The Distinction between Psychological Kinds and Natural Kinds Revisited: Can Updated Natural-Kind Theory Help Clinical Psychological Science and beyond Meet Psychology's Philosophical Challenges?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara S. Held
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Inductive Generalization ◽  
Psychological Science ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Homeostatic Property Cluster ◽  
Research Domain

Philosophers and psychologists have long held that mind-dependent/human (or social) kinds are not natural kinds. Yet in the last three decades philosopher of science Richard Boyd has challenged this belief to widespread acclaim in the philosophy of biology, where the natural-kind status of species taxa has been debated. Boyd proposed that natural-kind status hinges not on a kind's mind independence or on demonstration of its essential properties but rather on whether it supports inductive generalization, in which case it is a “homeostatic property cluster” (HPC) kind. Boyd indicates that any human/mental kind can in principle be a natural kind, without physical reduction of its properties, as long as it constitutes an HPC kind and so can be studied by way of the causal mechanisms that, he theorizes, underlie all natural kinds. In the last decade Boyd's HPC theory of natural kinds has influenced theory of mental disorder kinds and shares commonality with Denny Borsboom's burgeoning “symptom network” approach to psychiatric diagnosis. It therefore warrants more thoroughgoing theoretical and empirical analysis. This article revisits the heterogeneity that inheres in DSM categories and motivated alternative approaches, such as the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) of the NIMH. Also assessed are two worries about the future of “HPC kinds” of mental disorder kinds: (a) ontological relativism and reification, and (b) epistemic perspectivalism and relativistic knowledge. Though focused on clinical kinds, this analysis has implications for psychological science beyond its clinical subdiscipline.

The World Essence

Dialogue ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bigelow
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Joint Paper ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Necessity

Recently, Brian Ellis came up with a neat and novel idea about laws of nature, which at first I misunderstood. Then I participated, with Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse, in writing a joint paper, “The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature” (Ellis, Bigelow and Lierse, forthcoming). In this paper, the Ellis idea was formulated in a different way from that in which I had originally interpreted it. Little weight was placed on possible worlds or individual essences. Much weight rested on natural kinds. I thought Ellis to be suggesting that laws of nature attribute essential properties to one grand individual, The World. In fact, Ellis is hostile towards individual essences for any individuals at all, including The World. He is comfortable only with essential properties of kinds, rather than individuals. The Ellis conjecture was that laws of nature attribute essential properties to the natural kind of which the actual world is one (and presumably the only) member.

Ostension, Names and Natural Kind Terms

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohan Matthen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Recent Issue ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

It seems to be a part of the oral and written tradition of contemporary philosophy that Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have resurrected a kind of Aristotelianism about natural kinds by reference to purely semantic ideas. Thus in a recent issue of the Journal of Philosophy, M. R. Ayers writes that according to Kripke and Putnam: “The names ‘gold’, ‘tiger’ etc. have their meaning … by being the name of, or, more technically, by ‘rigidly designating’, a natural kind.” And in the immediately following pages he suggests that the view Kripke and Putnam arrive at is “not at all unlike Aristotelian doctrine”, but arrived at from “the rather special point of view of a concern with modal logic, and against the background of Russell's theory of descriptions, the modern obsession with proper names, and so forth”. Presumably what Ayers is alleging here is that something like the Aristotelian position on substance, species, essential properties and so forth is or is intended to be the outcome of the Kripke-Putnam investigations.

Cancer

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anya Plutynski
Keyword(s):  
Cancer Research ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Molecular Subtyping ◽  
Stable Property ◽  
Scientific Kinds ◽  
False Assumption ◽  
Homeostatic Property Cluster ◽  
Cluster View

Is cancer one or many? If many, how many diseases is cancer, exactly? I argue that this question makes a false assumption; there is no single “natural” classificatory scheme for cancer. Rather, there are many ways to classify cancers, which serve different predictive and explanatory goals. I consider two philosophers’ views concerning whether cancer is a natural kind, that of Khalidi, who argues that cancer is the closest any scientific kind comes to a homeostatic property cluster kind, and that of Lange, whose conclusion is the opposite of Khalidi’s; he argues that cancer is at best a “kludge” and that advances in molecular subtyping of cancer hail the “end of diseases” as natural kinds. I consider several alternative accounts of natural or “scientific” kinds, the “simple causal view,” the “stable property cluster” view, and “scientific kinds,” and argue that the diverse aims of cancer research require us to embrace a much more pluralistic view.

scholarly journals Three Approaches to Understanding and Classifying Mental Disorder: ICD-11, DSM-5, and the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Anna Clark ◽  
Bruce Cuthbert ◽  
Roberto Lewis-Fernández ◽  
William E. Narrow ◽  
Geoffrey M. Reed
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
International Classification Of Diseases ◽  
The United States ◽  
Classification Systems ◽  
Prescribe Medication ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Classification Of Diseases ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Research Domain

The diagnosis of mental disorder initially appears relatively straightforward: Patients present with symptoms or visible signs of illness; health professionals make diagnoses based primarily on these symptoms and signs; and they prescribe medication, psychotherapy, or both, accordingly. However, despite a dramatic expansion of knowledge about mental disorders during the past half century, understanding of their components and processes remains rudimentary. We provide histories and descriptions of three systems with different purposes relevant to understanding and classifying mental disorder. Two major diagnostic manuals—the International Classification of Diseases and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—provide classification systems relevant to public health, clinical diagnosis, service provision, and specific research applications, the former internationally and the latter primarily for the United States. In contrast, the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria provides a framework that emphasizes integration of basic behavioral and neuroscience research to deepen the understanding of mental disorder. We identify four key issues that present challenges to understanding and classifying mental disorder: etiology, including the multiple causality of mental disorder; whether the relevant phenomena are discrete categories or dimensions; thresholds, which set the boundaries between disorder and nondisorder; and comorbidity, the fact that individuals with mental illness often meet diagnostic requirements for multiple conditions. We discuss how the three systems’ approaches to these key issues correspond or diverge as a result of their different histories, purposes, and constituencies. Although the systems have varying degrees of overlap and distinguishing features, they share the goal of reducing the burden of suffering due to mental disorder.

Describing disorder: The importance and advancement of compositional explanations in psychopathology

2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110211
Author(s):  
Hannah Hawkins-Elder ◽  
Tony Ward
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Signs And Symptoms ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Classification Schemes ◽  
Research And Practice ◽  
Assessment And Treatment ◽  
Historical Accounts ◽  
Research Domain

Understanding the makeup of mental disorders has great value for both research and practice in psychopathology. The richer and more detailed our compositional explanations of mental disorder—that is, comprehensive accounts of client signs and symptoms—the more information we have to inform etiological explanations, classification schemes, clinical assessment, and treatment. However, at present, no explicit compositional explanations of psychopathology have been developed and the existing descriptive accounts that could conceivably fill this role—DSM/ICD syndromes, transdiagnostic and dimensional approaches, symptom network models, historical accounts, case narratives, and the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)—fall short in critical ways. In this article, we discuss what compositional explanations are, their role in scientific inquiry, and their importance for psychopathology research and practice. We then explain why current descriptive accounts of mental disorder fall short of providing such an explanation and demonstrate how effective compositional explanations could be constructed.

Problems of psychopathologic systematics: alternative approaches and clinical practice requests

2020 ◽  
Vol LII (2) ◽  
pp. 20-28
Author(s):  
Мikhail L. Zobin ◽  
Natalia V. Ustinova
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Reliability And Validity ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Diagnostic Categories ◽  
Clinical Instability ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Research Domain

The reliability and validity of traditional classifications give rise to justifiable criticism because of the conventionality of the boundaries between norm and pathology, fuzzy delimitation of disorders and their frequent co-occurrence, heterogeneity and clinical instability of symptoms within the diagnostic categories. There is little evidence that the majority of mental disorders are discrete entities. Discontent with the expert consensus classifications have led to attempts at a new quantitative and empirical systematization of psychopathology. Two alternative projects have been proposed: Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP). The aim of the paper is to clarify the conceptual framework of RDoC and HiTOP, discuss their advantages and disadvantages in terms of the prospects for use in clinical practice.

Systematicity in the semantics of noun compounds: The role of artifacts vs. natural kinds

Linguistics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-471
Author(s):  
Beth Levin ◽  
Lelia Glass ◽  
Dan Jurafsky
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Native Habitat ◽  
Production Experiment ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Noun Compounds ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
English Noun

Abstract The nature of the relationship between the head and modifier in English noun compounds has long posed a challenge to semantic theories. We argue that the type of head-modifier relation in an English endocentric noun-headed compound depends on how its referent is categorized: specifically, on whether the referent is conceptualized as an artifact, made by humans for a purpose; or as a natural kind, existing independently of humans. We propose the Events vs. Essences Hypothesis: the modifier in an artifact-headed compound typically refers to an event of use or creation associated with that artifact, while the modifier in a natural kind-headed compound typically makes reference to inherent properties reflective of an abstract essence associated with the kind, such as its perceptual properties or native habitat. We present three studies substantiating this hypothesis. First, in a corpus of almost 1,700 attested compounds in two conceptual domains (food/cooking and precious minerals/jewelry), we find that as predicted, compound names referring to artifacts tend to evoke events, whereas compound names referring to natural kinds tend to evoke essential properties. Next, in a production experiment involving compound creation and a comprehension experiment involving compound interpretation, we find that the same tendencies also extend to novel compounds.

Evolution and Mental Disorders

2018 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Marco Del Giudice
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Psychiatric Comorbidity ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Network Approach ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Developmental Processes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Research Domain

The chapter discusses the definition of mental disorder, reviews the biological explanations for vulnerability to disease, and presents a detailed taxonomy of undesirable conditions that may be regarded as disorders in a broad sense (whether or not they involve genuine dysfunctions). After detailing the main evolutionary and developmental processes that can lead to psychopathology, the chapter addresses some important questions about the structure and classification of disorders and the nature of psychiatric comorbidity. The chapter also considers the strengths and weaknesses of other emerging approaches: computational psychiatry, the network approach to psychopathology, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), and transdiagnostic models such as the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP).

Towards a new conceptual framework for psychopathology: Embodiment, enactivism, and embedment

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 800-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristopher Nielsen ◽  
Tony Ward
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Metaphysical Position ◽  
Research Domain

Psychopathology classification is at a conceptual crossroads. It is becoming increasingly accepted that the flaws of the DSM relate to its struggles to pick out “real” entities as opposed to clusters of symptoms. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) was formulated in response to this failure, and attempts to address the concerns confronting the DSM by shifting to a causal and continuous model of psychopathology. Noting key criticisms of neurocentricism and problems with conceptual validity leveled at the RDoC, we argue that they stem from its grounding in the metaphysical position of eliminative materialism, or at least material-reductionism. We propose that 3e cognition (viewing the mind as embodied, embedded, and enactive) offers a superior alternative to eliminative materialism. A 3e-informed framework of mental disorder is sketched out and its advantages as a basis for classifying and conceptualizing mental disorders are considered.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Approaches to Schizophrenia Diagnostics: from Kraepelin to ICD-11

10.17816/cp62 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Alexander B. Shmukler
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Psychotic Disorders ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Research Domain Criteria ◽  
Dsm 5 ◽  
Promising Area ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Research Domain

This article presents the evolution of views on schizophrenia diagnostics over the course of 150 years, beginning from the pre-Kraepelin period and ending with concepts developed in recent decades. Consideration is given to the merits and demerits of contemporary official classifications (DSM-5 and ICD-11) as well as to alternative approaches, particularly in relation to scientific research, and their prospects for development. Special attention is paid to the Research Domain Criteria Project (RDoC) of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). Another promising area discussed in this paper relates to network analysis as a method for the investigation of psychotic disorders, particularly schizophrenia.

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