Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
SONA NADENICHEK GOLDER

Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

Politics ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 172-180
Author(s):  
Carlos E. Casillas ◽  
Alejandro Mújica

Mexico's 2000 presidential election was one of the most important political events in the nation's contemporary history. The victory of the National Action Party (PAN) and Vicente Fox, the first ‘non-official’ candidate ever to win a Mexican presidential election, surprised both local and world observers. This article comprises four parts. Part I very briefly places the election in historical perspective. In Part II, each of the three front-runners in the contest is profiled. Part III includes a systematic analysis of the general election results by constituencies or other territorial units, and features tabulated data. Part IV addresses the development of political parties and the party system before and after the elections.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-326
Author(s):  
Christopher D Raymond

Cross-national models of party system fragmentation hold that social diversity and district magnitude interact: higher levels of district magnitude allow for greater expression of social diversity that leads to higher levels of party system fragmentation. Most models, however, ignore differences between majoritarian and proportional electoral rules, which may significantly alter the impact of district magnitude, as well as the way in which district magnitude impacts the translation of social cleavages into party system fragmentation. Examining the case of Singapore suggests majoritarian multimember districts limit party system fragmentation, particularly by reducing the degree to which ethnic and religious diversity are translated into political parties. Applying these insights to a standard cross-national model of party system fragmentation, the results suggest that majoritarian multimember districts produce lower levels of party system fragmentation than proportional multimember districts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Widayati Widayati ◽  
Winanto Winanto

Indonesia since before independence until the time the core adopted a multi-party system. While the system of government changes, from a presidential, parliamentary, quasi presidential system. Multiparty presidential government systems can disrupt the stability and effectiveness of the government because there must be a coalition of political parties in the government, the preparation of the cabinet by the President must consider and accommodate the interests of coalition political parties, decision making or policy-making must also consider the interests of coalition political parties, so it will require longer time. The coalition of political parties is very fluid and pragmatic, so there may be a change in the coalition because there is a possibility that political parties that were outside the coalition will then enter the government coalition, and vice versa. Exit the entry of political parties in the government coalition will certainly be very disturbing, because political parties who have just joined the government will demand a seat in the government, especially in the cabinet. Unloading pairs of the cabinet or dismantling pairs of government seats will often occur. This of course greatly disrupts the stability and effectiveness of government. Therefore, a presidential government system ideally does not combine with a multi-party system. A change from a multi-party system to a simple multi-party system is needed, or if possible with a two-party system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110594
Author(s):  
Danica Fink-Hafner ◽  
Meta Novak

In Slovenia, political parties have been the key actors in opting for a proportional electoral system and constitutional choice of a parliamentary system, both of which are believed to help to develop a consensual type of democracy. However, a vicious circle involving a fragmented party system and a proportional electoral system has not only led to polarisation within the party system, but has also contributed to problems of democratic governability and legitimacy. The destabilisation of the party system since 2011 has not only caused a crisis of political legitimacy and accountability, but has also contributed to a recent trend of de-democratisation. At the moment, there does not appear to be a realistic alternative to the existing electoral rules in the near future, in spite of recurring calls by an anti-communist party (Slovenian Democratic Party) to introduce a majoritarian system.


Author(s):  
Nathan Allen

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.


Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 805-824 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josephine T. Andrews ◽  
Jeannette Money

Using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data for twenty established parliamentary democracies, the authors have studied the relationship between number of parties in a party system and party dispersion. They found that as the number of parties in the system increases, the dispersion of parties also increases, but only up to a point. The boundaries of a finite issue space appear to expand up to at most five parties. In addition, once the number of parties in the party system was controlled for, they found that electoral rules have no direct effect on party dispersion. Thus, their findings validate the theoretical predictions of spatial theory while at the same time highlighting surprising ways in which the policy space is constrained.


Author(s):  
Josep M. Colomer

A long tradition of empirical studies has focused on the consequences of electoral systems on party systems. A number of contributions have turned this relationship upside down by postulating that it is the parties that choose electoral systems and manipulate the rules of elections. The most remote shaping of innovative electoral rules, the choice of electoral systems in new democracies, and further electoral reforms in well-established regimes can be explained on the basis of political parties’ relative strength, expectations, and strategic decisions. In a broader institutional context, political parties can also trade off electoral systems with choices and changes of other institutional rules.


Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Gissur Ó. Erlingsson

This introduction to the section on the party system in Sweden starts with the premise that political parties are essential for the upholding of legitimacy in parliamentary democracies. Four chapters make up the section. The first focuses on the changing Swedish party system, where Social Democrats historically have held an exceptionally strong position, which has weakened during recent years. The second analyzes the parties’ internal organizational structure, suggesting that although Swedish parties have become more professionalized, and the ‘mass party’ has faded away, this does not imply they have become internally less democratic. The third chapter focuses on representation, arguing that Swedish parties today face a more complex environment than before, with more diversity among representatives. The concluding chapter suggests that some features of Swedish cabinets stand out in a comparative perspective, with many single-party minority governments, where the Social Democrats have ruled with the help of ‘support party coalitions’.


2021 ◽  
pp. 505-527
Author(s):  
Daniela Giannetti ◽  
Andrea Pedrazzani

This essay examines speechmaking activity in the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1996 to 2018. Such a period covers almost entirely the phase called the “Second Republic” following a radical change in the electoral rules and the party system that Italy experienced in the early 1990s. Our analysis of the determinants of speechmaking activity shows that the small percentage of MPs holding leading positions within and for their party in the legislative and executive arena (e.g., committee chairs, parliamentary party groups’ leaders, ministers) do speak more in parliament. Our results largely confirm the hypothesis that, in systems where party government is predominant, floor access is strictly controlled by political parties. This hypothesis receives further support from the analysis carried out in the section of this chapter examining the impact of different electoral incentives on speechmaking activity.


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