The Social Dilemma of Exaggerating the Positive--of People and of Policies

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robyn M. Dawes
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Tripat Gill

AbstractThe ethical dilemma (ED) of whether autonomous vehicles (AVs) should protect the passengers or pedestrians when harm is unavoidable has been widely researched and debated. Several behavioral scientists have sought public opinion on this issue, based on the premise that EDs are critical to resolve for AV adoption. However, many scholars and industry participants have downplayed the importance of these edge cases. Policy makers also advocate a focus on higher level ethical principles rather than on a specific solution to EDs. But conspicuously absent from this debate is the view of the consumers or potential adopters, who will be instrumental to the success of AVs. The current research investigated this issue both from a theoretical standpoint and through empirical research. The literature on innovation adoption and risk perception suggests that EDs will be heavily weighted by potential adopters of AVs. Two studies conducted with a broad sample of consumers verified this assertion. The results from these studies showed that people associated EDs with the highest risk and considered EDs as the most important issue to address as compared to the other technical, legal and ethical issues facing AVs. As such, EDs need to be addressed to ensure robustness in the design of AVs and to assure consumers of the safety of this promising technology. Some preliminary evidence is provided about interventions to resolve the social dilemma in EDs and about the ethical preferences of prospective early adopters of AVs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan Isler ◽  
Simon Gächter ◽  
A. John Maule ◽  
Chris Starmer

AbstractHumans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people with selfish preferences rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity—a preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these explanations with each other as well as with strong reciprocity. We study one-shot cooperation across two main dilemma contexts, provision and maintenance, and show that cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally study the cognitive processes underlying this robust result. Supporting the Self-Control Account, people are intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Contextual differences between maintenance and provision are observed across additional measures: reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social appropriateness; beliefs about others’ cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we show that preferences, coupled with beliefs, successfully predict the high levels of cooperation in both maintenance and provision dilemmas. While the effects of intuitions are context-dependent and small, the widespread preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We advance the Contextualised Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.


Author(s):  
T. K. Krishnapriya ◽  
◽  
Padma Rani ◽  
Bashabi Fraser ◽  
◽  
...  

The Colonial Bengal of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a place of contradictions. For instance, despite certain evident advancements in the resolution of the women’s question, some of the emancipatory attempts of the period marked a rather dubious account of women’s liberation as patriarchal underpinnings hegemonized the efforts. Amid this complex backdrop, the colonial women’s position is further jeopardized by the western feminist scholarship that contrives colonial third world women as perennial victims and beneficiaries of emancipatory actions from the West. The paper attempts to relocate the colonial women and their resistance by negotiating the fissures in their construction. This study, informed by bell hooks’ (1990) postulations on margin and resistance, simultaneously seeks to form a bridge between the experiences of marginalized women beyond borders. Rabindranath Tagore’s Nastanirh (1901) and Chaturanga (1916) are chosen for close textual reading to examine the experiences of colonial women. The author’s women protagonists often embody the social dilemma of the period. Tagore’s Damini and Charu exist in the margin of resistance whilst Nanibala occupies the margin of deprivation. Significantly, Charu and Damini traverse the precarious “profound edges” of the margin to imagine a “new world” free of subjugation. Thus, the resistance offered by these women subverts the predominant conceptions of victimhood of colonial women, and it enables them to be posited as active agents.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Stefania Collodi ◽  
Maria Fiorenza ◽  
Andrea Guazzini ◽  
Mirko Duradoni

Reputational systems promote pro-social behaviors, also in virtual environments, therefore their study contributes to the knowledge of social interactions. Literature findings emphasize the power of reputation in fostering fairness in many circumstances, even when its influence is not directly oriented towards specific individuals. The present study contributes to the investigation of the psychological antecedents of fairness, introducing (or not) reputation in the social dilemma framework. Although reputational systems usually influence fairness dynamics, there are also socio-psychological characteristics that can play a role, affecting the adhesion to the norm online. To investigate their effects, we employed a virtual bargaining game that could include a reputational system depending on the experimental condition. Results show that the participant’s fairness could be significantly influenced by socio-psychological and demographic characteristics, as well as personality traits. Reputation seems to decrease fairness in those individuals who report high levels of Neuroticism and Openness. At the same time, high values of Self-Efficacy appear to be more likely associated with unfair behaviors when reputation is off the bargaining. Finally, Age and Sense of Community emerge as fairness promoters regardless of the experimental condition.


2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 501-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCIN SEREDYNSKI ◽  
PASCAL BOUVRY

A distributed nature of a wireless mobile ad hoc network, lack of a single authority, and limited battery resources of participating devices may lead its users to be reluctant to packet relaying duties. This paper investigates potential networking conditions that could lead to a direct reciprocity-based cooperation on packet relaying. Simulation of behaviour of the network is carried out using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach. A game-based model of nodes' interactions coupled with a genetic algorithm is used to find successful relaying strategies for various networking conditions. Computational experiments demonstrate that the reciprocity-based packet relaying is an efficient way to overcome the social dilemma present in such a network. However, in the presence of a large number of unconditionally cooperatives nodes a selfish permanent defection strategy is more efficient than a reciprocal tit-for-tat strategy. Nevertheless the switch from cooperative to selfish behaviour among some users does not change significantly the overall performance of the network as the negative consequences of the switch are compensated by the generous packet relaying contribution of unconditionally cooperative nodes.


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