Public Policy Making and Interest Groups Politics in the U.S: An Analysis of IRCA

2001 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang-Soo Choe
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Traditional Group ◽  
American Society ◽  
The U.S

Several theories have been introduced to explain American politics along the historical development of American society. It has been told that any one theory tends to prevail in explaining American politics at any given period. Is it possible then to describe the structure of American politics by any one theory? Which theory or theoretical perspective is valid to understand the U.S. policy making system in 1980s? The purpose of this paper is to show that American politics in any given period cannot be explained by any one prevalent theoretical framework. Despite the arguments between interest group stasis and “countervailing forces,” (McFarland 1992) some policy area can still be explained only by the traditional group theory framework. The Imigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 is a case in point. In the following, theoretical frameworks concerning policy formation will be presented first. Second, the process of IRCA formation will be briefly reviewed with special reference to the role of interest groups. Finally, by summarizing the gain and loss of each interest group, the characteristics of IRCA formation will be suggested.

5. Steam and Iron

2018 ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Politics And Government ◽  
American Society ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Union Victory

From 1850, the issue of slavery’s future affected nearly every aspect of American politics and government. That same decade also witnessed a virtual technological revolution that affected large segments of American society and also transformed the tools of war. ‘Steam and iron: the Civil War navy (1850–1865)’ describes the introduction of new technology at sea during the Civil War, including steam propulsion, iron armor, and exploding shells fired from ever-larger naval guns, many of them rifled, which dramatically increased both range and accuracy. There was also significant enlargement of the Union navy both in ships and the enlisted force, which allowed the U.S. Navy to play an essential role in Union victory.

scholarly journals Uncovering interest group participation in Germany: web collection of written statements in ministries and the parliament

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Rasch ◽  
Florian Spohr ◽  
Rainer Eising ◽  
Simon Ress
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Web Pages ◽  
Group Participation ◽  
Collection Process ◽  
Data Source ◽  
German Parliament

Abstract This article discusses web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source. Written statements allow the identification of actors active in policy-making as well as those actors’ positions, lobbying coalitions and issue saliency. These data also can contribute to the measurement of interest groups’ influence on legislation. Taking web collection from the German parliament’s and ministries’ web pages as an example, we demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data. Our analysis of statements submitted by interest groups, private firms and policy experts to four federal ministries and the respective parliamentary committees in the years 2015 and 2016 reveals differences between parliamentary and ministerial consultations. Although ministries have invited written statements for fewer draft laws than parliamentary committees, they received far more statements from interest groups. The reason is that German ministries often issue open calls, in which all actors are given the opportunity to comment on legislation, whereas the German parliament invites selected interest group representatives and other experts. As a further result, ministries are mostly contacted by business groups, whereas parliamentary committees use their gatekeeper function to balance interests.

17. Organized Interests

2020 ◽  
pp. 316-332
Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Central Component ◽  
European Level ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
The Eu

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union (EU) institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest group access to the EU institutions.

Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages

1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart ◽  
Markus M. L. Crepaz
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Consensus Democracy ◽  
Interest Representation

This research Note has two complementary theoretical objectives. First, we shall attempt to place the form of interest representation and the involvement of interest groups in policy formation known as corporatism – or as democratic, societal, liberal or neo-corporatism – in a broader political context: is corporatism systematically linked with other democratic institutions and processes? Secondly, we shall try to fill a gap in the theory of consensus democracy. This theory holds that types of party, electoral, executive and legislative systems occur in distinct clusters, but it fails to link interest group systems to these clusters.

scholarly journals The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Interest Group Strategies

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Group Status ◽  
Privileged Status ◽  
Consultative Process ◽  
Interest Group Strategies ◽  
Group Term

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.

scholarly journals Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Bennedsen ◽  
Sven E. Feldmann
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
Willingness To Change ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
The U.S

This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems—the vote of confidence procedure—reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.

The interest group analogy: international non-governmental advocacy organisations in international politics

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELIZABETH A. BLOODGOOD
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Common Good ◽  
American Politics ◽  
New Approach ◽  
American Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact

AbstractWhat can models of interest group behaviour from American politics tell us about the existence, activities, and influence of international non-governmental advocacy organisations (advocacy INGOs) in International Relations? In this article I detail an analogy between traditional American interest groups and advocacy INGOs in order to suggest a new approach to theorising INGOs. American politics theories of interest groups provide insights to questions which International Relations has been unable to answer satisfactorily, including where INGOs are likely to be found; how INGOs will grow in the future; the organisational structure of INGOs; the impact of competing groups on the quality and content of foreign policy and international agreements; and the roles of INGOs in different stages of the policy process. Viewing INGOs as interest groups provides a curative to the tendency to view them as self-sacrificing knights in shining armour. Competing INGOs representing narrow interests can nevertheless contribute to the common good in the form of effective, efficient policy.

17. Organized Interests

2014 ◽  
pp. 308-326
Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Central Component ◽  
European Level ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
The Eu

This chapter focuses on the so-called organized interests, whose interaction with the formal European Union institutions is a central component of the EU’s decision-making process. The term ‘interest group’ refers to a range of organizations outside of the formal institutions that seek to influence decision making. They provide a link between state actors and the rest of society, also known as ‘civil society’. The chapter first considers the general growth of interest-group activity at the European level before discussing the types of group that try to influence EU policy making and the forms of representation open to interests. It then explores the strategies and tactics that interest groups use to try to influence the different institutions. Finally, it analyses the issue of regulating interest-group access to the EU institutions.

Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics. By Kevin W. Hula. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 208p. $55.00 cloth, $23.95 paper.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 475-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Ainsworth
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Washington Dc ◽  
Iron Triangle ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Georgetown University

Many political scientists like institutions, in particular exog- enous institutions, which guide and constrain actions and allow scholars to concentrate more narrowly on behaviors within well-defined settings. For the interest groups subfield, institutions tend to be more mercurial than those in other areas of American politics. For instance, fundamental aspects of Congress may be institutionalized, but groups and lobby- ists come and go. The environment of interests is ever changing. Characterizing the interactions between legislators and lobbyists is made more difficult because of the lack of clear institutional structures that guide or constrain behav- iors. The iron triangle concept was powerful and meaningful because it provided at the least a loose framework for the analysis of legislator-lobbyist interactions. Kevin Hula's new book follows the reasoning of Hugh Heclo and William Browne, who argue that the iron triangle concept is outdated and inappropriate. That convenient metaphor suggested an informal institutional structure that is simply no longer appropriate. Without the iron triangle, what can fill the void?

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