scholarly journals Formal modelling of the electricity markets: the example of the load reduction of electricity mechanism “NEBEF”

2021 ◽  
Vol 897 (1) ◽  
pp. 012017
Author(s):  
Florian Selot ◽  
Bruno Robisson ◽  
Claire Vaglio-Gaudard ◽  
Javier Gil-Quijano

Abstract The liberalisation of the electricity market initiated at the beginning of the 21st century has opened it to new parties. To ensure the growth of participants’ number will support the system’s balance, the EU regulation 2019/943 confirms that “all market participants should be financially responsible of the imbalances they cause”. In their respective area, the transmission system operators develops the regulation in compliance with this condition. However, as the regulation takes into account the new realities of the market such as renewables, the interactions between the participants become more complex. One of the risks is that the imbalance of an actor may not be due to its own actions, not complying with the EU regulation then. To analyse this kind of implicit condition, we propose a formal approach to model the exchanges of energy. Using the French regulation as a base, we model the participants and their interactions in the form of symbolic equations using the energy-related terms as variables. In this paper, to illustrate the model we will use to analyse the entire electricity market, we apply it to the NEBEF mechanism only. This mechanism is dedicated to the selling of demand response in France and introduces a third party between the final producer and the final consumer: the demand response operator. We model the mechanism and analyse how the mechanism complies with the balancing responsibility. Our results demonstrate that the mechanism complies with the regulation but there are some limits due to the calculation method of the reference consumption.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-186
Author(s):  
S. K. Jain ◽  
Paresh Khandelwal ◽  
P. K. Agarwal

The power system reforms worldwide have commoditized electric energy and thus the electricity market has been developed. With this, trading of electric energy takes place in various time-domain like the day ahead, real-time, etc. These transactions take place through over the counter (OTC) or Power Exchange (Px) which provide to the market participants the required platform and payment security. The transactions on OTC and Px requires a third-party platform and guarantee for contract & settlement, there incurs overhead cost. Since electric energy is a fungible commodity, it can be transacted very well with the old system like barter. Energy Banking is one such mechanism wherein one utility supplies the energy to another utility that need it more and in leisure, the energy can then be provided back. The requisite security of the transactions can be provided by blockchain technology. Energy banking is presently being done only on MW quantum basis with no price tag despite the cost being dependent on the demand-supply ratio. To ensure energy banking transactions in real-time and free from the perils of financial settlements, this article suggests the use of the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) model of blockchain technology for executing Smart Contracts mutually agreed upon by both parties and avoiding third parties overhead costs. Doi: 10.28991/HIJ-2021-02-03-03 Full Text: PDF


Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Yang ◽  
Minglei Bao ◽  
Yi Ding ◽  
Yonghua Song ◽  
Zhenzhi Lin ◽  
...  

Electricity markets have been established in many countries of the world. Electricity and services are traded in the competitive environment of electricity markets, which generates a large amount of information during the operation process. To maintain transparency and foster competition of electricity markets, timely and precise information regarding the operation of electricity market should be disclosed to the market participants through a centralized and authorized information disclosure mechanism. However, the information disclosure mechanism varies greatly in electricity markets because of different market models and transaction methods. This paper reviews information disclosure mechanisms of several typical electricity markets with the poolco model, bilateral contract model, and hybrid model. The disclosed information and clearing models in these markets are summarized to provide an overview of the present information disclosure mechanisms in typical deregulated power systems worldwide. Moreover, the various experiences for establishing an efficient information disclosure mechanism is summarized and discussed.


Author(s):  
Francesco Arci ◽  
Jane Reilly ◽  
Pengfei Li ◽  
Kevin Curran ◽  
Ammar Belatreche

Electricity markets are different from other markets as electricity generation cannot be easily stored in substantial amounts and to avoid blackouts, the generation of electricity must be balanced with customer demand for it on a second-by-second basis. Customers tend to rely on electricity for day-to-day living and cannot replace it easily so when electricity prices increase, customer demand generally does not reduce significantly in the short-term. As electricity generation and customer demand must be matched perfectly second-by-second, and because generation cannot be stored to a considerable extent, cost bids from generators must be balanced with demand estimates in advance of real-time. This paper outlines a a forecasting algorithm built on artificial neural networks to predict short-term wholesale prices on the Irish Single Electricity Market so that market participants can make more informed trading decisions. Research studies have demonstrated that an adaptive or self-adaptive approach to forecasting would appear more suited to the task of predicting energy demands in territory such as Ireland. We have identified the features that such a model demands and outline it here.


Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 2412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengnan Zhao ◽  
Beibei Wang ◽  
Yachao Li ◽  
Yang Li

With the rapid development of distributed renewable energy (DRE), demand response (DR) programs, and the proposal of the energy internet, the current centralized trading of the electricity market model is unable to meet the trading needs of distributed energy. As a decentralized and distributed accounting mode, blockchain technology fits the requirements of distributed energy to participate in the energy market. Corresponding to the transaction principle, a blockchain-based integrated energy transaction mechanism is proposed, which divides the trading process into two stages: the call auction stage and the continues auction stage. The transactions among the electricity and heat market participants were used as examples to explain the details of the trading process. Finally, the smart contracts of the transactions were designed and deployed on the Ethereum private blockchain site to demonstrate the validity of the proposed transaction scheme.


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 5672
Author(s):  
Bert Willems ◽  
Juulia Zhou

We describe how recent EU regulation affects demand response (DR) and highlight some of the remaining regulatory challenges from a legal and economic viewpoint. With the Clean Energy Package (CEP), the EU has opted for a fully market-based, consumer-centered approach for DR. The development of business models and products is left to a large extent to market forces. However, to enable the efficient development of those DR markets, network regulation has to adapt. (1) Network tariffs have to become more cost-reflective to provide correct incentives to market participants. The capacity tariffs have to increase, net-metering should be abolished, and optional tariff components for providing flexibility may need to be considered. (2) The regulation for distribution system operators (DSOs) may need to be fine-tuned to reflect their new roles. We present three scenarios: (a) a horizontal merger of unbundled DSOs under incentive regulation, (b) a DSO as a subsidiary of an integrated utility under cost plus regulation, (c) a transfer of some activities from DSO to TSO.


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. 3395
Author(s):  
Hansol Shin ◽  
Tae Hyun Kim ◽  
Kyuhyeong Kwag ◽  
Wook Kim

Under marginal-cost pricing, some generators cannot recover their production costs at the market price due to non-convexities in the electricity market. For this reason, most electricity markets pay side-payments to generators whose costs are not sufficiently recovered, but side-payments present the problem of deteriorating transparency in the market. Recently, convex hull pricing and extended locational marginal pricing have been reviewed or gradually introduced to reduce side-payments. Another method is to include non-convex costs in the market price, which is applied in the Korean electricity market. Although it is not generally considered in the electricity market, the Vickrey auction method is also one of the pricing mechanisms that can reduce side-payments. The main purpose of this study is to analyze the financial impact of these alternative pricing mechanisms on market participants through rigorous simulation. We applied the alternative pricing schemes to the Korean electricity market, and the impacts are analyzed by comparing the cost aspect of an electricity sales company and the profit aspect of generation companies. As a result of the simulation study, each pricing mechanism not only differed in the degree to which side-payments are reduced but also has different effects on the type of generators.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athanasios Dagoumas

This paper aims at tackling how the bilateral contracts affect wholesale electricity markets. It examines different levels of bilateral contracts among producers and demand aggregators, aiming to quantify their effect. In addition, it focuses on markets where bilateral contracts could be used as a tool by market participants with a dominant position. Further, the paper examined a case with asymmetrical portfolios, namely where a market participant has a dominant position as in case of Greece, aiming to investigate if bilateral contracts can be used as a tool to manipulate the market. The simulations have been done by an optimization model that provides the economic dispatch and clearing of the day-ahead electricity market. The model incorporated bilateral contracts with committed generating capacity from producers, as well as dynamic bidding strategy per market participant. Results provide useful insights on the design of electricity markets, especially in case of designing voluntary energy exchanges where a market participant has a dominant position.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 601
Author(s):  
Pilar Peiteado Mariscal

Resumen: Al hilo de la STJUE de 13 de octubre de 2016, este comentario examina el ámbito de aplicación y los foros de competencia del Reglamento 2201/2003, desde la perspectiva de los procesos de nulidad matrimonial instados por un tercero distinto de los cónyuges, y atiende también a la relación de esta norma con el resto de los Reglamentos que regulan el Derecho de familia en el ámbito europeo.Palabras clave: Nulidad matrimonial. Reglamento 2201/2003. Derecho de familia europeo.Abstract: Taking as frame of reference the Judgment of the EUC in Case C-294/15, this paper focuses on the scope and the jurisdiction rules in the EU Regulation 2201/2003. It tries to pay special atention to marriage annulment trials sued by a third party, and also to the relationship between EU Regulation 2201/2003 and the others EU regulations wich rule European Family Law.Keywords: Marriage annulment. EU Regulation 2201/2003. European Family Law.


Author(s):  
Marcello Bianchi ◽  
Carmine Di Noia ◽  
Matteo Gargantini

This chapter claims that the current EU securities and financial law falls short of delivering a satisfactory equilibrium between investor protection and limitation of issuer costs and may squeeze too many firms out of the market for both debt and equity capital. Based on the assumption that market participants are sometimes better suited to deciding how best to protect their own interests, the chapter submits a set of proposals largely based on optional rules that, we believe, could improve the quality of EU regulation. In contrast with the current regime, those options would be available irrespective of the trading venue where the relevant SME securities are traded, but they should also be allocated in a way that ensures sufficient standardization exists when needed. Matters covered by our proposal include takeovers, major shareholding disclosure, corporate governance statements, ongoing issuer disclosure duties, and prospectuses.


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