Explicating structural realism in the framework of the structuralist metatheory

A form of structural realism affirms that, when our theories change, what is always retained is their structural content and that there is structural continuity between our theories, even through radical theory change. I first introduce and discuss structural realism, with a focus on structural realism and change theory. Then, I will consider some critiques on structural realism. In order to address them, I introduce the framework of the so-called structuralist metatheory and allude to the notion of reduction, arguing that this notion provides the formal elucidation of the notion structural continuity. This aims to get a precise notion of continuity of structure, which is central to structural realism and to the understanding of theory change. In this sense, I propose a new way of formulating structural realism in an appropriate formal framework, namely, the framework of structuralist metatheory.

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Theory Change, Structural Realism, and the RelativisedA Priori

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1080/02698590802280860 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 5-20 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Dan McArthur

Keyword(s):

Theory Change ◽

Structural Realism

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Structural Realism and Category Mistakes

10.1093/oso/9780198748991.003.0018 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Elaine Landry

Keyword(s):

Category Theory ◽

Physical Theory ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Conceptual Tool ◽

The Third ◽

Meta Level ◽

Formal Framework ◽

Fundamental Physical ◽

Use Category ◽

Category Mistakes

Structural realists have made use of category theory in three ways. The first is as a meta-level formal framework for a structural realist account of the structure of scientific theories, either syntactic or semantic. The second is an appeal to the category-theoretic structure of some successful, successive or fundamental, physical theory to argue that this is the structure we should be physically committed to, either epistemically or ontically. The third is to use category theory as a conceptual tool to argue that it makes conceptual sense to talk of relations without relata and structures without objects. After a brief overview of structural realism, I consider how each appeal to the use of category theory stands up against the aims of the structural realist.

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Meaning Change, Theory Change, and Analyticity

Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change ◽

10.1017/cbo9780511527319.008 ◽

2003 ◽

pp. 150-174

Keyword(s):

Change Theory ◽

Theory Change ◽

Meaning Change

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Discovery, theory change and structural realism

Synthese ◽

10.1007/s11229-009-9672-z ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 179 (3) ◽

pp. 361-376 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Daniel James McArthur

Keyword(s):

Theory Change ◽

Structural Realism

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Structural realism - the search for a bearer of reality

Filozofija i drustvo ◽

10.2298/fid1603616s ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 27 (3) ◽

pp. 610-624

Author(s):

Milutin Stojanovic

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Scientific Theory ◽

Theory Change ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Physical Structure ◽

Scientific Revolutions ◽

Relationship Of ◽

The Relationship

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists? focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions - the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist?s strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) - in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

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Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of a Philosophical Death Foretold

Crítica Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía ◽

10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.890 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 42 (124) ◽

Author(s):

Andrés Rivadulla

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Theory Change ◽

Structural Realism ◽

The World ◽

Structure Retention

Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name structural realism. Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was dead. I claim that Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed.

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Ontic Structuralism and Fundamentality

The Foundation of Reality ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198831501.003.0004 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 69-86

Author(s):

Matteo Morganti

Keyword(s):

Historical Development ◽

Actual World ◽

Theory Change ◽

Structural Realism ◽

Building Blocks ◽

Ontic Structural Realism ◽

Fundamental Level ◽

Detailed Assessment ◽

Analytic Metaphysics

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the view that (i) in spite of the discontinuities that characterise the historical development of science, we can be realist about something, i.e., the concrete counterpart of certain theoretical structures that remain preserved across theory-change; and (ii) such structure is all there is in the actual world, at least at the fundamental level. It is thus a thesis about the fundamental—one whereby relations, not objects, are the basic building blocks of reality. However, there are in fact several dimensions to the structuralism-fundamentality link, and many alternative ways of cashing out the idea that reality is fundamentally structural. Arguably, these require a more systematic and detailed assessment than acknowledged in the literature so far. The chapter provides such an assessment based on considerations coming from both physics and analytic metaphysics, and concludes by pointing to a hitherto quite neglected theoretical option.

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An Epistemological Study of Theory Change

Bulletin of the Section of Logic ◽

10.18778/0138-0680.2021.26 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Theofanis Aravanis

Keyword(s):

Belief Revision ◽

Belief Change ◽

Theory Change ◽

Rational Belief ◽

Dominant Model ◽

Traditional Philosophy ◽

New Information ◽

Formal Framework ◽

The Face ◽

Main Shortcoming

Belief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics (revision) of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge.

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