scholarly journals Modelling collective action to change social norms around domestic violence: social dilemmas and the role of altruism

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Gram ◽  
Rolando Granados ◽  
Eva M. Krockow ◽  
Nayreen Daruwalla ◽  
David Osrin
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Violence ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Taking Action

AbstractInterventions promoting collective action have been used to prevent domestic violence in a range of settings, but their mechanisms of operation remain unclear. We formalise and combine feminist theoretical approaches to domestic violence into a game-theoretic model of women’s collective action to change gendered social norms and outcomes. We show that social norms create a social dilemma in which it is individually rational for women to abstain from action to prevent domestic violence among neighbours, but all women suffer negative consequences if none take action. Promoting altruism among women can overcome the social dilemma. Discouraging women from tolerating domestic violence, imposing additional external punishment on men for perpetrating violence, or lowering costs to women of taking action against violence may not work or even backfire. We invite researchers on community mobilisation to use our framework to frame their understandings of collective action to prevent domestic violence.

Strategic priority-purchasing and joining rules in a retrial queue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Customer Welfare

Abstract This paper considers a retrial queueing system with a pay-for-priority option. A queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among the customers, the service provider (SP) and the social planner is developed. We obtain the equilibrium strategy of customers for any fixed priority premium and identify the unique Pareto-dominant strategy. The optimal pricing strategies for the SP and the social planner are derived and compared extensively. Interestingly, we find that the equilibrium outcome of customers is non-monotone in the service reward and the profit of the SP is bimodal in the priority premium. We reveal the fact that the SP’s optimization makes the system more congested than what is socially desirable. Finally, numerical examples indicate that the customer welfare can be improved by providing priorities when the market size is large.

DIRECT RECIPROCITY-BASED COOPERATION IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 501-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCIN SEREDYNSKI ◽  
PASCAL BOUVRY
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc ◽  
Hoc Networks

A distributed nature of a wireless mobile ad hoc network, lack of a single authority, and limited battery resources of participating devices may lead its users to be reluctant to packet relaying duties. This paper investigates potential networking conditions that could lead to a direct reciprocity-based cooperation on packet relaying. Simulation of behaviour of the network is carried out using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach. A game-based model of nodes' interactions coupled with a genetic algorithm is used to find successful relaying strategies for various networking conditions. Computational experiments demonstrate that the reciprocity-based packet relaying is an efficient way to overcome the social dilemma present in such a network. However, in the presence of a large number of unconditionally cooperatives nodes a selfish permanent defection strategy is more efficient than a reciprocal tit-for-tat strategy. Nevertheless the switch from cooperative to selfish behaviour among some users does not change significantly the overall performance of the network as the negative consequences of the switch are compensated by the generous packet relaying contribution of unconditionally cooperative nodes.

Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1042-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

The (In)visible Body: Feminism, Phenomenology, and the Case of Cosmetic Surgery

Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luna Dolezal
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Constructionism ◽  
Cosmetic Surgery ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The Social ◽  
Visible Body

This paper will examine the experience of and drive for bodily invisibility in women through the theoretical approaches of phenomenology and social constructionism. An examination of the social disruptions of bodily invisibility and the compulsive avoidance of such instances, particularly with respect to the fastidious maintenance of body comportment and appearance within the narrow parameters afforded by social norms, will lead to an exploration of the conflation of biomedicine with the beauty industry.

scholarly journals Identity and reputation in organizational collectives

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Peter William Hofherr
Keyword(s):  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Geographic Region ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
The Social ◽  
Confirmatory Factor ◽  
Identity Based

This research explores the attributes of the identity-based mechanisms of group collective action. Recognizing that wine trails are organizational collectives that market themselves and the region in which they reside, the research tests for the presence of identity-based attributes that reflect the social, institutional, cultural and physical aspects of the region. Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, this research finds that the content of both external and internal stakeholders’ expectations and perceptions used in the reputational comparative process includes attributes of institutional, place-based, cultural, and social norms. This confirms that the specific content of stakeholders’ expectations and perceptions are developed in part from institutional norms, social categories, and structural roles associated with the wine trail organization and the geographic region in which they reside.

Information Transparency Hypothesis

2011 ◽  
pp. 15-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Electronic Markets ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Electronic Market ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
The Social ◽  
B2b Exchanges ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Business To Business

This chapter explores the private and social desirability of information transparency of a business-to-business (B2B) electronic market that provides an online platform for information transmission. The abundance of transaction data available on the Internet tends to make information more transparent in B2B electronic markets. In such a transparent environment, it becomes easier for firms to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals’ costs than in a traditional, opaque market. How then does this benefit firms participating in the B2B exchanges? To what extent does information transparency affect consumers and the social welfare in a broader sense? Focusing on the informational effects, this study explores firms’ incentives to join a B2B exchange by developing a game-theoretic model under asymmetric information. We then examine its effect on expected profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Our results challenge the “information transparency hypothesis” (that is, open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms). In contrast to the popular belief, we show that information transparency could be a double-edged sword. Although its overall effect on social welfare is positive, its private desirability is deeply divided between producers and consumers, and even among producers themselves.

Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: Differences in Dominance Relationships in Isolated Versus Socially Embedded Pairs of Fish

Behaviour ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 140 (10) ◽  
pp. 1193-1217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Murch ◽  
Craig Tovey ◽  
Ivan Chase
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Cichlid Fish ◽  
Dominance Behavior ◽  
Dyadic Interactions ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Dominance Relationships ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Over Time

AbstractWe performed experiments with cichlid fish to test whether several basic aspects of dominance were the same in isolated pairs as in pairs within a social group of three or four. We found that the social context, whether a pair was isolated or within a group, strongly affected the basic properties of dominance relationships. In particular, the stability of relationships over time, the replication of relationships in successive meetings, and the extent of the loser effect were all significantly less in socially embedded pairs than in isolated pairs. We found no significant winner effect in either isolated or socially embedded pairs. These findings call into question many current approaches to dominance that do not consider social context as an important factor in dominance behavior. These findings also cast serious doubt on the validity of empirical and theoretical approaches based on dyadic interactions. Among these approaches are game theoretic models for the evolution of aggressive behavior, experimental designs evaluating how asymmetries in attributes influence the outcome of dominance

scholarly journals Disobedient Markets: Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (11) ◽  
pp. 1524-1555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Calla Hummel
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
La Paz ◽  
Street Vendors ◽  
Informal Workers ◽  
Global Workforce ◽  
Poor Group ◽  
Game Theoretic

At 50% of the global workforce, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse, and resource-poor group with high barriers to collective action. Contrary to scholars’ expectations, informal workers organize to varying degrees in most countries, and states often encourage them to do so. Why do some informal workers organize while others do not? I argue that states can intervene in informal workers’ collective action decisions: As enforcement costs increase, states may pay informal workers to organize, and then bargain with the resulting organization over self-regulation. I present a game theoretic model of state intervention in collective action and illustrate it with original ethnographic, survey, and interview evidence from street markets in La Paz, Bolivia. I suggest that informal workers interact strategically with states and conclude with implications for formalization policies.

Group Size and Collective Action

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARUN AGRAWAL ◽  
SANJEEV GOYAL
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Distinctive Aspect ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Large Groups

This article examines the hypothesis that group size is inversely related to successful collective action. A distinctive aspect of the article is that it combines the analysis of primary data collected by the authors with a game-theoretic model. The model considers a group of people protecting a commonly owned resource from excessive exploitation. The authors view monitoring of individual actions as a collective good and focus on third-party monitoring. We argue that the costs of monitoring rise more than proportionately as group size increases. This factor along with lumpiness in the monitoring technology yields the following theoretical conclusion: Medium-sized groups are more likely than small or large groups to provide third-party monitoring. The authors find that the empirical evidence is consistent with this theoretical result.

Advertising in a social network as a signal of quality

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Kamilla Timerbulatova
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Advertising in a social network has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers who act as “opinion leaders” in the social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about posting advertising messages on their blogs, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. The paper investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a reliable signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.

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