no room for any direct political powers to be exercised by the King. Even on the occasion of a crisis- when the Cabinet tenders its resignation or when the Kingperforms His constitutional mission in the process towards the formation of a new government ; His freedom of action is restricted by the objective context, defined mainly by the political parties.The King, however, retains the possibility of exercising his political influence.  This influence may be all the more important in a country, such as Belgium, where the parliamentary system of proportional representation and the constitutional rule that both major linguistic groups be equally represented in the Cabinet -amongst other factors - cause a cabinet formation to be a complex and delicate process.


Author(s):  
Marian Grzybowski

The institution of the prime-minister, formed in monarchical states, has gained a new political environment in the republic affecting the position and nature of the p[rime-minister’s office. This position depended ,to a large extent, on the systemic location and the shape of the function and competences of the elected president of the republic. The systemic solution adopted in this respect were, as a rule, between two border models; the prime-minister’s full dependence on the political (party) and majority forces in the parliament and the political connection of the castoff the prime-minister’s position to the political profile and personal preferences of the president. Among the solutions indicated here were a number of intermediary solutions used in the systemic practice of individual countries. The political changes at the turn of the Year 1989/1990 in Central and South-Eastern Europe favoured shaping the position of the prime-minister in connections of the model of parliamentary government (i.e. depending on the party structure and majority confidence in parliament) ,but with influence of the president (especially in case of the cast of this office in general and direct election).


Author(s):  
Hubert Tworzecki

Poland represents a surprising case of democratic backsliding since the return to power of the PiS party in 2015, given that positive conditions associated with democracy are present—consistent strong per capita economic growth since 1989, moderate inequality, rising wages, strong preference for democracy, high levels of happiness, and a parliamentary system with proportional representation. The lack of strong underlying cleavages indicates the polarization was not bottom up. Instead, this article argues that polarization was driven from the top down by a segment of the political class that donned the cloak of radical populist anti-establishmentarianism to gain popular support, win an election, and rewrite the constitutional rules of the game to its own benefit. The Polish case points to the importance of elite cues, and especially the pernicious consequences of system-delegitimizing rhetoric, creating distrust in the media and institutions.


Author(s):  
Tomasz Słomka

This article is concerned with the relationship between more than 30 years of universal direct election to the post of President of the Republic of Poland and the essence of the roles associated with that position. The hypothesis put forward for testing has been that elections of the above kind give rise to distortions in the systemic model associated with the Polish Presidency. The legitimisation of the President at the ballot box reinforces the efforts of many holders of the office to introduce ruling-related elements of the Presidency in practice, in the context of the political system. Elections also strengthen relations between the President and his political camp, in this way undermining the presidential arbitration function. In essence, an election campaign is subject to mechanisms of “Prime Minister-isation”, whereby a candidate for President usually presents (feels obliged to present) a programme appropriate for an organ truly engaged in the pursuit of state policy.


1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-459
Author(s):  
Malbone W. Graham

The coup d'état, so-called, which, on January 6, 1929, brought into being a new form of government and established a new type of constitutional régime in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, marked the end of exactly a decade of experimentation with the traditional principles of parliamentary government. That this “critical period” had not been an unqualified success is admitted by statesmen, diplomats, and politicians alike; that it was abruptly ended by the personal intervention of King Alexander and the supercession of the Vidov-dan constitution is equally a matter of fact. From Zagreb to Belgrade the passing of the political order which had obtained in the triune kingdom since 1918 has brought general rejoicing; outside the country, however, the queries have been raised: Is the change indicative of the future fate of all democracies, and have not the doctrines of fascism, of military dictatorship, of camarilla government, simply been transplanted to the Yugoslav capital from Rome and Madrid respectively?The situation is not to be understood merely by drawing hasty conclusions as to the prospective demise of democratic or parliamentary government everywhere, nor is it possible to speak, with any scientific accuracy, of the new régime in the Serb-Croat-Slovene state as a Balkan adaptation of the Italian and Iberian dictatorships. The occurrence of this constitutional change in the life of the Yugoslav people has its own distinctive raison d'être and does not flow from mere facile imitation of dictatorial practices in other countries.


Afrika Focus ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Jean-Louis Esambo Kangashe

President Mobutu and the Prime Minister Under the Transitional Constitutional Act: Duel or Duo? Since the beginning of the democratic process in Mobutu’s Zaire, in April 1990, a judicial and political debate has continued to divide the opinion on the power sharing within the executive. The Transitional Constitutional Act, a result of the political negotiations of the Palais du Peuple, was aimed at resolving the competence conflicts between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. This constitutional framework, however, was unable to avoid neither the possibility of a “duel” nor the avatars of an alleged “duo” between the two main representatives of the executive function. In the meantime, the frequent violations of the constitution by the head of state have shown that power sharing within a parliamentary system could not come to a compromise with the power practice under Mobutu.


Author(s):  
Sulardi Sulardi ◽  
Wafda Vivid Izziyana

Constitutional change is always tinged with a tense and lasting political constellation in both national and international contexts. the existence of transactional politics to gain seats constantly influences political dynamics in the election period. The method used in this research is the doctrinal method. Indonesia applies a presidential government system but does not fully follow the existing doctrine. several coalitions in the government coalition were made. As a result when the President and Vice President are nominated. political parties that support the nomination feel they have the right to join the government, as in the parliamentary system of government. The cabinet filling model is also influenced by supporting parties. It shows that political parties can collaborate to form a joint government, however, the President has the prerogative in determining who will be his minister. It should be carefully noted down that our country is a country adopting a presidential government system. As a result, the formation and the ministers elections of the government is not at the hand of the chairperson of the political parties coalition, but fully at the hand of the president as the President’s prerogative rights. This cannot be proceeded. Chairperson of the Political parties in a coalition may expect to get some seats of powers (minister) from the President Keywords: cabinet; election; political; party; chairperson


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