Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning

This chapter introduces the most important interdisciplinary foundations and tools of business ethics. First, the authors discuss the philosophical foundations and concepts. The most important normative ethical theories, the notion of a reflective equilibrium, and several tools for justifying norms under dissent are introduced. Second, economic and socio-scientific foundations and tools are discussed, scrutinizing different concepts of rationality and assessments of social conditions. The importance of dilemma structures lies at the core of this section. Third, the authors present psychological foundations and tools, introducing the behavioral approach to ethics, dual process theory, and Haidt’s social intuitionist model to moral judgment, with its emphasis on the limits of reason for moral judgment. Moreover, the relevance of bounded ethicality in individuals and organizations for business ethics is outlined.

Download Full-text

Dual Models Argumentative Theory and Moral Reasoning

Advances in Religious and Cultural Studies - Adapting Human Thinking and Moral Reasoning in Contemporary Society ◽

10.4018/978-1-7998-1811-3.ch001 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-29

Author(s):

Roger Fontaine ◽

Valérie Pennequin

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Alternative Model ◽

Ecological Validity ◽

Human Mind ◽

Process Models ◽

Dual Process ◽

Critical Perspective ◽

Darwinian Theory ◽

Theory Of Evolution ◽

Dual Models

The idea of the existence of duality in the functioning of the human mind is very old: for some psychologists, this is due to the existence of two types of cognitive process, heuristic and analytic. The former is influenced by the individual's beliefs, and the latter analyzes the validity of arguments and justifications. This chapter examines this duality from a critical perspective by exploring its ecological validity. Thus, the duality will be examined in relation to the principles of the Darwinian theory of evolution and presented the advantages of the alternative model of argumentative theory. Authors present in more detail recent models of moral reasoning to illustrate what they believe are the limitations of the dual-process models of cognition.

Download Full-text

Reliable and Unreliable Judgments About Reasons

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.41 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Caitrin Donovan ◽

Cordelia Fine ◽

Jeanette Kennett

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Practical Reason ◽

Dual Process ◽

Moral Deliberation ◽

Reasons For Action ◽

Individual Level ◽

Process Theories ◽

Dual Process Theories ◽

Critical Overview ◽

Social Level

The new skepticism about practical reason is predicated upon empirical findings which challenge the primacy traditionally afforded to reasoning in contexts of normative deliberation. These findings, which are associated with dual-process theories of cognition, are taken to support two skeptical claims: our reasons for action are not what we take them to be, and reasoning is an unreliable means for arriving at reliable judgments. After providing a critical overview of empirically based skepticism and its implications, we argue that skeptics underestimate the role that reasoning processes play in moral deliberation. We then canvass ways in which threats to the reliability of individual-level moral reasoning can be countenanced by social-level practices such as “nudging,” inter-agent reasoning, and testimonial expertise.

Download Full-text

neurobiology supports virtue theory on the role of heuristics in moral cognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x05270097 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 28 (4) ◽

pp. 547-548 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

william d. casebeer

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Moral Judgment ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Virtue Theory ◽

Moral Cognition ◽

Wide Reflective Equilibrium

sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. his case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.

Download Full-text

Intuitions in Moral Reasoning – Normative Empirical Reflective Equilibrium as a Model for Substantial Justification of Moral Claims

Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Facts and Norms - Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-01369-5_10 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 179-193

Author(s):

Ghislaine J. M. W. van Thiel ◽

Johannes J. M. van Delden

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Moral Claims

Download Full-text

wide reflective equilibrium as an answer to an objection to moral heuristics

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x05420099 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 28 (4) ◽

pp. 561-562

Author(s):

edward stein

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Human Capacity

if, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics exist faces a serious objection. this objection can be answered by embracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our normative principles of morality.

Download Full-text

The Method of Reflective Equilibrium in Moral Reasoning

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej ◽

10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.89 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 89-96 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Marek Smolak

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Rule Of Law ◽

Reflective Equilibrium ◽

Constitutional Rights ◽

Theory Approach ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

Judicial Decisions ◽

Fundamental Assumption ◽

Background Theory

The paper analyses the nature of moral reasoning when balancing constitutional rights. The fundamental assumption is the idea that adequate moral reasoning based on the Weight Formula should demonstrate the reasons for adopting specific principles. This demonstration should be rational. Rationality can be achieved by applying J. Rawls’s methods of reflective equilibrium. The above method consists of background theory/approach. I propose to consider two background theories/approaches, namely Dworkin’s idea of integrity and the concept of the rule of law formulated by O. Raban. My aim is to argue that the latter is more accurate for moral reasoning when balancing constitutional rights than the former because it helps us to rationalize the broadly understood process of taking judicial decisions.

Download Full-text

Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy

Diametros ◽

10.33392/diam.1447 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-6

Author(s):

Wim De Neys

Keyword(s):

Moral Reasoning ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Process Model ◽

Probabilistic Reasoning ◽

Dual Process ◽

Dual Process Model ◽

Good System ◽

System 2

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.

Download Full-text