Theory Change, Structural Realism, and the RelativisedA Priori

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan McArthur
Keyword(s):  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism

scholarly journals Explicating structural realism in the framework of the structuralist metatheory

Perspectivas ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-166
Author(s):  
Thomas Meier
Keyword(s):  
Change Theory ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Radical Theory ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Structural Content ◽  
Structural Continuity

A form of structural realism affirms that, when our theories change, what is always retained is their structural content and that there is structural continuity between our theories, even through radical theory change. I first introduce and discuss structural realism, with a focus on structural realism and change theory. Then, I will consider some critiques on structural realism. In order to address them, I introduce the framework of the so-called structuralist metatheory and allude to the notion of reduction, arguing that this notion provides the formal elucidation of the notion structural continuity. This aims to get a precise notion of continuity of structure, which is central to structural realism and to the understanding of theory change. In this sense, I propose a new way of formulating structural realism in an appropriate formal framework, namely, the framework of structuralist metatheory.

Discovery, theory change and structural realism

Synthese ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 179 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel James McArthur
Keyword(s):  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism

scholarly journals Structural realism - the search for a bearer of reality

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-624
Author(s):  
Milutin Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists? focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions - the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist?s strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) - in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of a Philosophical Death Foretold

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (124) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Rivadulla
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
Structure Retention

Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name structural realism. Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was dead. I claim that Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed.

Ontic Structuralism and Fundamentality

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-86
Author(s):  
Matteo Morganti
Keyword(s):  
Historical Development ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
Detailed Assessment ◽  
Analytic Metaphysics

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the view that (i) in spite of the discontinuities that characterise the historical development of science, we can be realist about something, i.e., the concrete counterpart of certain theoretical structures that remain preserved across theory-change; and (ii) such structure is all there is in the actual world, at least at the fundamental level. It is thus a thesis about the fundamental—one whereby relations, not objects, are the basic building blocks of reality. However, there are in fact several dimensions to the structuralism-fundamentality link, and many alternative ways of cashing out the idea that reality is fundamentally structural. Arguably, these require a more systematic and detailed assessment than acknowledged in the literature so far. The chapter provides such an assessment based on considerations coming from both physics and analytic metaphysics, and concludes by pointing to a hitherto quite neglected theoretical option.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

scholarly journals The Bundle Theory Approach to Relational Quantum Mechanics

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Relational Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Essential Idea ◽  
Mereological Fusion ◽  
Metaphysical Interpretation ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

AbstractThe present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.

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