Collective intentionality: A basic and early component of moral evolution

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 680-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Boehm
Keyword(s):  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Early Component ◽  
Moral Evolution

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

scholarly journals We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
The Status

Abstract The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.

Insulating Peace: Managerial Coordination in Durable Security Complexes

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Travlos
Keyword(s):  
South Asian ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
South American ◽  
Proof Of Concept ◽  
The South ◽  
Mapping Tool ◽  
Region I ◽  
The Face ◽  
Future Evaluation

Abstract I argue that insulation via managerial coordination is a key element in any explanation about the formation of political regions among states. The key role it plays is as a tool for the maintenance of intra-regional pacific relations in the face of diffusion and contagion processes, resulting from continued security linkages with excluded extra-regional states. In order to explore these dynamics, I propose a new reconceptualization of the concept of managerial coordination based on the basic framework concept mapping tool. This leads to clarity about what managerial coordination does as a dimension of insulation. It also necessitates a revamp of the scale of interstate managerial coordination as a measuring instrument of the intensity of collective intentionality toward insulation among the members of a region. I then map the region concept of durable security complex (DSC) as the scope for the enactment of managerial coordination, based on a review of existing region concepts in the new regionalist literature. I then conduct an ideographic proof-of-concept exercise on three DSCs in the presence or absence of managerial coordination. These are the Scandinavian states, the South Asian regional security complex, and the South American Norther Tier local hierarchy. The exercise provides indicators for a number of theoretical propositions worthy of future evaluation.

scholarly journals Collective Referential Intentionality in the Semantics of Dialogue

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-159
Author(s):  
Dale Jacquette
Keyword(s):  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Shared Understanding ◽  
Shared Meaning ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Question And Answer ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
Reasoning And Argument

Abstract The concept of a dialogue is considered in general terms from the standpoint of its referential presuppositions. The semantics of dialogue implies that dialogue participants must generally have a collective intentionality of agreed-upon references that is minimally sufficient for them to be able to disagree about other things, and ideally for outstanding disagreements to become clearer at successive stages of the dialogue. These points are detailed and illustrated in a fictional dialogue, in which precisely these kinds of referential confusions impede progress in shared understanding. It is only through a continuous exchange of question and answer in this dialogue case study that the meanings of key terms and anaphorical references are disambiguated, and a relevantly complete collective intentionality of shared meaning between dialogue participants is achieved. The importance of a minimally shared referential semantics for the terms entering into reasoning and argument in dialogue contexts broadly construed cannot be over-estimated. Where to draw the line between referential agreement and disagreement within any chosen dialogue, as participants work toward better mutual understanding in clearing up referential incongruities, is sometimes among the dialogue’s main points of dispute.

Amygdala lesions block conditioned enhancement of the early component of the rat eyeblink reflex.

2001 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 764-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
June-Seek Choi ◽  
Derick H. Lindquist ◽  
Thomas H. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Early Component ◽  
Conditioned Enhancement ◽  
Amygdala Lesions

scholarly journals Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-148
Author(s):  
Kristina Lekic
Keyword(s):  
Diagnostic Criteria ◽  
Autistic Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Autistic Spectrum ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Spectrum Disorders ◽  
Shed Light

The paper aims to shed light on Searle?s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of ?we-intentionality?. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle?s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle?s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

scholarly journals A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 55-62
Author(s):  
Nicholas Overgaard
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Community ◽  
Epistemic Community ◽  
Epistemic Communities ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Social Agent ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Definition Of

Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, scientific community currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between accidental group and community through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the epistemic community that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the non-epistemic community that does not have such a collective intentionality. I note that both epistemic and non-epistemic communities might bear mosaics, but that epistemic communities are the intended social agents of scientific change because their main collective intentionality is to know the world and, in effect, to change their mosaics. I conclude my paper by arguing we are not currently in a position to properly define scientific community per se because of the risk of confusing pseudoscientific communities with scientific communities. However, I propose that we can for now rely on the definition of epistemic community as the proper social agent of scientific change.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0012]: Accept the following taxonomy of group, accidental group, and community:Group ≡ two or more people who share any characteristic.Accidental group ≡ a group that does not have a collective intentionality.Community ≡ a group that has a collective intentionality. [Sciento-2017-0013]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept that communities can consist of other communities.[Sciento-2017-0014]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept the following definitions of epistemic community and non-epistemic community as subtypes of community:Epistemic community ≡ a community that has a collective intentionality to know the world.Non-epistemic community ≡ a community that does not have a collective intentionality to know the world.[Sciento-2017-0015]: Provideed that modification [Sciento-2017-0013] and [Sciento-2017-0014] are accepted, accept that a non-epistemic community can consist of epistemic communities.

scholarly journals Revisit Euphemisms from the Perspective of Intentionality

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Starting Point

This paper studies the role of intentionality in the process of generating euphemisms. Intentionality, as the key to human consciousness activities, is not only the starting point of the language user’s consciousness activity related to euphemism generation, but also functions through the whole generating process. Its functions can be specified as triggering, orientation, and selection. Collective intentionality restricts individual intentionality and has the function of identifying and integrating individual intentionality. Under the effect of collective intentionality and social environment, the euphemisms are renewed with the time and bear features unique to a particular group.

scholarly journals Steps Towards an Evolutionary Account of Argumentative Competence

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristián Santibáñez Yáñéz
Keyword(s):  
Niche Construction ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Informal Logic ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Evolutionary Account ◽  
Logic Approach ◽  
Tentative Explanation ◽  
Argumentative Competence ◽  
Evolutionary Point

In this paper a tentative explanation of the competence of argumentation from an evolutionary point of view is offered. Because in contemporary argumentation theory and the informal logic approach the evolutionary perspective has been neglected, this paper gives an initial overview on the matter with the hope that core aspects of the argumentative faculty—such as argumentative normativity, the function of arguments, or fallacious moves, among others—can be seen differently afterwards. In order to specify the proposal, the main concepts considered are the notion of collective intentionality, cooperation, reputation, niche construction and, of course, basic evolutionary terms.

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