ASEAN and Its Problematic Treaty-Making Practice: Can International Organizations Conclude Treaties “on Behalf of” Their Member States?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhida CHEN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has, on various occasions, concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States. This raises some interesting questions: is ASEAN entitled to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States; and if so, what should be the status of ASEAN and its Member States vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty? The issue is not one of whether the ASEAN Member States have consented to such a practice—it must be assumed that they have. Instead, the real issue is whether such treaty-making practice can and should be valid under international law, even if the Member States have consented for ASEAN to conclude these treaties on their behalf. This paper will argue that, under international law, ASEAN is entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-637
Author(s):  
J. Roland Pennock

Political theorists have spilt much ink in controversies over “sovereignty,” while probably even more effort has been devoted to discussion of the nature of law. It cannot be said that the result of all this activity has been to produce a body of generally accepted doctrine, or even that it has greatly clarified the field of discussion. On the contrary, misunderstandings and the abuse of terms have contributed greatly to a general fog.The real issue raised by the pluralists is much more than a question of logic. They challenge the premises of their opponents. They deal largely with the question of the limits of political obligation. With that we are not here concerned. The primary purpose of this article is to search for a meaning of “law” that will at once contribute to the clarification of the question as to the nature of law and aid in the determination of the most helpful legal signification of the term “sovereignty.” The accomplishment of this purpose should aid in settling the incidental questions of the nature of “constitutional law,” the possibility of “nullifying” law, and the status of “international law.”The two subjects—law and sovereignty—are frequently treated independently, but they are so inter-related as to render such treatment inadequate. A brief examination of the controversy over “sovereignty” will demonstrate how it ultimately resolves itself into a question of the definition of law.



2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.



2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (S1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILLIAM BAIN

AbstractThis article takes up Louise Arbour's claim that the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of ‘responsibility’ alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the ‘real’ world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the ‘real’ world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.



1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 451-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Lapidoth

Since the establishment of the State and up to the present day, Israeli law has had to deal with a great number of various problems in the field of international law, e.g. whether the State of Israel is a successor to the obligations of the Mandatory government; the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts with regard to offences committed in demilitarized zones or beyond the State's boundaries (on the high seas or abroad); the immunity of foreign states and their representatives from the jurisdiction of Israeli courts and from measures of execution; the status of international organizations and of their employees; the effect and implications of official acts performed within the territory of a state which is at war with Israel; the effect of international treaties in Israel; the question whether the Eastern neighbourhoods of Jerusalem are part of Israel; various issues concerning extradition, and of course, many questions regarding the laws of war: the powers of the military governor, and in particular his power to expropriate land in the territories under Israeli control and to expel residents from the territories, the extent of his legislative powers, etc.



2021 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines the rules of international law governing the birth, the life, and the death of treaties. Treaties, a formal source of international law, are agreements in written form between States or international organizations that are subject to international law. A treaty falls under the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), no matter what form or title it may have. The most important factor is that it sets out obligations or entitlements under international law. The VCLT enumerates the rules governing the ‘birth’, ie the steps from the negotiation until the entry into force of the treaty; the ‘life’, ie the interpretation and application of the treaty; and its ‘demise’, ie its termination. The two fundamental tenets are, on the one hand, the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and, on the other, the principle of contractual freedom of the parties.



Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

There are two reasons to consider member states’ obligations to supervise international organisations as a distinct category of due diligence obligations. First, due diligence obligations typically require states to regulate third parties in some way. But it is harder for states to regulate international organisations than other private actors because international law protects the autonomy of international organisations. Second, such due diligence obligations merit attention because they may compensate for the dearth of mechanisms to hold international organisations accountable when they cause harm. This chapter canvasses member states’ existing obligations vis-à-vis international organisations, and argues in particular that the International Law Commission (ILC) missed an opportunity to frame broader obligations when drafting the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (the ARIO). The chapter closes by making the normative case for establishing a due diligence obligation on member states to ensure that international organisations do not abuse their immunities.



Author(s):  
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen

This chapter introduces a constitutional perspective on international organizations (IOs) that foregrounds the legally constituted relationship between authority-holders and authority-addressees. Distinct from the common principal–agent perspective, it paves the way for understanding IOs’ crisis-induced authority-leaps as an assumption of emergency powers—an act defined as the constitutionally deviant widening of executive discretion at the expense of the political autonomy of the rule-addressees that is justified by exceptional necessity. The chapter taxonomizes the possible institutional embodiments of IO exceptionalism according to its constitution, reach, and intrusiveness and highlights its phenomenological differences with respect to domestic exceptionalism. Given the structural conditions of the international spheres of authority in which IO exceptionalism operates, it is expected to rely on the acquiescence of the most powerful member states, to be stratified in scope and application according to states’ power differentials, and to instrumentalize rather than openly suspend norms of international law.



Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

The final consequence of the dual legal nature discussed in the book concerns the international responsibility of international organizations. In particular, this chapter describes how the absence of a common conceptualization affected the work of the International Law Commission, the International Law Institute, and the International Law Association. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the dual attribution of conduct to an international organization and to its member states. It contends that dual attribution is extremely important in practice and it reviews the cases in which it was at issue. After providing a set of principles on how to apply the dual attribution, it distinguishes between three sets of circumstances: dual attribution via institutional links, dual attribution via factual links, and exclusion of dual attribution when the conduct is attributable to only the organization or its member states. Finally, it discusses the effects of dual attribution in terms of joint responsibility.



Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri

Functionalism is conventionally considered the mainstream paradigm of the law of international organizations: organizations are agents of their member states by the means of a contractual relationship; the law created by international organizations is purely international law; the institutional veil is characterized by a crystallin transparency; the autonomy of the organization is minimal and only granted by a rigid conferral of competences and few implied powers; the conduct of member states acting in the institutional forum is relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter introduces the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are purely international law. It describes the flaws of this theory, discussing the breach of institutional rules by the organization and the adoption of countermeasures against a wrongful act committed by a member state.



2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Thomas Worster

This submission challenges the presumption that uk nationals will lose eu citizenship following Brexit. Until now, the dominant narrative has been drawn from the law on treaties or international organizations, and this article adds the human rights perspective to Brexit. Firstly, eu citizenship can be assimilated to nationality. While eu citizenship is unique, the status protected under international law is a legal bond a person has with a political entity. This protection certainly covers nationality, and this paper argues it can be understood to also protect eu citizenship. Secondly, international law prohibits arbitrary withdrawal of this legal bond with a person. The uk does not have jurisdiction over eu citizenship, so it is doubtful the uk can terminate eu citizenship unilaterally. Even if the eu were to withdraw eu citizenship on its initiative, it would still constitute retroactive law, discrimination, and infringement of sovereignty. It is also disproportionate, because the loss of eu citizenship is not necessary for Brexit. When Greenland withdrew from the eu, its residents retained eu citizenship. For these reasons, the revocation of eu citizenship would be arbitrary. A distinction must be made between the membership of a state in the eu which can be terminated, and the direct legal bond formed between a person and the Union, which is far harder to revoke. On this basis, any uk national who has acquired eu citizenship prior to Brexit, should not be divested of it following Brexit.



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