Individual application to the Turkish Constitutional Court as a case of constitutional transfer

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
ENGIN YILDIRIM ◽  
SERDAR GÜLENER

Abstract:The article has sought to clarify the phenomenon of constitutional transfer through an analysis of the introduction and implementation of the individual complaint procedure in Turkey. Individual access to constitutional courts has recently attained prominence as an effective tool of human rights protection and it is viewed as an example of the broader phenomenon of transfer of constitutional ideas from a point of origin to a new host environment. Critically applying the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer to the Turkish experience of the individual application to the Constitutional Court, we argue that the transfer process involves more than a simple interaction between the promoter and the importer, both of whom have converging as well as diverging expectations. The Turkish experience has proved a useful case to demonstrate the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the process of constitutional transfers. The Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Turkish Government all have important stakes in the success of the transfer to realise their own policy objectives.

2015 ◽  
pp. 36-51
Author(s):  
RUDOLF DUR SCHNUTZ

The recent move towards the individual access to constitutional justice is a progress for protection of human rights in Europe. The explicit purpose of these efforts is to settle human rights issues on the national level and to reduce the number of cases at the Strasbourg Court. Such individual complaints have to be designed in a way that makes them an effective remedy which has to be exhausted before a case can be brought before the European Court of Human Rights. This paper points out the current state of these improvements on the national level in a difficult context on the European level and the recommendations of the Venice Commission in this regard.


2021 ◽  
pp. 425-442
Author(s):  
Marie-Christine Fuchs

This chapter addresses the changing role and reception of international law into domestic constitutional jurisdictions in Latin America and Europe. It begins by presenting a descriptive analysis of the differences between Europe and Latin America. Despite the existence of the 'conventionality control' doctrine developed in Latin America by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICtHR), the European context seems more complex and diverse due to the 'three spheres of human rights protection': the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the national constitutional courts. The chapter then argues that, despite the fact that the multilevel architecture of protection provides States with a large range of opportunities for improving the effective protection of human rights both in Europe and Latin America, in practice, the most relevant level of guaranteeing such protection still seems to be at the domestic constitutional level. After exploring the 'conventionality control' and the application of the 'constitutionality block' doctrine developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, it turns to examine the 'margin of appreciation doctrine'. Paradoxically, this doctrine, introduced by the ECtHR, has recently regained power both in Europe and Latin America as a bedrock of the 're-birth' of nationalistic movement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-67
Author(s):  
Antonia Baraggia ◽  
Maria Elena Gennusa

Abstract International and constitutional law, originally distinct realms with limited areas of intersection, are getting closer and closer, particularly in the European landscape within the human rights protection field, where these mere contacts between the two systems have become intersections and overlaps. The present article will try to shed light on the still unsolved and problematic issues to which overlapping human rights protection systems give rise, by focusing on an analysis of the heterologous in vitro fertilization case, where both the Strasbourg Court and the Italian Constitutional Court delivered relevant judgments on very similar matters (ECtHR’s S.H. Judgment; Judgment No. 162/2014 from the Italian CC). Such analysis revealed useful in highlighting connections and disconnections between the different levels of protection of rights, and led us to argue that the development of a multilevel protection of rights is also, at least partially, a tale of Courts, each competing to have the last word on human rights adjudication.


Author(s):  
Nussberger Angelika

This introductory chapter provides a background of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a multilateral treaty based on humanism and rule of law. Similar to the—albeit non-binding—Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ECHR is a document that marks a change in philosophy and gives a new definition of the responsibility of the State towards the individual. It fixes basic values in times of change and paves the way towards reconciliation in Europe. Unlike in a peace treaty, not all wartime enemies participate in its elaboration, but, one by one, all the European States accede to it, signalling their consent to the values fixed by a small community of States in the early 1950s. Seven decades later, forty-seven European States have ratified the Convention. Admittedly, the new start based on common values could not prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts between Member States. At the same time, the resurgence of anti-democratic tendencies could not be successfully banned in all Member States, but such tendencies could be stigmatized as grave human rights violations in binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Thus, it is not surprising that the European model of human rights protection has been attractive and inspirational for other parts of the world. Nevertheless, there was and is a debate in some Member States to withdraw from the Convention as the Court’s jurisprudence is seen to be too intrusive on national sovereignty.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 869-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hartwig

On October 14, 2004 the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) delivered a judgment which gave rise to vivid reactions in the mass media and to a dispute between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the German Federal Constitutional Court. In interviews, members of the Strasbourg court spoke about their disappointment in the German Court's unwillingness to implement decisions of the ECtHR while members of the German court referred to the necessity to respect national particularities. Whereas, normally, the ECtHR and the constitutional courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe are fighting side by side for human rights and, therefore, consider themselves as natural allies, this time their decisions, which seem to be incompatible, led to a dispute which attracted as much public interest as a film or theatre premiere.


Author(s):  
VLADIMÍRA PEJCHALOVÁ GRÜNWALDOVÁ

AbstractThis article deals with the implementation, at the national level, of European human rights protection standards as enshrined in theEuropean Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It discusses the principles of interpretation of theECHRby the ECtHR, the interaction and mutual dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts, and the approach of the latter to interpretation and application of the case law of the ECtHR. Using the concrete examples of France and the Czech Republic as case studies, it is shown to what extent and how European constitutional courts take into account and apply the letter of the Convention and its interpretation by the ECtHR.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 513-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat

The Federal Republic of Germany counts among the earliest States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It ratified the ECHR on 5 December 1952, three years ahead of Italy, and hence found itself among the original members of the treaty system when the ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953. For the new democratic Government, it was a decision of principle to affirm its willingness to cooperate peacefully within the group of European States, submitting to an international review mechanism with regard to all of its activities. Therefore, very shortly afterwards, it accepted also the individual application under Article 25 ECHR, which at that time was not yet compulsory for all States parties. For many years under the Nazi dictatorship, Germany had brought death and destruction to its neighbours. Now, organized under a democratic and liberal constitution, the Basic Law (BL), it wanted to manifest its newfound identity as a civilized State abiding by the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (31) ◽  
pp. 96-103
Author(s):  
Sergiy Maksymov ◽  
Natalia Satokhina

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis about human dignity as the initial and universal legal value. The investigation belongs to philosophical and legal anthropology and axiology. In the process of research, phenomenological and analytical methods in their unity and complementarity were used. The article draws attention to the tendency of increasing interest to the value component of law in contemporary legal philosophy and doctrine. Traditionally, justice is recognized as the main legal value embodying the high purpose of law. It is a complex value and embodies a certain ratio of no less universal legal values based on human experience, such as human dignity, freedom and equality. Since the mid-twentieth century, human dignity has become the “new key concept” for law. This was due to the desire to prevent a recurrence of the state of barbarism – massive and large-scale humiliation of it during the Second World War. As an expression of a person’s intrinsic value, his subjectivity, human dignity is considered as a value basis of human rights as a whole, as well as an independent right, the inviolability of which is enshrined in the fundamental international documents and constitutions of developed countries. It finds protection in the practice of national Constitutional Courts (primarily the German Federal Constitutional Court), the European Court of Human Rights and other legal institutions. The ethical priority of dignity in the system of legal values emphasizes the universality of human rights, which are based on the initial and unconditional recognition of the other in his uniqueness, regardless of his belonging to a particular community.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Ragone ◽  
Valentina Volpe

This Article analyses, through the lens of comparative law, theOliari and others v. Italyjudgment, which was issued by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in July 2015. TheOliaricase is important for being the first judgment in which the ECtHR established the granting of legal “recognition and protection” to same-sex couples as a positive obligation for the Member States of the Council of Europe on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to understand the role of judicial bodies in the progressive protection of homosexual rights, this Article combines an analysis of European case law with the national perspective. As it concerns the supranational facet, the authors illustrateOliari's reasoning and situate the case in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Elements of both continuity and innovation emerge from the analysis, as well as a relevant dimension of judicial dialogue supporting the incremental recognition of gay rights in Europe. As it concerns the national facet, this specific case was initially dealt with at the domestic level and was the object of judgment 138/2010 by the Italian Constitutional Court. The judgment is critically put into perspective through the examination of the jurisprudence of other European Constitutional Courts (France, Portugal and Spain) that were called on to decide similar cases in the same period. Therefore, the Article offers a comparative analysis of theOliarijudgment clarifying its relevance and speculating on the potential value of this case for the future recognition of the right to a “gay” family life in Europe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 24-28
Author(s):  
Inga A. Starostina ◽  
◽  
Dmitriy G. Shustrov ◽  

The article reviews the Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Amendments to the 2020 Constitution of the Russian Federation concerning enforcement of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Russian Federation, that constitute a contradiction to the obligations of Russia under the Convention, and a worry that the corresponding power of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation will be fixed in the Constitution.


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