Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Geographic Dispersion ◽  
Proportional Systems

There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.

Ballot spoilage as a response to limitations on choice and influence

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199025
Author(s):  
Patrick Cunha Silva ◽  
Brian F Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Reasoning Systems

Electoral systems vary in terms of the choice and influence they offer voters. Beyond selecting between parties, preferential systems allow for choices within parties. More proportional systems make it likely that influence over who determines the assembly’s majority will be distributed across relatively more voters. In response to systems that limit choice and influence, we hypothesize that voters will cast more blank, null, or spoiled ballots on purpose. We use a regression discontinuity opportunity in French municipal elections to test this hypothesis. An exogenously chosen and arbitrary cutpoint is used to determine the electoral rules municipalities use to select their assemblies. We find support for our reasoning—systems that do not allow intraparty preference votes and that lead to disproportional outcomes provoke vote spoilage. Rates of vote spoilage are frequently sufficient to change control over the assembly if those votes had instead been cast validly for the second-place party.

Replacing FPTP

Federalism-E ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Alberto Di Candia
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Inherent Stability ◽  
Opposition Parties

Canada’s use of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system has been defended due to its simplicity, constituency representation, and inherent stability. Arguments have been raised, however, that the system does not sufficiently represent Canadian demographics in parliament, it renders opposition parties ineffective, smaller parties have trouble or are unable to win seats in parliament, and regionally-concentrated parties are encouraged over national based ones. It has been suggested that adding an element of proportionality would address some of these issues. This paper seeks to consider this claim by examining the political outcomes of proportional electoral systems. The literature review outlined that the use of proportional systems increased descriptive as well as geographic representation, and was positively linked to voter turnout.

Physical attractiveness, voter heuristics and electoral systems: The role of candidate attractiveness under different institutional designs

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stockemer ◽  
Rodrigo Praino
Keyword(s):  
Multivariate Statistics ◽  
Physical Attractiveness ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Positive Effect

While existing studies have shown that more attractive candidates running for office have an electoral advantage, very little has been written on how this advantage relates to different institutions. We theorise that formal institutions mediate the positive effect from which attractive candidates benefit. More in detail, we focus on the type of electoral system, hypothesising that physical attractiveness plays a more important role in majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems than in list proportional systems. We test this stipulation using the German federal elections’ two-tier electoral system, together with data collected in Australia on the physical attractiveness of German federal election candidates in 2013. A series of bivariate and multivariate statistics show that physical attractiveness is a significant factor explaining a candidate’s likelihood to win in the FPTP tier, but not in the list proportional representation (PR) tier.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAE-WON JUN ◽  
SIMON HIX
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Career Paths ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
National Assembly

AbstractA growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1000
Author(s):  
Brendan J Connell
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Foreign Credit

Abstract Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are dependent on how the borrowing state's electoral system aggregates competing domestic economic interests. Internationally oriented economic interests prefer to minimize creditor losses since sizeable debt reductions are more likely to compromise access to foreign credit. Conversely, workers and domestic-oriented economic interests prefer to maximize losses faced by foreign creditors in order to ease the costs of austerity at home. By shaping the political incentives of policymakers, I argue that democracies with candidate-centric electoral systems should be associated with sovereign defaults that are less costly for foreign creditors. Under these electoral systems, governments hold incentives to cater primarily to internationally oriented economic interests that are best able to overcome the costs of collective action. Statistical evidence from 53 sovereign debt restructurings between 1978 and 2012 supports the main argument.

Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay K. Dow
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Studies ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Ideological Divergence ◽  
System Characteristics

This study evaluates the extent of party-system extremism in thirty-one electoral democracies as a function of electoral-system proportionality. It uses data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems project to estimate the extent of party-system compactness or dispersion across polities and to determine whether more proportional systems foster greater ideological divergence among parties. Electoral system characteristics most associated with party-system compactness in the ideological space are investigated. The empirics show that more proportional systems support greater ideological dispersion, while less proportional systems encourage parties to cluster nearer the centre of the electoral space. This finding is maintained in several sub-samples of national elections and does not depend on the inclusion of highly majoritarian systems (such as the United Kingdom).

Electoral System Change

2017 ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Renwick
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Systemic Level ◽  
System Changes ◽  
Core Issues

Most research into electoral systems focuses on their effects. Only recently has a significant literature emerged examining how they are chosen. This chapter explores four core issues in that literature. First, it considers what is meant by “electoral system change.” This can refer to changes of any scale to any electoral rules in any context, but typically—including here—a narrower definition is used. Second, the chapter investigates what electoral system changes happen. It considers the frequency of reforms and patterns in those reforms. Third, it examines the determinants of electoral system change. Most studies focus on the microfoundations of reform. Others highlight the systemic level. Both perspectives are needed to develop a complete picture. Finally, the chapter gauges the effects of electoral system change and assesses why such changes, notwithstanding important effects, often fail to deliver on their promoters’ expectations.

Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (7) ◽  
pp. 905-927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames ◽  
Martin S. Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Institutional Differences

The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed-member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199372
Author(s):  
Marius Radean
Keyword(s):  
Research Design ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Party Switching ◽  
Do So

When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so early in the term to exploit voters’ short retrospective time horizon. These expectations are tested using a quasi experimental research design that estimates the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on party switching. In 2008 Romania changed its electoral system from a closed-list PR to a candidate-centered electoral system, where all candidates compete in single-member districts. Both hypotheses are supported by empirics. This helps weed out competing explanations which now have to account for both the decrease in and the different timing of party switching.

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