1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL N. DOREMUS
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3B) ◽  
pp. 125-138
Author(s):  
Yuliia Nesterchuk ◽  
Petro Bechko ◽  
Ruslan P. Mudrak ◽  
Serhii Sokoliuk ◽  
Liudmyla Melnyk

The aim of the work is to establish effective state instruments of development of entrepreneurial activity in the agrarian sector of Ukraine. For the realization of the purpose was used a number of economic-mathematical methods of analysis by panel data of EU and OECD countries for the period 1986-2020: regression modeling of relationships between the total value of agrarian production and total support, rendered to agrarian sector, types and structural volumes of such support; regression dependence statistics, methods of comparative analysis and graphics analysis. The results allowed us to establish that the change in the total production value of the agrarian sector by 96,79% is determined by the types and structural volumes of state support provided to the agrarian sector. For the development of entrepreneurial activity in the agrarian sector of Ukraine it is advisable to activate state support of knowledge and innovation system, infrastructure of agrarian sphere and optimize measures of inspection and control, significantly prevail among the tools of domestic regulation of the agrarian sphere.


Author(s):  
Meg Rithmire

How do state-business relations interact with outward investment in authoritarian regimes? This article focuses on the importance of domestic political status and specifically business’ vulnerability to the state in explaining the dynamics of China’s outward investments. I present three types of domestic capital whose economic and political logics differ as they go abroad: tactical capital pursues political power and prestige, competitive capital pursues commercial goals, and crony capital seeks refuge from the state and asset expatriation. The Chinese regime’s approach to outward investment, which I characterize as mobilization campaigns adjusted over time and combined with targeted domestic regulation, endeavors to treat these different kinds of capital differently, deploying and disciplining tactical capital, enabling competitive capital, and constraining crony capital.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Vladimirovna Ponomareva

The development of industrial cooperation creates fundamental and long-term foundations for BRICS current and future economic partnership. It was reflected in recently adopted Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025. At the same time, realization of the existing potential of industrial cooperation cannot take place without taking into account the development of new global trends. These trends and respective factors influence companies` business strategies and government regulatory policies significantly. As a result, both traditional factors and novel challenges, such as comprehensive digitalization processes in global economy and trade, technical and technological development of different industries and global value chains, the pressure of trade conflicts resulted in accumulation of protectionism in trade policies and the ongoing crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered thoroughly. In the case of the BRICS countries the existing incentives for the reconfiguration of GVCs and the enhancement of their resilience and reliability can be implemented in the strengthening of trade and industrial ties and the diversification of suppliers and markets through the development of cooperation with the partner countries. To realize these opportunities, it is necessary to ensure favorable regulatory basis both in traditional areas (trade and investment liberalization, convergence in domestic regulation) and in the framework of modern trends that are gaining momentum: increasing cooperation in e-commerce, trade facilitation, developing scientific, technological and innovative cooperation, addressing infrastructural issues in order to reduce transport and logistics costs and expand trade and industrial cooperation..


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOOST PAUWELYN

Depending on how one classifies market intervention, trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as a ‘market access restriction’ and that defined as ‘domestic regulation’. Both the GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary. Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it finds crucial differences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the paper's basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning certain imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document