Could a Feminist and a Game Theorist Co-Parent?

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Wendling ◽  
Paul Viminitz

Game theorists assume that rational defensibility is a necessary condition for moral, social, or political justification. By itself, this is a fairly uncontroversial claim; most moral or political philosophers would agree. And yet game theorists tend to be advocates of the free market. External critics of game theory usually claim this is because game theorists assume that individuals are atomistic and self-interested. Game theorists themselves deny this, however, for what strike us as good reasons. In principle, game theory has no necessary ties to right-wing distribution schemes. Why, then, is game theory almost exclusively the province of conservative philosophers, political scientists, and economists? The problem, we believe, lies in the theory of rational choice standardly employed by game theory. Even if we accept, for the purposes of argument, game theory's account of the justification of moral dispositions — that a disposition is morally justified if and only if, in its absence, it would be game theoretically rational to acquire it — we need not be led to right-wing solutions. If we expand the kinds of choices facing individuals to include choices about what we will call ‘institutional roles,’ then we can explain the game theoretic rationality of the kinds of emotions and behavior exemplified by duty, loyalty, and love.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pete C Trimmer ◽  
Brendan J Barrett ◽  
Richard McElreath ◽  
Andrew Sih

AbstractHuman-induced rapid environmental change (HIREC) has recently led to alterations in the fitness and behavior of many organisms. Game theory is an important tool of behavioral ecology for analyzing evolutionary situations involving multiple individuals. However, game theory bypasses the details by which behavioral phenotypes are determined, taking the functional perspective straight from expected payoffs to predicted frequencies of behaviors. In contrast with optimization approaches, we identify that to use existing game theoretic models to predict HIREC effects, additional mechanistic details (or assumptions) will often be required. We illustrate this in relation to the hawk-dove game by showing that three different mechanisms, each of which support the same ESS prior to HIREC (fixed polymorphism, probabilistic choice, or cue dependency), can have a substantial effect on behavior (and success) following HIREC. Surprisingly, an increase in the value of resources can lead to a reduction in payoffs (and vice versa), both in the immediate- and long-term following HIREC. An increase in expected costs also increases expected payoffs. Along with these counter-intuitive findings, this work shows that simply understanding the behavioral payoffs of existing games is insufficient to make predictions about the effects of HIREC.It’s the little details that are vital. Little things make big things happen.John Wooden


Author(s):  
Michael Suk-Young Chwe

This chapter explains game theory from the ground up. It first considers the concepts of choice and preferences before discussing strategic thinking as a combination of several skills. Game theory is built upon rational choice theory, and the chapter uses an example from Jane Austen's Mansfield Park to illustrate first rational choice theory and then game theory. To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, it uses a simple game-theoretic model to show how Beatrice and Benedick in William Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, Richard and Harrison in Richard Wright's Black Boy, and people revolting against an oppressive regime all face the same situation. Finally, it reviews previous work trying to bring game theory, as well as related concepts such as “theory of mind,” together with the study of literature.


CounterText ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Rooney

The initial part of Caroline Rooney's essay offers an incisive account of the author's experience of Cairo in the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings that led to the end of Hosni Mubarak's rule. Rooney's narrative evinces an active Downtown cosmopolitan spirit characterised by a burgeoning sense of ‘audacity’ in forms of arts activism, and its attendant collective spirit of perseverance that increasingly rendered ineffective the repressive manoeuvres of Egypt's disciplinary State. Criticising the impulse to construe the Egyptian revolution in terms of a mimetic desire for a secular democracy on Western lines, Rooney insists that the Arab uprisings consisted, in many respects, of a revolution against Western-style free market neoliberalism. Countering the perpetual cynicism attendant to the latter, Rooney argues, requires a form of politicisation that maintains ‘the ongoing presence of the real as a matter of collective spirit’ – one that can outlast the colonial interlude by resisting the absolutist self-assertion of market fundamentalism and its collusions with ‘diplo-economic cosmopolitanism’ as a mode of class-discriminatory privilege, as well as the compromising nature of right-wing Islam. Rooney moves on to locate a counter-movement based on an alternative form of consciousness that manifests itself ‘as solidarity, as resoluteness, as genuine comradeship, as collective consciousness, as revolutionary faith and [as] festiveness.’ In the last part of her essay, Rooney raises the intriguing case of Sufism, and specifically its mulid rituals and its important role in the Egyptian revolutionary effort, as a relational cultural mode that can survive the will-to-dominance as a persistent and liberatory collective gesture.


Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


Author(s):  
Ayan Sinha ◽  
Farrokh Mistree ◽  
Janet K. Allen

The effectiveness of the use of game theory in addressing multi-objective design problems has been illustrated. For the most part, researchers have focused on design problems at single level. In this paper, we illustrate the efficacy of using game theoretic protocols to model the relationship between multidisciplinary engineering teams and facilitate decision making at multiple levels. We will illustrate the protocols in the context of an underwater vehicle with three levels that span material and geometric modeling associated with microstructure mediated design of the material and vehicle.


Author(s):  
Dario Tuorto

The transformation of politics in contemporary democracies has led to the emergence of a new ideological conflict, alongside the traditional left-right scheme, described as liberal–authoritarian or cosmopolitan–nationalist cleavage (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Kriesi 2008; 2012; Hooge and Marks 2009; 2018). This brought to a redefinition of the linkages between issue and voting preferences, as many voters decide to support a party independently of their positions or change positions on the issues while voting for the same party. Within such framework, the contribute of the new generations to the growth of the electoral dealignment and volatility has been largely analysed (Franklin 2004; Miller and Shanks 1996; Plutzer 2006). Issue incongruency is part of the process. Young people are often considered to be tolerant and inclusive because they grew up under prosperous and secure conditions and developed post-materialist values of freedom, multiculturalism, progressivism (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Janmaat and Keating 2019). However, the perspective of left-cosmopolitans engaged in electoral politics contrasts with the image of economically-insecure left-behind group of young people who don’t share the same progressive values (Sloam and Henn 2017; Sanders and Twyman 2016) and support right-wing political parties. What is still unknown is the extent to which extreme ideological traits and attitudes (e.g. negative discourses on immigration) combine with positions of openness on individual freedom. Likewise, the same contradiction can be found among left-wing voters who assume liberal position on economy or those economically left and culturally conservative. The article aims at analysing the relationship between issue positions and vote (propensity to vote). We test the hypotheses of a coherent vs incoherent ideological space by looking at the structure of voters’ preferences on economic (State vs. free market) and cultural issues (individual rights, attitudes towards minorities, European integration) and the differences between young people and older component of the electorate. The analysis is focused on the Italian case. Data are taken from the 2020 Itanes survey.


Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.


Recently, game-theoretic models have become famous in many academic research areas. Therefore, many applications and extensions of the original game theoretic approach appear in many of the major science fields. Despite all the technical problems, the history of game theory suggests that it would be premature to abandon the tool, especially in the absence of a viable alternative. If anything, the development of game theory has been driven precisely by the realization of its limitations and attempts to overcome them. This chapter explores these ideas.


Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 204-218
Author(s):  
Chih-Yu Wang ◽  
Hung-Yu Wei ◽  
Mehdi Bennis ◽  
Athanasios V. Vasilakos

Improving capacity and coverage is one of the main issues in next-generation wireless communication. Heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which is currently investigated in LTE-Advanced standard, is a promising solution to enhance capacity and eliminate coverage holes in a cost-efficient manner. A HetNet is composed of existing macrocells and various types of small cells. By deploying small cells into the existing network, operators enhance the users' quality of service which are suffering from severe signal degradation at cell edges or coverage holes. Nevertheless, there are numerous challenges in integrating small cells into the existing cellular network due to the characteristics: unplanned deployment, intercell interference, economic potential, etc. Recently, game theory has been shown to be a powerful tool for investigating the challenges in HetNets. Several game-theoretic approaches have been proposed to model the distributed deployment and self-organization feature of HetNets. In this chapter, the authors first give an overview of the challenges in HetNets. Subsequently, the authors illustrate how game theory can be applied to solve issues related to HetNets.


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