Neurocognitive Bases of Preschoolers’ Theory-of-Mind DevelopmentIntegrating Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Development

2006 ◽  
pp. 153-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience

scholarly journals Towards a more inclusive and equitable developmental cognitive neuroscience

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jazlyn Nketia ◽  
Dima Amso ◽  
Natalie Hiromi Brito
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Marginalized Communities ◽  
Developmental Science ◽  
Science Theory ◽  
Brain Structure And Function ◽  
Scientific Potential ◽  
And Function

Brain and cognitive development is a burgeoning area of scientific inquiry, with tremendous potential to better the lives of children. Large scale longitudinal neuroimaging studies offer opportunities for significant scientific advances in our understanding of developing brain structure and function. The proposed manuscript will focus on the scientific potential of the HEALthy Brain and Cognitive Development (HBCD) Study, highlighting what questions these data can and what they cannot answer about child development. Specifically, we caution against the misuse of these data for advancing de-contextualized and scientifically questionable narratives about the development of children from marginalized communities. We will focus on building and organizing a framework for interpreting HBCD data through the lens of sampling, cultural context, measurement, and developmental science theory. Our goal is to thoughtfully offer the scientific community opportunities to use the large scale and collaborative nature of HBCD to collectively revise practices in developmental science that to-date have not carefully considered their own role in perpetuating narratives that support systemic injustice.

scholarly journals Chapter 9 - Theory of Mind and Joint Attention - The Handbook on Socially Interactive Agents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jairo Pérez-Osorio ◽  
Eva Wiese ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Joint Attention ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Virtual Agents ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Social Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Intelligent Virtual Agents

The present chapter provides an overview from the perspective of social cognitive neuroscience (SCN) regarding theory of mind (ToM) and joint attention (JA) as crucial mechanisms of social cognition and discusses how these mechanisms have been investigated in social interaction with artificial agents. In the final sections, the chapter reviews computational models of ToM and JA in social robots (SRs) and intelligent virtual agents (IVAs) and discusses the current challenges and future directions.

Are cognitive representations of friends' request refusals implemented in the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices? A cognitive neuroscience approach to ‘theory of mind’ in relationships

2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan D. Heisel ◽  
Michael J. Beatty
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Brain Imaging ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Brain Wave ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Dorsolateral Prefrontal ◽  
Prefrontal Cortices

Formulating cognitive representations of others' mental states when interpreting behavior (i.e., ‘theory of mind’) rather than merely focusing on the behavior is considered a distinctly human trait which both interpersonal scholars and cognitive neuroscientists agree plays a critical role in the development and maintenance of social relationships. Although brain-imaging studies have led to huge advances in the understanding of memory and language, theories of social relationships remain relatively uninformed by cognitive neuroscience. In the present study, hypotheses regarding the implementation of theory of mind in a relationship context are (a) derived from extant theory and research, and (b) tested via brain-imaging technology. Specifically, spectrum analyses were conducted using brain wave recordings collected by an electroencephalograph (EEG) monitoring oscillations in the gamma range for the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices while participants attempted to construct cognitive representations regarding a friend's request refusal. Results indicated statistically greater electrical activity in both cortical regions for participants engaged in the task than for participants in the control condition. The implications of the findings for building a fully elaborated sequential process model of cognitive representations in interpersonal contexts, among other theoretical endeavors, are discussed.

Development of Lying and Cognitive Abilities

2018 ◽  
pp. 398-407
Author(s):  
Victoria Talwar
Keyword(s):  
Autism Spectrum Disorder ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functioning ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Disorder

The emergence and development of children’s lie-telling is closely associated with their developing cognitive abilities. Telling a lie involves complicated cognitive functions including theory-of-mind understanding and executive functioning abilities. Recent research has found that lie-telling emerges in the preschool years and children’s abilities to maintain their lies improves with age. The current chapter reviews existing literature on the development of children’s lie-telling behavior and its relation to various aspects of children’s cognitive development. It covers the work of Lewis, Stanger, and Sullivan (1989), including the well-known guessing-game experiment, where the child is left alone with temptation and the instruction not to peek. Much of Talwar, Lee, et al.’s research into three-to-seven-year-old children’s lie-telling behavior is covered; and the interaction between these studies and Theory of Mind is emphasized; this is illuminated in the account of research using child subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

An Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Human Self-awareness and Theory of Mind

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farah Focquaert ◽  
Johan Braeckman ◽  
Steven M. Platek
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Self Awareness

scholarly journals Theory of Mind and Linguistic Acquisition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arab World English Journal ◽  
Ronnie Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Idiomatic Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a conceptual theory that is credited with enabling individuals to anticipate the mental states of others, including their beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and additional emotive circumstances (Flavell, 2004). Linguistic acquisition is a natural development that begins to develop in children from birth and enables communication. The cognitive domains necessary to comprehend language is also required in order for the formation of ToM to develop. The interpretations made through ToM presumptions can contain the discernment of another’s false belief. In this context, the individual must be aware that the literal interpretation could be an inaccurate symbol or manufactured belief. This understanding requires a certain level of cognitive development in the child since the intention may be to signify something else and the child must be able to correctly process idiomatic expressions in order to accurately make ToM determinations (Caillies & Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008). This paper explores the relationship between ToM and linguistic acquisition in normally developing children, as well as those with various disabilities to ascertain the degree of cognitive development necessary in order to make ToM determinations. Exploration of this relationship reveals that linguistic and cognitive development are both essential in the construct of ToM perceptions in early childhood.

The Epistemology of Young Children

2011 ◽  
pp. 21-44
Author(s):  
Denise L. Winsor
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Epistemological Development ◽  
Children's Beliefs ◽  
Impact Of Technology ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this chapter is to raise questionable doubt about young children’s abilities to engage in more sophisticated thinking; and the impact of technology on children’s early epistemological development. The theoretical framework is rooted in Piaget’s theories of cognitive development, and is typically applied to college students and adults. However, Piaget is criticized for seriously underestimating young children’s cognitive ability. Moreover, scholars including Chandler, Hallet, and Sokol (2002) and Burr and Hofer (2002) have proposed an early predualist phase of epistemological development in which children between the ages of 3-to-6 may demonstrate more sophisticated ways of thinking and knowing related to theory of mind development. How does technology influence young children’s beliefs about knowledge or how might teacher’s and parent’s beliefs about knowledge affect young children? This chapter explores the answer to this question by discussing the research on epistemology and young children in relation to cognition and cognitive development.

The Development of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Micronesian Children

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Oberle
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Preschool Age ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Preschool Age Children ◽  
False Belief Tasks

AbstractIn this study, the development of false-belief understanding was investigated among 3–5-year-old Yapese and Fais children in Micronesia. Sixty-nine children took part in an experiment investigating their understanding of false belief with a culturally adjusted surprise content task, which has been widely used in Theory of Mind (ToM) research and was first introduced by Hogrefe, Wimmer and Perner (1986). The results show that as in western cultures, 3-year-old Micronesian preschoolers do not display understanding of false belief measured with classical false-belief tasks, while 5-year-olds do. These findings contribute to research on the universality and cultural variability of cognitive development in preschool age children.

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