scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Structural Realism. A Confirmation of a Philosophical Death Foretold

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (124) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Rivadulla
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
Structure Retention

Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name structural realism. Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was dead. I claim that Worrall’s attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed.

scholarly journals Structural realism - the search for a bearer of reality

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-624
Author(s):  
Milutin Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists? focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions - the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist?s strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) - in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

Physics, Structure, and Reality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill North
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Physical Theory ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Classical Mechanics ◽  
Careful Attention ◽  
Coordinate Systems ◽  
Spacetime Structure ◽  
The World ◽  
Background Assumption ◽  
And Mathematics

How do we figure out the nature of the world from a mathematically formulated physical theory? What do we infer about the world when a physical theory can be mathematically formulated in different ways? Physics, Structure, and Reality addresses these questions, questions that get to the heart of the project of interpreting physics—of figuring out what physics is telling us about the world. North argues that there is a certain notion of structure, implicit in physics and mathematics, that we should pay careful attention to, and that doing so sheds light on these questions concerning what physics is telling us about the nature of reality. Along the way, lessons are drawn for related topics such as the use of coordinate systems in physics, the differences among various formulations of classical mechanics, the nature of spacetime structure, the equivalence of physical theories, and the importance of scientific explanation. Although the book does not explicitly defend scientific realism, instead taking this to be a background assumption, the account provides an indirect case for realism toward our best theories of physics.

scholarly journals D. Dennett’s Real Patterns as a Modal Ontology: Essentialist Interpretation of Truth-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Modal Ontology

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.

Critical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Realism ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Science And Society ◽  
The Real ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The World

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.

1. The methods and fruits of science

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
David Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Dark Matter ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Real Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Theory Test

This chapter briefly discusses central key topics in the philosophy of science that the remainder of the book draws upon. It begins by considering the scientific method. ‘Induction’—the idea that we construct scientific theories just by generalizing from observations—is a very poor match to real science. ‘Falsification’—Popper’s idea that we create a theory, test against observation, and discard it if it fails the test—is much more realistic, but still too simple: data only falsifies data given auxiliary assumptions that can themselves be doubted. The issues are illustrated through an example from modern astrophysics: dark matter. The chapter then explores how we can resolve issues of underdetermination, where two theories give the same predictions. Finally, it introduces ‘scientific realism’, the view that our best theories tell us things about the world that go beyond what is directly observable.

scholarly journals Approaches to Realism

2013 ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rom Harre
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The World ◽  
Reliable Knowledge ◽  
Design Experiments

Scientific realism asserts that the methods of science, combined with the intellectual powers of human beings can give us reliable knowledge of states of the world beyond the limits of perception. Among the varieties of realism, policy realism is based on the principle that taking plausible theories to be putative descriptions of actual states of affairs is the best way to design experiments and to advance our knowledge. We carve out the umwelt from the welt by the use of our instruments and apparatus. The key procedure in science has been and still is the invention and testing of models---plausibility and empirical adequacy are the marks of a theory based on a model capable of supporting policy realism.

Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Steve Smith
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Social Science ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
English School ◽  
International Theory ◽  
The World

This text argues that theory is central to explaining International Relations (IR) and that the discipline of IR is much more relevant to the world of international relations than it has been at any point in its history. Some chapters cover distinct IR theories ranging from realism/structural realism to liberalism/neoliberalism, the English school, constructivism, Marxism, critical theory, feminism, poststructuralism, green theory, and postcolonialism. Oher chapters explore International Relations theory and its relationship to social science, normative theory, globalization, and the discipline’s identity. This introduction explains why this edition has chosen to cover these theories, reflects on international theory and its relationship to the world, and considers the kind of assumptions about theory that underlie each of the approaches.

4. Realism and anti‐realism

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Aim Of Science ◽  
The World ◽  
True Description ◽  
Underdetermination Argument

‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.

scholarly journals Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science

Diametros ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 61-71
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Future Development ◽  
End Of History ◽  
The World ◽  
Genetic Fallacy ◽  
The Future ◽  
The End Of History

Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.

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