Getting “Primaried” in the Senate: Primary Challengers and the Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Sitting senators

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Chase B. Meyer
2016 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Frederick

Numerous studies have examined the roll call voting behavior of women in Congress. Much of this scholarship has focused on whether female legislators tend to be more liberal than their male colleagues. However, most of this research has examined whether gender differences exist within a specific legislative chamber. This paper seeks to build on this past research by exploring whether the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women is contingent upon the institutional context in which female legislators serve. Using Common Space Scores which estimate the roll call voting behavior of U.S. Senators and U.S. House members on a scale that allows for comparisons across each chamber this study analyzes the voting records of Female Senators, Male Senators, Female House Members and Male House Members in the 109th-111th Congresses. The results show that in the contemporary Congress, gender exerts minimal influence on how legislators cast their votes with the exception of female Republican Senators who are noticeably more liberal than Republicans in both the House and Senate.


2008 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 408-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Rocca ◽  
Gabriel R. Sanchez ◽  
Ron Nikora

Author(s):  
Simon Hug

Roll call votes offer rich behavioural information on individual members of parliament (MPs) and have been used to study many important research questions, also dealing with issues of representation. With the help of such votes MPs (and/or their parties) can be held to account. Thus, scholars have assessed broadly whether political parties act in a disciplined fashion and what affects the voting behavior of individual MPs, thus covering both processes of collective and individual accountability. The literature finds that evidence for such accountability relationships, is, however, also hampered by different uses of roll call votes across time and space.


1981 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald J. Mattheisen

The reputation of the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 has undergone a partial revision in the last few years. Its members used to be considered political novices from whom one could learn little about how to run a parliament (Huber, 1960: 613 is typical). Ziebura (1963) was perhaps the first to challenge this view. He showed that the Frankfurt Assembly was, in fact, run in a very professional way: It created sophisticated and disciplined political parties, and these parties actually exerted effective control over parliamentary business. They even joined together to form a coalition that gave reliable political support to a German provisional government. Kramer (1968), Boldt (1971), Botzenhart (1977), and Langewiesche (1978) have subsequently documented the skillful organization of these parties and their attempts to control members, to create extraparliamentary connections, and to maintain both a formal government coalition and an organized opposition. Kramer (1968: 175-178) has shown that they were particularly successful in applying party discipline to voting behavior: The results of voting could often be foretold simply from a knowledge of how the parties stood on the question at issue.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Kingdon

The pattern of communications between representatives and constituents has become a matter of central concern to many students of legislative behavior. As Lewis A. Dexter points out, the statement that a Congressman “represents” his district is only shorthand for the fact that the Congressman “represents his image of the district or of his constituents.” This image is established, according to Dexter, by the communications between representative and constituents: “what he hears from the district as he interprets it.” Miller and Stokes explore directly Congressmen's images of their constituents' opinions. The representative's image of his district is significant because it may constitute part of the explanation for various important types of behavior, such as his roll call voting, the stands he takes on issues of public policy, and the formulation of his campaign strategies.A portion of a representative's image of his district is composed of his beliefs about voters, his explicit or implicit theory of voting behavior. Because his position is contingent upon the approval of a majority of voters in an election, he is likely to consider at least to some degree the effect that various of his decisions might have on election outcomes. In making such judgments, the representative probably makes some assumptions, conscious or not, about the manner in which voters make their choices. If he believes, for example, that voters pay close attention to his actions, he probably feels more constrained by his district's likely opinions than if he does not hold that belief.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Schoch ◽  
Ulrik Brandes

Abstract Scaling techniques such as the well known NOMINATE position political actors in a low dimensional space to represent the similarity or dissimilarity of their political orientation based on roll-call voting patterns. Starting from the same kind of data we propose an alternative, discrete, representation that replaces positions (points and distances) with niches (boxes and overlap). In the one-dimensional case, this corresponds to replacing the left-to-right ordering of points on the real line with an interval order. As it turns out, this seemingly simplistic one-dimensional model is sufficient to represent the similarity of roll-call votes by U.S. senators in recent years. In a historic context, however, low dimensionality represents the exception which stands in contrast to what is suggested by scaling techniques.


The Forum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-413
Author(s):  
Mike Cowburn ◽  
Michael T. Oswald

Abstract We examine the extent to which Republican members of the House of Representatives have attempted to delegitimize established media by adopting the fake news label on Twitter since Donald Trump’s election. We find that a significant minority of Republican representatives used the fake news label on Twitter. Ideology, measured through roll-call voting behavior (DW-NOMINATE), was the strongest indicator of likely adoption, with conservative representatives using the label at significantly higher rates than comparative moderates. Quantity of tweets sent was a further significant predictor of use, with active Twitter users more disposed to use the label on the platform. District partisanship (PVI) provided no explanatory value beyond ideology, suggesting limited ‘tactical’ use of the label for electoral gain. We discuss potential reasons for these findings and consider consequences for various actors, including Trump. We respond to a call in the literature for more empirical data concerning the use of the fake news label by actors other than President Trump by assessing the extent to which House Republicans have adopted this behavior.


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