Development of Lying and Cognitive Abilities

The emergence and development of children’s lie-telling is closely associated with their developing cognitive abilities. Telling a lie involves complicated cognitive functions including theory-of-mind understanding and executive functioning abilities. Recent research has found that lie-telling emerges in the preschool years and children’s abilities to maintain their lies improves with age. The current chapter reviews existing literature on the development of children’s lie-telling behavior and its relation to various aspects of children’s cognitive development. It covers the work of Lewis, Stanger, and Sullivan (1989), including the well-known guessing-game experiment, where the child is left alone with temptation and the instruction not to peek. Much of Talwar, Lee, et al.’s research into three-to-seven-year-old children’s lie-telling behavior is covered; and the interaction between these studies and Theory of Mind is emphasized; this is illuminated in the account of research using child subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Selfless Assertions

There are three central components to the phenomenon of selfless assertion: first, a subject, for purely non-epistemic reasons, does not believe that p; second, despite this lack of belief, the subject is aware that p is very well supported by all of the available evidence; and, third, because of this, the subject asserts that p without believing that p. In this piece, it is argued that selfless assertion sheds crucial light on how to understand the nature of lying. In particular, it is shown that only accounts of lying that secure a connection with deception deliver the correct verdict that cases of selfless assertion are importantly different from lies.

Lying and Fiction

Lying and fiction both involve the deliberate production of statements that fail to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis for fiction and lies. This chapter discusses the similarities, but also some fundamental differences between lying and fiction. It argues that there is little hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth-conditional semantic framework. Rather than immediately moving to a fully pragmatic analysis involving distinct speech acts of fiction-making and lying, the chapter first explores how far we get with the assumption that both are simply assertions, analyzed in a Stalnakerian framework, i.e., as proposals to update the common ground.

Bullshitting

This chapter provides an overview of reactions to Harry Frankfurt’s influential theory of bullshitting, addressing the four main features he ascribes to it, and considers some alternatives to Frankfurt’s account. Among others, issues raised by Thomas Carson and G. A. Cohen are examined in the discussion. A proposal to characterize bullshitting in terms of Gricean maxims is discussed, and it is argued that these views fail to capture the full range of cases. Here, works by Stokke and Don Fallis are cited. An alternative view that analyzes bullshitting in terms of the speaker’s attitudes toward the communal project of inquiry is canvassed, and the chapter ends by discussing the relation between bullshitting and lying.

Lying and Omissions

Work in the philosophy of deception tends to focus on outright lying. However, saying something that you believe to be false is not the only way to intentionally cause people to have false beliefs. This chapter focuses on deceiving people by *not* saying things. Not speaking may constitute lying, in contexts where it can be construed as a communication. Deceptive omissions, such as half-truths and lies of omission, can be just as common, just as misleading, and just as dangerous at outright lies. Grice’s “first maxim of Quality” and “first maxim of Quantity” are used in directing the discussion. The chapter investigates the ontology, the epistemology, and the ethics of deceptive omissions.

Lying in Different Cultures

This chapter reviews key issues related to lying within the framework of a cross-cultural context. First, important notions such as individualism and collectivism are discussed. Various definitions of lying are then introduced based on semantics and pragmatics frameworks (e.g., Grice’s Cooperative Principle). Next, the motivations and acceptability of lies are addressed by referring to values and assumptions found in different cultures. Finally, the chapter examines conversational data collected from Japanese people and New Zealanders. The data contain lies that are used as strategies to manage undesirable situations. The examples illustrate how people would choose different types of lie by following their own cultural protocols and preferences.

Lying and Psychology

Lying is a very complex behavior, occurring in different forms and situations. It requires the liar not only to constantly keep the perspective of the to-be-deceived person in mind, but at the same time to remember and activate the truth, prevent the truth from slipping out, and flexibly switch between the lie and the truth. The affective correlates of lying seem to range from guilt and the fear of being discovered to a delight after successfully getting away with a lie. Because of the observed variability in the affective correlates of lying, most recent research on lie detection has started to explore methods that are based on cognitive rather than affective processes. Those methods aim either to measure the increased cognitive load during lying, or to measure lying indirectly by assessing whether a suspect recognizes critical crime-related information.

Lying and Self-Deception

Given the definitions of lying and self-deception, it would be wrong to understand self-deception as lying to oneself. It seems, however, that any definition of self-deception gives rise to two paradoxes. According to the ‘static paradox’, self-deception involves believing ‘p and not-p’ at the same time. According to the ‘dynamic paradox’, self-deception involves the intention to deceive oneself. If both claims were true, self-deception would seem to be impossible. ‘Divisionists’ try to solve the first paradox by arguing that the human mind is divided into several subsystems such that the self-deceiver consciously believes that p while unconsciously believing that not-p. ‘Non-intentionalists’ try to solve the second paradox by arguing that self-deception is based on a ‘motivational bias’. Since both explanations fall short of accounting for the blameworthiness of self-deception, a third approach examines the phenomenon from the perspective of virtue theory, claiming that self-deceivers have not yet succeeded in developing the virtue of accuracy.

Bald-Faced Lies

Bald-faced lies are utterances that seem to lack the intent of the speaker to deceive the hearer, which is usually assumed in the definition of proper lying. Therefore, the so-called non-deceptionists call the latter assumption into question. The so-called deceptionists, sticking to the traditional definition of lying, argue in turn that bald-faced lies either are no real lies or are connected to an intention to deceive. The chapter gives a concise overview of the main positions in this dispute, discusses the cases typically employed to illustrate bald-faced lies, and summarizes recent experimental findings on how ordinary speakers perceive bald-faced lies. It turns out that ordinary speakers often think that bald-faced lies are lies and that they are deceptive at the same time. This poses problems for both the deceptionists and the non-deceptionists.

Lying, Belief, and Knowledge

What is the relationship between lying, belief, and knowledge? Most philosophical accounts of lying define it in terms of belief, namely telling someone something that one believes to be false, often with the intent to deceive. This chapter develops a novel account of lying by deriving evaluative dimensions of responsibility from the knowledge norm of assertion. On these dimensions, we can distinguish reasonable assertions, negligent assertions, and vicious assertions. On the definition of lying defended here, lies are best understood as special cases of vicious assertion; thus lying is the anti-paradigm of proper assertion. This enables an account of lying in terms of knowledge rather than belief: roughly, lying is telling someone something you know ain’t so.