Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Crook ◽  
Carl Gillett

Materialist metaphysicians want to side with physics, but not to take sides within physics.If we took literally the claim of a materialist that his position is simply belief in the claim that all is matter, as currently conceived, we would be faced with an insoluble mystery. For how would such a materialist know how to retrench when his favorite scientific hypotheses fail? How did the 18th century materialist know that gravity, or forces in general, were material? How did they know in the 19th century that the electromagnetic field was material, and persisted in this conviction after the aether had been sent packing?The doctrine of physicalism casts a long shadow in contemporary philosophy, configuring all kinds of philosophical issues and projects. Unsurprisingly, its proponents argue that physicalism has all the obvious features necessary for a scientific hypothesis to be in what we will call ‘good standing,’ i.e. being worthy of serious scientific investigation. In fact, many claim much more, arguing that physicalism is a well-confirmed hypothesis and possibly amongst the best of our theories. But, as our second opening passage makes clear, a persistent worry has been that physicalism, or ‘materialism’ as van Fraassen terms it, is an edifice built on sand. For many philosophers question whether the ‘physical’ can be specified at all, or at least in a manner that will produce a physicalism that would be in good standing.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 228-233
Author(s):  
Soyib Raupov ◽  

Background. In the following article, the concept of makhalla, its essence, functions, the responsibilities and the duties of the elderman of the makhalla are studied from the viewpoint of historical trends. Also, there is a discourse on the types of the makhalla, the makhallas which are adjacent to the cities and their suburbs, their peculiarities, the makhallas which are based on different professions and different ethnicities, including the makhallas of the Jews, the makhallas in the steppes and desert areas, the peculiarities of their management is analysed. Materials and methods. There is a scientific hypothesis that makhallas emerged long before the state. But this hypothesis is still waiting for its researchers who need scientific investigation and study. Sources found in Sopollitepa indicate that the place where 8 families stay is the makhalla. The eight families at this residence include more than a hundred couples of families, built according to the patriarchal order. Results and Discussions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 670-686
Author(s):  
Rory O’Connell

AbstractElizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that to do this, we must appreciate the role of know-how or skill in practical knowledge.


Author(s):  
Bernhard Schlink

The interpretations of legal norms, which are abstract and general, are also abstract and general. Legal norms are if-then-sentences—if this factual constellation occurs, then these are the legal consequences—and their interpretations aim to cover all cases that are similar enough to fall under the if-clause and all variations that the legal consequences can take on. These normative if-then sentences have something important in common with the factual if-then sentences of empirical science. Both claim relevance for an infinite number of instances, an infinite universe of discourse. Therefore, both can never be verified, only falsified. This also means that there can be no rules that have only to be followed to discover the right legal interpretation or scientific hypothesis. In the context of discovery, anything goes, so long as it is imaginative and creative. Rules come into play in the context of justification; they demand that legal interpretations and scientific hypotheses are justified by demonstrating that all ways to falsify them have been tried and tested without resulting in a falsification. Scientific hypotheses are falsified by consensus about how to understand reality. Legal interpretations are also falsified by consensus: about what the text of the norm says, about what the legislature intended, and about the consequences of a legal interpretation being compatible or incompatible with the rest of the legal system. Since legal interpretations are and can only be hypotheses, there is no one right interpretation, and the quest for it goes astray.


Author(s):  
Bradley E. Alger

Chapter 10 reviews the writings of three prominent scientists who reject the hypothesis as the basis for scientific thinking and research. Stuart Firestein is virulently anti-hypothesis and champions Curiosity-Driven science, a free-form mode which is deliberately unstructured. David Glass’s program of Questioning and Model-Building is rigidly structured and inductivist in spirit; he rejects the hypothesis in favor of “models” that he distinguishes from hypotheses. Both Firestein and Glass accept the empiricist standard for assessing scientific truth and believe that a scientific investigation proceeds on the basis of asking testable questions. David Deutsch is a theoretical physicist whose advanced ideas are, in principle, empirically untestable and, since empirical testability is the key to scientific hypothesis testing, he also rejects the hypothesis. His program is called Conjectures and Criticism. Unlike the other two critics, Deutsch is sympathetic to the scientific thinking process that Karl Popper advanced, but feels that Popper’s program must be superseded for science to get beyond the constraints of empiricism. The chapter shows that the supposed incompatibilities of each of the alternative approaches with the hypothesis are largely based on misrepresentations or misapplications of the nature of hypothesis-based science. The counterproposals are not grounds for rejecting the hypothesis, which can in fact coexist comfortably with them.


Dementia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (8) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian J Crutch ◽  
Keir XX Yong ◽  
Amy Peters ◽  
Dilek Ocal ◽  
Diego Kaski ◽  
...  

The current report describes the journey from the sharing of a single, extraordinary experience during a support group conversation to the development of a novel scientific investigation of balance problems in a rarer form of dementia. The story centres around the involvement of people living with or caring for someone with posterior cortical atrophy (often referred to as the visual variant of Alzheimer’s disease) in highlighting hitherto under-appreciated consequences of their condition upon their ability to know ‘Am I the right way up?’. We describe how comments and descriptions of these balance symptoms were collated and communicated, and the involvement of people with posterior cortical atrophy in shaping a series of scientific hypotheses and developing and adapting appropriate experimental materials and procedures. We also reflect more broadly on how we might better recognise, acknowledge and encourage different forms of involvement, and describe several engagement-inspired extensions to the research involving people living with dementia, scientists and artists.


1985 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 728-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Wikander

Dunbar (M. J. Dunbar. 1980. Can. J. Zool. 58: 123–128) argues that both the principle of parsimony and testability of scientific hypotheses are unnecessary and even on occasion undesirable features of scientific investigation. These conclusions are based on examination of selected events in the history of science, major innovations, or discoveries which Dunbar argues might never have happened had the investigators responsible for them been constrained by considerations of parsimony and testability. It is argued here that (1) Dunbar has confused the initial conception of an idea or a hypothesis with the problem of choosing between available competing hypotheses: the latter is a problem proper to the logical analysis of scientific procedure, and presupposes hypotheses to begin with, whereas the former is a problem for the psychology of science; and (2) Dunbar has misunderstood the meaning of the term "testability," and has confused it with the meaning of the phrase "testable at time tn."


Author(s):  
G.D. Danilatos

The advent of the environmental SEM (ESEM) has made possible the examination of uncoated and untreated specimen surfaces in the presence of a gaseous or liquid environment. However, the question arises as to what degree the examined surface remains unaffected by the action of the electron beam. It is reasonable to assume that the beam invariably affects all specimens but the type and degree of effect may be totally unimportant for one class of applications and totally unacceptable for another; yet, for a third class, it is imperative to know how our observations are modified by the presence of the beam. The aim of this report is to create an awareness of the need to initiate research work in various fields in order to determine the guiding rules of the limitations (or even advantages) due to irradiation.


Author(s):  
G.F. Bastin ◽  
H.J.M. Heijligers ◽  
J.M. Dijkstra

For the calculation of X-ray intensities emitted by elements present in multi-layer systems it is vital to have an accurate knowledge of the x-ray ionization vs. mass-depth (ϕ(ρz)) curves as a function of accelerating voltage and atomic number of films and substrate. Once this knowledge is available the way is open to the analysis of thin films in which both the thicknesses as well as the compositions can usually be determined simultaneously.Our bulk matrix correction “PROZA” with its proven excellent performance for a wide variety of applications (e.g., ultra-light element analysis, extremes in accelerating voltage) has been used as the basis for the development of the software package discussed here. The PROZA program is based on our own modifications of the surface-centred Gaussian ϕ(ρz) model, originally introduced by Packwood and Brown. For its extension towards thin film applications it is required to know how the 4 Gaussian parameters α, β, γ and ϕ(o) for each element in each of the films are affected by the film thickness and the presence of other layers and the substrate.


ASHA Leader ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Know How ◽  

How to use your local know-how to get the media to pay attention.


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