scholarly journals Bingkai Kurus Realisme Struktural Epistemik

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-190
Author(s):  
Karlina Supelli
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mathematical Structure ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Unobservable Entity ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
History Of

Abstrak: Di tengah-tengah perdebatan panjang antara realisme dan anti realisme dalam filsafat ilmu, realisme struktural (RS) diajukan sebagai gagasan yang terbaik dari keduanya. Versi epistemik RS (RSE) berpendapat bahwa kita memiliki alasan yang baik untuk percaya bahwa teori memiliki struktur yang tepat, yaitu bahwa wujud dan struktur yang dipostulatkan oleh teori betul-betul ada. Namun demikian, RSE tidak mengajukan dakuan epistemik menyangkut hakikat wujud yang melandasi struktur. Semua pengetahuan mengenai dunia fisis adalah pengetahuan tentang struktur. Dalam tulisan ini penulis memberi tinjauan tentang RSE dan beberapa argumen yang menolak RSE. Belajar dari sejarah fisika zarah, penulis akan memperlihatkan bahwa struktur menunjuk ke sifat-sifat mendasar yang dimiliki oleh komponen-komponennya dan dengan demikian menyediakan jalur epistemik bagi wujud yang relasi-relasinya mendefinisikan struktur. Meski demikian, struktur matematis sebuah teori hanya memungkinkan kita membangun pengetahuan tentang wujud-wujud yang tidak teramati sebagai “objek” dan bukan objek-objek partikular. Kata-kata Kunci: Realisme, anti-realisme, realisme struktural epistemik, argumen tanpa keajaiban, meta-induksi pesimistik, wujud takteramati. Abstract: In the lengthy debate between antirealism and realism in the philosophy of science, structural realism (SR) has been suggested as “the best of both worlds.” The epistemic version of SR (ESR) holds that we have good reason to believe that our most successful scientific theories are structurally correct—that the entities and structures postulated by a theory actually exist, and yet it makes no epistemic claim about the nature of the underlying entities. All that we can know is the structure of the physical world. In this article I present an overview of ESR and a number of arguments that have been brought up against it. Drawing lessons from the history of contemporary physics, I will show that “structure” points to the fundamental properties of its constituents and thus provides an epistemic access to the nature of those entities whose relations define structure in the first place. Nevertheless, the mathematical structure of a theory enables us only to construe knowledge of an unobservable entity as “object,” and not this or that particular object. Keywords: Realism, anti-realism, epistemic structural realism, no miracle argument, pesimistic meta-induction, unobservable entity.

scholarly journals Scientific Practice and the Epistemology of Governing Laws

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
TYLER HILDEBRAND
Keyword(s):  
British Journal ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
General Interest ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (‘Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2017) that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers.

scholarly journals CREATION – FROM PRE-ETERNITY TO PROBABILITY (AL-JADID TAHAFUT AL-FALASIFAH) A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Naseeb Ahmed Siddiqui
Keyword(s):  
Physical World ◽  
Ultimate Reality ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Delay Effect ◽  
Islamic Theology ◽  
Cause And Effect ◽  
History Of

<p>It is not the physical world consist in itself as to what reality is, but proof of ultimate reality. Reality does not change by changing the process rather attributable quality named from A to B or This to that but essence remains the same. Process in metaphysics has two inseparable parts according to philosophers, cause and effect, which in any case intrinsic to every event coming into being. Denying either one makes impossibility of event. Once cause with all necessary condition fulfilled, cannot delay its effect by necessity, which is the sole premise with philosophers to assume worlds pre-eternity. On the contrary, according to Islamic theologians, it is not necessary and condition for event to have causal connection and it is possible to delay effect in presence of cause also and this is possible in conventional as well as rational and reasoning level. The central issue rose by Imam Al-Gazali (rahmatullahali) in his `Tahafut Al-falasifa concerning the world’s pre-eternity rotate around the cause and effect. He showed the incoherence of arguments posed by philosophers and proposed that it’s possible to delay the effect. Now, after 800 years, creation already unveiled mysteries in the form, which both the parties (Philosophers and theologians) did not know. However, who won the debate over world’s pre-eternity is still open. This paper will try to fill that gap by attempting direct discussion of Tahafut Al-falasifa on the issue of world pre-eternity, considering cause and effect as central debate and will show that what Imam Al-Gazali (rahmatullahali) proposed was correct: The delay in effect with cause is possible. This will be a contribution to the Islamic theology collecting physical facts from science, which anyhow reached to the same level where it meets metaphysics. This will be the latest debate on the issue, and provide new insights on some of core results of scientific theories, which are not considered yet.</p>

Whewell, William (1794–1886)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Fisch
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
Mathematical Truth ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
New Era ◽  
History Of ◽  
Scientific Ideas

William Whewell’s two seminal works, History of the Inductive Science, from the Earliest to the Present Time (1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History (1840), began a new era in the philosophy of science. Equally critical of the British ‘sensationalist’ school, which founded all knowledge on experience, and the German Idealists, who based science on a priori ideas, Whewell undertook to survey the history of all known sciences in search of a better explanation of scientific discovery. His conclusions were as bold as his undertaking. All real knowledge, he argued, is ‘antithetical’, requiring mutually irreducible, ever-present, and yet inseparable empirical and conceptual components. Scientific progress is achieved not by induction, or reading-out theories from previously collected data, but by the imaginative ‘superinduction’ of novel hypotheses upon known but seemingly unrelated facts. He thus broke radically with traditional inductivism – and for nearly a century was all but ignored. In the Philosophy the antithetical structure of scientific theories and the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific discovery form the basis for novel analyses of scientific and mathematical truth and scientific methodology, critiques of rival philosophies of science, and an account of the emergence and refinement of scientific ideas.

Scientific Research; Instructions from the Holy Quran

IIUC Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 225-232
Author(s):  
Muhammad Athar Uddin ◽  
Fouzia Ferdous
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Research ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
Know How ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Holy Quran ◽  
The Holy Quran ◽  
Experimental Works ◽  
The Universe

Science is the branch of knowledge that deals with the material world. In scientific research it is necessary to know "How does our knowledge of physical world expand?" and "What are the principles of scientific research?" In fact scientific research is a combination of experimental works and intellectual activity. The Almighty Allah has given specific fundamental properties to every materials of the universe. The Scientist can only discover very few of those properties and apply them in integrated form when and where necessary. Continuation of scientific research and advancement of the technology is possible only because of the unchangeable fundamental properties of all materials of the universe formulated by the Almighty Allah. As per Quranic instructions no scientific research is accepted without proven reason and the scientific theories contradictory to the Holy Quran must be rejected.IIUC Studies Vol.9 December 2012: 225-232

Newton and the Origin of Civilization

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jed Z. Buchwald ◽  
Mordechai Feingold
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
History Of Mathematics ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Ancient History ◽  
Isaac Newton ◽  
History Of ◽  
Ancient Civilizations ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
One Year ◽  
Radical Ideas

Isaac Newton’s Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended, published in 1728, one year after the great man’s death, unleashed a storm of controversy. And for good reason. The book presents a drastically revised timeline for ancient civilizations, contracting Greek history by five hundred years and Egypt’s by a millennium. This book tells the story of how one of the most celebrated figures in the history of mathematics, optics, and mechanics came to apply his unique ways of thinking to problems of history, theology, and mythology, and of how his radical ideas produced an uproar that reverberated in Europe’s learned circles throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. The book reveals the manner in which Newton strove for nearly half a century to rectify universal history by reading ancient texts through the lens of astronomy, and to create a tight theoretical system for interpreting the evolution of civilization on the basis of population dynamics. It was during Newton’s earliest years at Cambridge that he developed the core of his singular method for generating and working with trustworthy knowledge, which he applied to his study of the past with the same rigor he brought to his work in physics and mathematics. Drawing extensively on Newton’s unpublished papers and a host of other primary sources, the book reconciles Isaac Newton the rational scientist with Newton the natural philosopher, alchemist, theologian, and chronologist of ancient history.

Laws of Nature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Universe

The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.

Robert M. Young's Mind, Brain and Adaptation revisited

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Christopher Lawrence
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Social Reform ◽  
Victorian Britain ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Philosophy Department ◽  
History Of ◽  
Science Community ◽  
Scientific Ideas

Abstract Robert Maxwell Young's first book Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (1970), written from 1960 to 1965, still merits reading as a study of the naturalization of mind and its relation to social thought in Victorian Britain. I examine the book from two perspectives that give the volume its unique character: first, Young's interest in psychology, which he considered should be used to inform humane professional practices and be the basis of social reform; second, new approaches to the history of scientific ideas. I trace Young's intellectual interests to the Yale Philosophy Department, the Cambridge Department of Experimental Psychology and a new history and philosophy of science community. Although Young changed his political outlook and historiography radically after 1965, he always remained faithful to ideas about thought and practice described in Mind, Brain.

What is a scientific instrument, now?

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Smithsonian Institution ◽  
Scientific Instrument ◽  
Scientific Instruments ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.

scholarly journals The Origins of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Enros
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
University Of Toronto ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Programs Of Study ◽  
The University ◽  
Phd Programs

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

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