Electoral rules of the authoritarian game: undemocratic effects of proportional representation in Rwanda

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Download Full-text

Electoral Systems and the Substantive Representation of Marginalized Groups: Evidence from Women’s Issue Bills in South Korea

Political Research Quarterly ◽

10.1177/10659129211028290 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 106591292110282

Author(s):

Yesola Kweon ◽

Josh M. Ryan

Keyword(s):

Electoral Systems ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Substantive Representation ◽

National Assembly ◽

Representation Of Women ◽

Representation Systems ◽

Marginalized Groups ◽

Original Dataset ◽

The Relationship

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.

Download Full-text

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055406062095 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 100 (2) ◽

pp. 183-193 ◽

Cited By ~ 68

Author(s):

ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽

BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽

ELLIS S. KRAUSS

Keyword(s):

Electoral System ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Parallel System ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Legislative Organization ◽

Party Leaders ◽

Electoral Incentives ◽

Members Of Parliament ◽

Different Types ◽

The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Download Full-text

Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test

American Economic Journal Economic Policy ◽

10.1257/pol.3.3.144 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 144-174 ◽

Cited By ~ 40

Author(s):

Stefano Gagliarducci ◽

Tommaso Nannicini ◽

Paolo Naticchioni

Keyword(s):

House Of Representatives ◽

Electoral System ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Using Data

Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994–2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin, we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. (JEL D72)

Download Full-text

Is Proportional Representation More Favourable to the Left? Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Elections, Parliaments and the Formation of Cabinets

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123415000290 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 47 (1) ◽

pp. 149-164 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Holger Döring ◽

Philip Manow

Keyword(s):

Electoral Systems ◽

Regional Distribution ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Right Wing ◽

Voting Behaviour ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Post War ◽

The Right ◽

Established Democracies ◽

The Impact

How do electoral rules affect the composition of governments? It is a robust finding that countries with majoritarian rules more often elect conservative governments than those with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. There are three explanations for this pattern. The first stresses the impact of voting behaviour: the middle class more often votes for right-wing parties in majoritarian electoral systems, anticipating governments’ redistributive consequences. The second explanation is based on electoral geography: the regional distribution of votes may bias the vote-seat translation against the Left in majoritarian systems due to the wide margins by which the Left wins core urban districts. The third explanation refers to party fragmentation: if the Right is more fragmented than the Left in countries with PR, then there is less chance of a right-wing party gaining formateur status. This study tests these three hypotheses for established democracies over the entire post-war period. It finds the first two mechanisms at work in the democratic chain of delegation from voting via the vote-seat translation to the formation of cabinets, while party fragmentation does not seem to co-vary as much as expected with electoral rules. These findings confirm that majoritarian systems have a substantive conservative bias, whereas countries with PR show more differentiated patterns.

Download Full-text

The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation

World Politics ◽

10.1017/s0043887109000100 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 61 (2) ◽

pp. 254-295 ◽

Cited By ~ 46

Author(s):

Ernesto Calvo

Keyword(s):

Bayesian Model ◽

Western Europe ◽

Voting Rights ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Party Competition ◽

Late Nineteenth Century ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Electoral Reforms ◽

Late Nineteenth ◽

Number Of Parties

One of the most noteworthy political regularities in the early twentieth century was the shift away from majoritarian electoral rules in Western Europe. The conventional wisdom suggests that proportional representation (PR) was introduced by elites who believed that under the existing majoritarian rules (simple plurality, block-vote, two-ballot rules) they would soon lose power to rapidly growing socialist parties. But this does not explain why many electoral reforms were carried out in countries with weak or nonexistent socialist parties. The author shows that increasing the number of parties distorts the seat-vote properties of electoral rules to a larger degree than previously anticipated. Under increasing party competition, electoral regimes display larger partisan biases than those observed in two-party races and crowd out minority parties that have territorially dispersed constituencies in favor of minority parties that have territorially concentrated constituencies. Using a dynamic Bayesian model for seats and votes, the author measures the partisan biases brought about by the expansion of voting rights in the late nineteenth century to explain the drive to reform majoritarian electoral systems.

Download Full-text

Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123405000311 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 35 (4) ◽

pp. 573-606 ◽

Cited By ~ 284

Author(s):

JANA KUNICOVÁ ◽

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN

Keyword(s):

Cross Section ◽

Political Corruption ◽

Interaction Effects ◽

Rent Seeking ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Opposition Parties

Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. We also examine the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism. We test our main predictions and interaction effects on a cross-section of up to ninety-four democracies. The empirical findings strongly support our hypothesis that PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking.

Download Full-text

Social protectionist bias: The domestic politics of North–South trade agreements

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations ◽

10.1177/1369148120910991 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 347-366

Author(s):

Evgeny Postnikov ◽

Ida Bastiaens

Keyword(s):

Domestic Politics ◽

Trade Agreements ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Preferential Trade Agreements ◽

Trade Liberalisation ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Preferential Trade ◽

The Past ◽

Social Standards ◽

Panel Regressions

North–South preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have proliferated rapidly in the past decades. Despite a common focus on trade liberalisation, these preferential trade agreements differ greatly in their inclusion of labour and environmental provisions. A difference in the enforcement of these social standards is also puzzling: some preferential trade agreements envision sanctions for non-compliance while others do not. What explains this variation? We argue that Northern governments have their hands tied by domestic constituents demanding social standards as a key protectionist instrument. However, different electoral rules moderate the success of these demands. Because majoritarian systems provide a more efficient channel for the mobilisation of protectionist interests, they are more prone to social protectionist bias than their proportional representation counterparts. We assess our hypotheses using panel regressions of all North–South preferential trade agreements. Our analysis refines previous findings on tariff and non-tariff protectionist bias in majoritarian systems and shows how it is manifested in the design of preferential trade agreements.

Download Full-text

The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity

Political Research Quarterly ◽

10.1177/1065912920987898 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 106591292098789

Author(s):

Thomas Däubler

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Spatial Model ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Group Leadership ◽

Representation System ◽

Electoral Impact ◽

Party Group

How does making electoral systems more candidate-centered affect party unity? Using a principal-agent perspective, this study makes three contributions to the literature on this topic. Conceptually, it suggests thinking about the incentives due to personalization as arising from a shift in electoral impact from party selectors to voters. Theoretically, it incorporates this notion into a spatial model of parliamentary voting that also considers principals’ monitoring capacities. From the resulting framework follows a rich set of observable implications, notably that candidate-centered electoral systems facilitate rather than undermine collective action within parliamentary parties under certain conditions. Empirically, this study then analyzes the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list proportional representation system, which changed the preference vote threshold. As expected, I find that when extreme (district-based) selectors disagree with the moderate bills supported by the party group leadership, personalized rules incentivize politicians to support these policies and vote in unison.

Download Full-text