Article 13(2) TEU: Institutional Balance, Sincere Co-Operation, and Non-Domination During Lawmaking?

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-126
Author(s):  
David Yuratich

This Article assesses the extent to which Article 13(2) TEU supports a republican reading of the EU's institutional structure. This question has arisen in light of the move towards more intergovernmental forms of economic governance following the Eurozone Crisis. Dawson and de Witte and Bellamy have critiqued this mutation through theory-driven readings the institutional balance clause of Article 13(2) TEU, arguing that it establishes a norm of non-domination between EU institutions that has been undermined by increased intergovernmentalism. This Article considers whether the institutional balance case law supports their reading. It finds that institutional balance's dominant role is not normative: It protects pre-existing institutional competences. It does carry a normative side when used as a general principle of EU law to support arguments about increasing the European Parliament's legislative contributions, but this is not an independent head of claim. A better legal support for the presence of a non-domination in Article 13(2) lies within its second clause, the principle of sincere cooperation. Ultimately, the case law around both clauses of Article 13(2) TEU means that the provision is best understood as having a tripartite structure providing a constitutional basis for non-domination during lawmaking.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-86
Author(s):  
Luis Arroyo Jiménez ◽  
Gabriel Doménech Pascual

This article describes the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law as a result of the influence of the EU law general principle of legitimate expectations. It examines, firstly, whether the formal incorporation of the principle of legitimate expectations into national legislation and case law has modified the substance of the latter, and if so, secondly, whether this has led to a weaker or a more robust protection of the legal status quo. To carry out that examination, the article considers the influence of the principle of legitimate expectations in two different areas: in individual administrative decision-making, and in legislative and administrative rulemaking. Our conclusion is that the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law through the principle of legitimate expectations has been variable and ambiguous.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Marek Rzotkiewicz

According to the Article 16.1 of Regulation 2015/1589 the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of EU law. The potential existence of such a contradiction can be then of un utmost significance to a Member State and aid beneficiaries. However, notwithstanding its significance, the notion of a general principle of EU law has not been defined in the EU legislation, has been derived from the case law of the Court of Justice. The current paper strives to analyze different sorts of general principles of the EU law and their impact on the recovery obligation, especially as such an obligation differs between particular principles. Some of those principles have no significance at all on the existence of the recovery order, while others can, and sometimes even should, bar the Commission from ordering a Member State to recover an aid.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 257-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota Leczykiewicz

AbstractThe emergence of private party liability in damages is EU law has been much discussed by academics, but it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that we do not yet have a principle of private party liability analogous to the principle of Member State liability. This chapter examines under what conditions it would be justified to claim that there was indeed a general principle of private party liability in EU law. Furthermore, the chapter explains that the introduction of the general principle of private party liability would require a thorough clarification of some of the most fundamental, yet still unclear, concepts of EU law, such as direct effect, the horizontal applicability of EU norms and the principle of effective judicial protection. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to introduce a general regime of private party liability in damages is not without controversy and that the judicial creation of the principle will be legitimate only if adequate normative justification is provided for its presence in EU law. In this respect, it has to be recognised that EU competition law is not an adequate legal setting for the general regime to be born, because it does not bring to light tensions arising in other contexts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 257-282
Author(s):  
Dorota Leczykiewicz

AbstractThe emergence of private party liability in damages is EU law has been much discussed by academics, but it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that we do not yet have a principle of private party liability analogous to the principle of Member State liability. This chapter examines under what conditions it would be justified to claim that there was indeed a general principle of private party liability in EU law. Furthermore, the chapter explains that the introduction of the general principle of private party liability would require a thorough clarification of some of the most fundamental, yet still unclear, concepts of EU law, such as direct effect, the horizontal applicability of EU norms and the principle of effective judicial protection. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to introduce a general regime of private party liability in damages is not without controversy and that the judicial creation of the principle will be legitimate only if adequate normative justification is provided for its presence in EU law. In this respect, it has to be recognised that EU competition law is not an adequate legal setting for the general regime to be born, because it does not bring to light tensions arising in other contexts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2021 ◽  
pp. 138826272110049
Author(s):  
Victoria E. Hooton

The role of proportionality and individual assessments in EU residency and welfare access cases has changed significantly over the course of the last decade. This article demonstrates how a search for certainty and efficiency in this area of EU law has created greater uncertainty, more legal hurdles for citizens, and less consistency in decision-making at the national level. UK case law illustrates the difficulty faced by national authorities when interpreting and applying the rules relating to welfare access and proportionality. Ultimately, the law lacks the consistency and transparency that recent CJEU case law seeks to obtain, raising the question of whether the shift from the Court's previous, more flexible, case-by-case approach was desirable after all.


This Commentary provides an article-by-article summary of the TEU, the TFEU, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, offering a quick reference to the provisions of the Treaties and how they are interpreted and applied in practice. Written by a team of contributors drawn from the Legal Service of the European Commission and academia, the Commentary offers expert guidance to practitioners and academics seeking fast access to the Treaties and current practice. The Commentary follows a set structure, offering a short overview of the Article, the Article text itself, a key references list including essential case law and legislation, and a structured commentary on the Article itself. The editors and contributors combine experience in practice with a strong academic background and have published widely on a variety of EU law subjects.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lenas Tilman Götz

The work takes a comprehensive look at the possible liability in the event of data protection violations by the works council or by individual works council members. The question is of considerable importance in practice because works councils have to deal with numerous data in their daily work. In addition, a personal liability of works council members is possible - even in spite of the alleged clarification in the context of § 79a sentence 2 BetrVG. After a fundamental discussion of the question of whether the works council can be the responsible party within the meaning of Article 4 No. 7 of the GDPR, the work deals with the admissibility of Section 79a sentence 2 of the BetrVG under EU law. The author comes to the conclusion that § 79a S. 2 BetrVG is not compatible with the requirements of EU law and may not be applied due to this illegality of EU law. Existing case law is also comprehensively evaluated in the process.Subsequently, all liability facts of the German Civil Code (BGB) as well as of the GDPR are illuminated. Finally, possible liability risks for employers are discussed. Due to numerous practical examples, the work is ideally suited for practitioners.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


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