Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Community, Industry, and the National Security Community

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald L. Epstein
Pathogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1497
Author(s):  
Owen P. Leiser ◽  
Errett C. Hobbs ◽  
Amy C. Sims ◽  
George W. Korch ◽  
Karen L. Taylor

As of 2021, the biothreat policy and research communities organize their efforts around lists of priority agents, which elides consideration of novel pathogens and biotoxins. For example, the Select Agents and Toxins list is composed of agents that historic biological warfare programs had weaponized or that have previously caused great harm during natural outbreaks. Similarly, lists of priority agents promulgated by the World Health Organization and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases are composed of previously known pathogens and biotoxins. To fill this gap, we argue that the research/scientific and biodefense/biosecurity communities should categorize agents based on how they impact their hosts to augment current list-based paradigms. Specifically, we propose integrating the results of multi-omics studies to identify bioagent-agnostic signatures (BASs) of disease—namely, patterns of biomarkers that accurately and reproducibly predict the impacts of infection or intoxication without prior knowledge of the causative agent. Here, we highlight three pathways that investigators might exploit as sources of signals to construct BASs and their applicability to this framework. The research community will need to forge robust interdisciplinary teams to surmount substantial experimental, technical, and data analytic challenges that stand in the way of our long-term vision. However, if successful, our functionality-based BAS model could present a means to more effectively surveil for and treat known and novel agents alike.


Author(s):  
Yuli Subiakto

Airports need high security procedures, especially for preventing outbreaks of infectious diseases spread by passenger and carried goods. Outbreaks of disease form real threat to national defense that can endanger national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. Biological agents that are dangerous sources of outbreaks infectious diseases can be spread by criminal and terrorists for biological warfare. Based on data, the spread of diseases in Indonesia came from abroad, such as SARS from China, Mers-CoV from the Middle East, Avian Influenza from China, HIV from Africa etc. Indonesia has a population of more than 262 million peoples, 17,500 islands, and climate conditions that allow microorganisms to grow well. In 2017 domestic flights transported 95,401,545 persons and international flights 16,253,259 persons, we need to prevent the spread of diseases in Indonesia entering through the Airports. Efforts to prevent the entry of dangerous biological agents in Indonesia were carried out by Quarantine Officers and Port Health Officers. The development of threat outbreak disease in air transportation is real in the future, so all Indonesia airports must have action plans to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. The Air Force must act as guardian of sovereignty by having medical personnel on the spot for role interoperability with the personnel Port Health Office for prevent the entry of dangerous biological agents. Capacity building need for be enhanced for prevention, detection, identification and response through a training of the personnel, procurement facilities for readiness prevent, detect and respond when facing biological threat


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-104
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Kantemnidis

Environmental security was established academically in the early 1980s in the United States. The threat of environmental issues to national security has been the dominant approach among the many distinct interpretations. In 2008, environmental concerns, particularly climate change, were addressed for the first time in the context of EU security. The European security community frequently considers environmental aspects; however, this is usually limited to a strategic level before moving to implementation. In this article, we illustrate how environmental security has evolved, how it has permeated the European security community, and how it might advance further to secure the security of European citizens better.


Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht

Canada contrasts distinctly with the prominence of intelligence oversight in the United States, insofar as Canada stands out for a predominately ex post facto approach to reviewing intelligence. Recent changes, however, bolstered the role of oversight in Canada’s accountability system. Previously, only three of 16 agencies that make up Canada’s intelligence and security community were reviewed by independent expert review bodies. Critics, however, argued that review should be more encompassing, lamented constraints by the Canadian intelligence accountability system that made it difficult for review bodies to cooperate and the negligible role of Parliament in holding ISAs accountable. Recent legislation created a security-cleared committee of parliamentarians to review Canada’s security and intelligence community, an agency to review activity related to national security and intelligence as well as an independent commissioner to oversee certain ministerial intelligence authorizations. The chapter reviews member organizations of the Canada’s intelligence community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in Canada; national security threats to Canada; as well as internal and external dynamics that culminated in changes to Canada’s intelligence accountability architecture: the Civilian Review and Complains Commission of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and the Intelligence Commissioner. The prospect of the NSICOP, NSIRA, and the IC strengthening compliance and general operations of Canada’s intelligence and security community will be realized by how each fulfils its broad mandate in practice and the degree of cooperation among NSIRA, NSICOP, and CRCC.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-170
Author(s):  
Chunyan Huang (黃純豔)

Abstract China’s ancient tributary system not only served the vanity of the dynasty but had multiple political implications, closely tied to the dynasty’s national security. The Song dynasty’s [960-1279] notion of security followed an overall policy of guarding the dynasty against external threats, surrounding barbarian nations, and maintaining domestic order. The stability and eventual collapse of the tributary system were closely tied to the domestic security of the Song dynasty and to the security of all the countries that participated in the system. The system constituted a dynamic and interactive security community.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dahlia Peterson ◽  
◽  
Kayla Goode ◽  
Diana Gehlhaus

A globally competitive AI workforce hinges on the education, development, and sustainment of the best and brightest AI talent. This issue brief compares efforts to integrate AI education in China and the United States, and what advantages and disadvantages this entails. The authors consider key differences in system design and oversight, as well as strategic planning. They then explore implications for the U.S. national security community.


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