The institutional architecture of the European Union: emerging and unresolved questions

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Giacomo Delledonne
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Institutional Architecture

Itinera Europea

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-154
Author(s):  
Adrienne Héritier
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Interaction Analysis ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Federal State ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Future ◽  
Institutional Architecture

Based on strategic interaction analysis, the chapter assesses the plausibility of the future paths of development of the European Union: a federal state, a differentiated and flexible union, covert integration, or disintegration. Systematically varying either the preferences of the main actors or the macro decision-making rules and external shocks/crises, the analysis comes to the conclusion that a differentiated and flexible union and covert integration are the most likely paths of development. The chapter discusses implications of specific scenarios, such as a possible popular backlash against ‘covert integration’ and elaborates on the desirability of practical proposals of a change in the European institutional architecture.

scholarly journals External Explanations

2020 ◽  
pp. 185-211
Author(s):  
Leonardo Morlino ◽  
Daniela Piana ◽  
Cecilia E. Sottilotta
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Social Protection ◽  
Welfare System ◽  
International Terrorism ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
The Impact

When checking the influence of European Union empirically, as for inequalities, first, the amount of resources which are devoted to cohesion policy is still negligible. Second, looking at the effects of the crisis and the impact of austerity measures, compounded by significant reforms of the EMU institutional architecture, the six countries under examination were affected to different degrees. Germany was mostly immune to the crisis, and Poland even experienced sustained growth during the crisis years. As a non-member of the Eurozone, the UK was affected by the crisis but retained its monetary sovereignty, and its commitment to austerity with a decline in social protection, healthcare and education cannot be directly traced to EU-level commitments. France avoided a significant overhaul of its welfare system, while Spain and Italy experienced a contraction, especially in the sectors of healthcare and education. As for freedoms, in the case of the possible ‘trade-off’ between the need to guarantee security in the face of domestic and international terrorism and citizens’ right to privacy, the middle ground established by the current EU ‘Privacy Shield’ paradigm leaves several problems unsolved. Moreover, it is essential to mention that the mechanism put in place by Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union to sanction possible violations of those values and principles, has not been sufficient to stop the current democratic backslides in some member states, notably Poland and Hungary. To sum up, the new scenario seems to depict a more nuanced predominance of the transnational provisions in terms of European freedoms and a reshaping of the domestic-European balance.

The EU’s institutional human rights architecture

2020 ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Monika Mayrhofer
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
European Commission ◽  
External Action ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Council ◽  
Pivotal Role ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
The Eu

The EU is neither a state nor a ‘normal’ international organisation, but has a unique institutional structure that is sometimes also referred to as a ‘sui generis’ institutional framework. The institutions of the EU have a pivotal role concerning EU human rights policies. This chapter will provide an analysis of how human rights competences are distributed among EU institutions. It will discuss the institutional architecture of human rights in the EU by analysing the European Council, the Council of the European Union and its human rights-related Working Parties, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European External Action Service and the Special Representative on Human Rights, the Fundamental Rights Agency, and the European Ombudsman. The analysis will be followed by a summary of opportunities and challenges, a presentation of areas for improvements and recommendations, and a brief conclusion.

Uwarunkowania kryzysu tożsamości Unii Europejskiej w zakresie polityki zewnętrznej

2014 ◽  
pp. 54-73
Author(s):  
Anna Skolimowska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Identity Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Institutional Architecture

The aim of the article is to explore identity crisis of the European Union in external relations – its causes and consequences. To this end it is necessary to define European Union’s identity in external relations as well as analyse the factors that determine the problems of its foreign policy. The analysis is rooted in historical institutionalism. It is assumed that the distinctiveness of the European Union in international relations is the result of the definition of its identity and the historical experience of building the political dimension of European integration. Methods applied for verification of the hypothesis are: historical analysis and content analysis of the documents relevant to the integration in the field of external policy. The analysis identifies factors constituting an identity crisis of the European Union in external relations, both ideational (identity construction) and material (political and institutional architecture).

European Union governance in the shadow of contradicting ideas: the decoupling of policy ideas and policy instruments

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva G. Heidbreder
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Policy Ideas ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Competing Ideas ◽  
Union Governance ◽  
Institutional Architecture

The institutional architecture of the European Union is based on two fundamentally competing ideas: supranational rule and national sovereignty. These two underlying ideas are not reconcilable and work at different levels in the background of the policy debate. While on the normative level public sentiments remain strongly linked to the idea of state autonomy, on the cognitive level the paradigm of a functional necessity to cooperate is decisive for actual policy making. Only in some policy domains, such as the single market program, have policy-makers attempted to re-couple normative and cognitive ideas. In contrast to this, the central argument is that policy-makers mostly adhere to an alternative strategy: the systematic decoupling of normative and cognitive ideas. Focusing on public administration, it is shown how deft policy instrumentation allows actors to realize program ideas that satisfy demands for increased supranational governance. At the same time, however, these instruments are in dissonance with how policies are framed against the background of public sentiments that assume domestic bureaucratic independence.

scholarly journals The European Union between Intergovernmentalism and ‘Shared and Responsible Sovereignty’: The Haptic Potential of EMU’s Institutional Architecture (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture, 2016)

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Piattoni
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Organization ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Distinct State ◽  
The Government ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The article starts from a critique of the widespread assumption that intergovernmentalism is not only the more practical but also the more democratic way of handling the current European crises – and particularly the euro crisis – to argue for the need to rethink the working and the definition of democracy in the current heightened interconnectedness of political organization. It suggests that perceiving European citizens as being separated into distinct state communities stands in the way of a full appreciation of the externalities, hence of the reciprocal responsibilities, that they owe each other and turns apparently democratic decisions into potential acts of domination, as theorized by both Pettit (1997) and Bohman (2006). It suggests that we should embrace a more encompassing and dialogical notion of democracy which translates Pallasmaa’s (2012) notion of hapticity from the field of physical architecture to that of institutional architecture. It concludes by suggesting that there are already institutional architectures in the EU which lend themselves to a haptic declension, for example the European Semester.

Accountability

2020 ◽  
pp. 144-175
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Federal State ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
Institutional Architecture

Accountability is the most fundamental principle of the European Union. By offering practical assurance that agreements will be enforced, that the Union’s institutions will not go beyond their enumerated powers and the division of competences will be respected by all, the Union’s legal framework makes long-term multilateral cooperation possible. However, the European Union does not follow the pattern of accountability through the separation of powers in the way of a federal state. The distinction between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary does not work in the same way because of the role played by the member states. Many important decisions are made by the states’ institutions, not the Union’s institutions. The institutional architecture of the European Union is thus unfamiliar. It is impossible to compare it to that of a constitution. The European Union is divided between the institutions of the EU and the institutions of the member states. The fragmentation of accountability in the European Union among the EU’s institutions and the various member states (in various combinations, e.g. the members of the Eurozone) is a principled position. It does not mean that the relations between the states and the Union are unregulated or merely transactional.

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