Democratization and Authoritarian Party Survival

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy Langston
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
National Party ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Party Funding

Mexico’s Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) held executive power continuously from 1929 to 2000, when its candidate suffered a shocking defeat in the presidential elections. This study, which covers the years 1980–2012, uses an institutional focus to understand why the PRI survived its defeat and loss of the resources of the executive bureaucracy to return victoriously after two six-year terms out of office. The book offers a model of the difficulties authoritarian parties must face after they are ousted from the executive through fair and free elections: the danger of dramatic fractures that could destroy the party and the possibility of mass voter rejection. The institutional context of Mexico allowed the party’s factions to continue to cooperate and win elections. Mexico is a federal, presidential regime with a two-tiered electoral system, with no consecutive reelection and generous public party funding. The PRI changed dramatically in organizational terms as its directly elected state governors became power brokers within the party (though governors cannot be reelected). Yet, because of the nation’s electoral rules, the national party office remained a central player, both in party and national politics. The national party headquarters continued to mount an important response to the new government’s executive and coordinated the party’s legislators in Congress. The institutional context played a crucial role in creating spaces for both factions (the governors and the national party) and allowing them to cooperate. The former hegemonic party did not, however, develop a consistent ideology or try to purge itself of its clientelist or corrupt practices, because the governors had no authority strong enough to force them the change their conduct.

Comparing the PRI Experience to Kenya and Taiwan

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
National Union ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The Impact

The final chapter applies the argument based on the Mexican experience to other authoritarian regimes with strong parties that transitioned to democracy: Kenya and Taiwan. Kenya African National Union (KANU) practically disappeared because electoral rules allowed politicians to win elections without strong labels. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang survived and returned to power after two terms out of executive power, in large part because its divisions did not lead to fragmentation and because voters continued to support the label. Thus, the work’s argument: that party leaders must learn to garner electoral victories under democratic circumstances while avoiding the pressures to fragment, holds. Federalism, the mixed-member electoral system, and generous party financing all play a role in determining how electoral competition creates winners and losers within the party organization. These institutions also reduce the impact of the electoral opening on the party’s tendency to fragment.

The Queensland Electoral System and Indigenous Representation

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Tereza Smejkalová
Keyword(s):  
Torres Strait Islander ◽  
Indigenous Population ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Member ◽  
National Party ◽  
Torres Strait Islander People ◽  
Indigenous Representation ◽  
Torres Strait ◽  
Aboriginal Person ◽  
Legislative Assembly

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people represent more than 3 per cent of the Queensland population, but only one Aboriginal person has so far been elected to the Queensland Legislative Assembly. (Mr Eric Deeral was the National Party member for Cook from 1974 to 1977.) This fact suggests that the Indigenous population and minorities in general do not have much influence on government in Queensland. Questions therefore arise as to why and what can be done to address this deficiency.

Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
SONA NADENICHEK GOLDER
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Coalitions ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
Coalition Size ◽  
Government Coalition

Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

‘Op proef doeltreffend gebleken, kunnen we spreken van een bereikt ideaal’

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-59
Author(s):  
Jacques Lemmink
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Dutch Version ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Religious Networks ◽  
Voting Machine

Abstract ‘Proved effective on trial, we can speak of an achieved ideal’ Abraham Kuyper and the mechanical voting machine, c. 1895-1905 During the latest presidential elections in the United States, unfounded conspiracy theories sprung up concerning alleged ballot box fraud by compromised voting machines. Although different voting machines had been used in the Netherlands since 1966, concerns over their reliability ended this in 2007. This article investigates the forgotten but ultimately failed attempt to introduce mechanical voting machines a century earlier. It focuses on the role played by prominent politician Abraham Kuyper, who personally visited the Standard Voting Machine Company in Rochester in 1898. The article illustrates how Kuyper’s transatlantic political and religious networks facilitated the voting machine’s transfer, rather than scientific connections. Paradoxically, the introduction of proportional representation in 1917 marked the end of tentative attempts to develop a Dutch version of the American mechanical voting machine. The implementation in the voting process turned out be too expensive, too early, and too complicated for the Dutch electoral system at the dawn of the twentieth century.

scholarly journals Hacia el estudio de lo preocupante en nuestro régimen de partidos = The worrying state of our party system

2015 ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Óscar Alzaga Villaamil
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Full Control ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Siglo Xix ◽  
Party Funding ◽  
Sociological Studies ◽  
Spanish Legislation

Noting that in sociological studies at European level Spain is almost at the bottom of civic appraisal of its democracy and its political, the study explores the historical roots of poor political representation in the nineteenth century Spanish with management from the Crown Decrees of dissolution of parliament and full control by governments shift elections based on small districts and on a rooted cacique system. The 1977 Law for Political Reform conditioned the electoral system for the Parliament, distorting proportional representation in terms that have come down to us and who have devoted bipartisanship when none of the major parties has a majority depends on the Nationalist forces, they have made great revenues as unique representative map. The Spanish legislation regulating political parties with great precision how the upcoming ban terrorism forces, but hardly develops the constitutional requirements regarding the organization and internal functioning must be democratic, nor on party funding, for what you need to consider the reform of the parties Act 2002.Tras constatar que en los estudios sociológicos de ámbito europeo España se sitúa prácticamente a la cola de valoración ciudadana de su democracia y de sus políticos, el estudio profundiza en las raíces históricas de la mala representación política durante el Siglo XIX español con manejo desde la Corona de los Decretos de disolución de las Cortes y pleno control por los gobiernos del turno de unas elecciones basadas en distritos pequeños y en un arraigados sistema caciquil. La Ley de 1977 para la Reforma Política condicionó el sistema electoral para las Cortes, distorsionando la representación proporcional en términos que han llegado a nuestros días y que han consagrado un bipartidismo que cuando ninguno de los principales partidos tiene mayoría absoluta depende de las fuerzas nacionalistas, que han obtenido grandes réditos de tan singular mapa representativo. La legislación española de partidos políticos regula con gran precisión la forma de prohibir las fuerzas próximas al terrorismo, pero prácticamente no desarrolla los imperativos constitucionales en cuanto a que la organización y el funcionamiento interno deben ser democráticos, ni sobre la financiación de los partidos, por lo que procede abordar la reforma de la Ley de partidos de 2002.

Voters reward hard-working MPs: empirical evidence from the French legislative elections

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel François ◽  
Julien Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political System ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Legislative Election

AbstractThis paper studies the relationship between incumbent MPs’ activities and their electoral fortune. We address this question in the context of the French political system characterized by an executive domination, a candidate-centered electoral system, and an electoral schedule maximizing the impact of the presidential elections. Given the contradictory influence of these three institutional features on the relationship between MPs’ activities and electoral results, the overall link can only be assessed empirically. We test the effects of several measurements of MPs’ activities on both their vote share and reelection probability in the 2007 legislative election. We show that MPs’ activities are differently correlated to both the incumbents’ vote shares in the first round and their reelection. Despite the weakness of the French National Assembly, several parliamentary activities, especially bill initiation, have a significant effect on MPs’ electoral prospects.

The Transition to Democracy and the Struggles to Take Over the Party

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joy K. Langston
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Party ◽  
Economic Crises ◽  
Party Change

This chapter provides a description of the political and economic crises of the mid-1990s that led to the loss of the PRI’s majority in the Chamber and the presidential defeat in 2000. Even as leaders of the authoritarian regime grappled with downward electoral trends, groups within the party began to battle among themselves over the timing and scope of the transition and of party change. The PRI adapted to the rigors of electoral competition because vote-winning groups within its ranks took over the party and defeated their internal rivals, who were less able to respond to the challenges of the ballot box. Political institutions such as federalism and the two-tiered electoral system helped define winners and losers within the party and gave the winning groups—the party’s governors and the national party officers—ways of controlling resources (candidacies and finances) that did not come into direct conflict.

Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Geographic Dispersion ◽  
Proportional Systems

There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.

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