The Common Sense Theory of Theory in the Enquiries, Essays and History of England

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna L. Blumenthal

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.


2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN DYDE

AbstractThis article examines the history of two fields of enquiry in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Scotland: the rise and fall of the common sense school of philosophy and phrenology as presented in the works of George Combe. Although many previous historians have construed these histories as separate, indeed sometimes incommensurate, I propose that their paths were intertwined to a greater extent than has previously been given credit. The philosophy of common sense was a response to problems raised by Enlightenment thinkers, particularly David Hume, and spurred a theory of the mind and its mode of study. In order to succeed, or even to be considered a rival of these established understandings, phrenologists adapted their arguments for the sake of engaging in philosophical dispute. I argue that this debate contributed to the relative success of these groups: phrenology as a well-known historical subject, common sense now largely forgotten. Moreover, this history seeks to question the place of phrenology within the sciences of mind in nineteenth-century Britain.


Author(s):  
Ruth Anna Putnam

The American William James was motivated to philosophize by a desire to provide a philosophical ground for moral action. Moral effort presupposes that one has free will, that the world is not already the best of all possible worlds, and, for maximum effort, according to James, the belief that there is a God who is also on the side of good. In his famous, often misunderstood paper ‘The Will to Believe’, James defended one’s right to believe in advance of the evidence when one’s belief has momentous consequences for one’s conduct and success, and a decision cannot be postponed. One such belief is the belief in objective values. Generally, a belief is objective if it meets a standard independent of the believer’s own thought. In morals, objective values emerge from each person’s subjective valuings, whatever their psychological source, when these valuings become the values of a community of persons who care for one another. Still, even in such a community there will be conflicting claims, and the obligations generated by these claims will need to be ranked and conflicts resolved. James’ solution is to say that the more inclusive claim – the claim that can be satisfied with the lesser cost of unsatisfied claims – is to be ranked higher. This is not to be mistaken for utilitarianism: James is not a hedonist, and it is not clear what he means by the most inclusive claim. A concern for others makes sense only if there are others who inhabit with us a common world. Pragmatism, which he co-founded with C.S. Peirce, and radical empiricism provide James’ answer to those who would be sceptics concerning the existence of the common-sense world. Pragmatism is both a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. As a theory of meaning it aims at clarity; our thoughts of an object are clear when we know what effects it will have and what reactions we are to prepare. As a theory of truth, pragmatism makes clear what is meant by ‘agreement’ in the common formula that a belief is true if it agrees with reality. Only in the simplest cases can we verify a belief directly – for example, we can verify that the soup is too salty by tasting it – and a belief is indirectly verified if one acts on it and that action does not lead to unanticipated consequences. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, this does not mean that James defines truth as that which is useful; rather, he points out that it is, in fact, useful to believe what is true. James rejects the dualism of common sense and of many philosophers, but he is neither a materialist nor an idealist, rather what he calls a ‘pure experience’ (for example, your seeing this page) can be taken as an event in your (mental) history or as an event in the page’s (physical) history. But there is no ‘substance’ called ‘pure experience’: there are only many different pure experiences. You and I can experience the same page, because an event in your mental history and an event in mine can be taken to be events in the same physical history of the page; James may even have been tempted to say that a pure experience can be taken to belong to more than one mental history. According to James, pragmatism mediates the so-called conflict between science and religion. James took religious experiences very seriously both from a psychologist’s perspective and as evidence for the reality of the divine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Béla Mester

Abstract The topic of the present article is the destruction of the common sense tradition linked to the urbanity of philosophy, which had deep roots both in the European and Hungarian traditions. This destruction was based on Hegelian ideas by János Erdélyi as an argument of the greatest philosophical controversy of the Hungarian philosophical life in the 1850s. In Erdélyi’s argumentation, the turn from the supposed urbanity to the supposed rurality of the common sense has a fundamental role. The idea of the rurality of the common sense has an influence on the Hungarian intellectual history of the next centuries, as well.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Adam Mesiarkin

The concept of Slavic solidarity is taken by some political or ideological movements as obviosity. In its later tradition it is based mainly on the language and cultural solidarity emphasised by romantic (and earlier) literature. The very origin of closeness of nowadays (and historical) Slavic nations is there traced to assumed bio-historical root. From the perspective of scientific analysis the examination of the whole term Slav should be done at first place. In medieval Polish and Bohemian chronicles we can observe a growing phenomenon of the identification with wider name Slav and with the common history of Slavs as well. In the Chronicle of Greater Poland, followed by chronicle of the Pulkava of Radenin and with the work of Jan Długosz was defined the model of biblical genealogy of Slavic nations. The solidarity was based mainly on the perception of similar languages and geographical closeness and was transformed in a literary way into blood relations. Reflection of this literary concept in foreing affairs is hardly to declare, but some dynastical representatives used the intelectual concept in a literary propaganda of their goals.


Author(s):  
Colwyn Trevarthen ◽  
Aline-Wendy Dunlop ◽  
Jonathan Delafield-Butt

Our contributors offer inspiring stories—from a psychology of early childhood and teaching experience that appreciates the spiritual values that young children affirm in shared enjoyment of life. We confirm that every child has motives of an affectionate learner, seeking companions for an active and imaginative life. Each boy and girl, with their individual characters and interests, wants to take part in the ‘common sense’ world of a community with its treasured moral and artistic values, sharing joy in the discovery of a natural and meaningful world. They do not just need to be taught how to use material possessions, and how to obey social and cultural rules. We seek principles for early education and care to support responsive teachers in the years before formal school begins. Scotland’s kindergarten tradition and its contemporary policies for transition to school offer a distinguished history of curriculum reformation, following the spirit of the child.


Panggung ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Willy Himawan ◽  
Setiawan Sabana

AbstrakPraktek penciptaan karya seni rupa pada dasarnya memiliki regularitas yang didasari oleh common sense (nalar wajar), dalam proses permulaan, produksi hingga apresiasinya. Dalam sejarah Seni Rupa Indonesia, persoalan itu hadir oleh karena suatu prinsip yang disebutnya sebagai prinsip modernism. Modernisasi yang terjadi di Bali melalui pengaruh orang-orang barat dan utamanya perkembangan pariwisata telah menstrukturkan Bali pada identifikasi tentang tempat yang khas dengan budaya kehidupan sehari-hari masyarakatnya, panorama alam serta suasana mistis-eksotis yang selalu menginspirasi.Penelitian ini melihat pemanfaatan identifikasi tentang Bali, melalui imaji-imaji yang terdapat dalam media sosial Instagram,pada praktek penciptaan karya seni rupa dengan menggunakan nalar wajar yang ditawarkan oleh metodologi visual.Pemanfaatan imaji-imaji tentang Bali yang terdapat pada Instagram telah menggeser situs produksi yang akan menimbulkan makna-makna baru, namun tidak menghilangkan makna-makna dan konteks yang sebelumnya melekat padanya.Kata kunci: bali, identitas, imaji, praktek penciptaan, metodologi visualAbstractThe led-practice of art basically have a regularity that is based on the common sense, on the beginning of the process, the production and its appreciation. In the history of Indonesian Arts, this issue is present because of the principle of modernism. Modernization is happening in Bali through the influence of the western and main tourism development that structured Bali on the identification on the images of distinctive culture with unique daily life, natural scenery and mystical-exotic atmosphere that always inspire.This research looked at the use of the identification of Bali, through the images contained in Instagram, the led-practice sensed by visual methodology. The Application of images of Bali contained in Instagram has shifted production sites which will give inflict to new meanings, but it does not eliminate the meanings and contexts that were previously attached to it.Keywords: bali, identity, images, led-practice, visual methodology 


2020 ◽  
pp. 193-242
Author(s):  
Nisha P R

Circus has always figured in the common sense as a place of extreme exploitation with dangerous working conditions, wretched living conditions, miserable wages, irregular working hours, physical and mental harassments, and insecure employment and life. But, strangely, if we look at the history of trade unions in India we would hardly find a circus workers’ union. This chapter talks about the Akhil Bharat Circus Karmachari Sangh organized under the Communist Party in late 1960s, which succeeded to an extent to establish a workers’ circus—owned, worked, and managed by the workers. The chapter also discusses the emergence of the only existing circus workers’ union in India now, the Indian Circus Employees Union, under the tutelage of Indian National Congress.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Gellera

In the nineteenth century James McCosh and many others identified the Common Sense school with “Scottish philosophy” tout court: the supposedly collective “Scottish” reply to Hume was the rejection of skepticism and Ideal Theory. This chapter addresses the anticipations of the Common Sense school and its broader place in the history of Scottish philosophy. The seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers reacted to Cartesian skepticism with epistemological views which anticipate Thomas Reid: direct realism and perception as a faculty of judgment. Common sense-like views seem to have been a popular strategy against skepticism already before the Common Sense school, thus providing additional evidence for McCosh’s claim of the special role of common sense in the history of Scottish philosophy.


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