Croatia and the European Union

Author(s):  
Pero Maldini

Croatia’s accession to the European Union (EU) meant, in political terms, the recognition of its political and normative-institutional achievements in the establishment of a nation state and the democracy. At the same time, for the vast majority of Croatian citizens EU membership also had a symbolic meaning: a departure from the troubled past and a return to the Western, European cultural circle, which they have always felt they belong to. This feeling is the source for the strong pro-European orientation, which, as state independence was being achieved, and democracy established—as an expression of the strong political will of Croatian citizens for freedom and autonomy—helped achieve those historical and political goals. The EU was perceived as a framework that would enable those goals to be realized, so there was a general political consensus about joining it among all relevant political actors, and the vast majority of Croatian citizens granted their consent. The path to full EU membership was long and arduous, primarily because of the specific conditions that marked the process of establishing a Croatian state and a democratic order. On the one hand, these are endogenous structural and socio-cultural factors: the structure and activity of political actors and the functioning of institutions, which were significantly marked by their authoritarian political and historical legacy. On the other hand, was a war of aggression and a struggle for freedom and independence with long-lasting and difficult social and political consequences. These specific conditions—which none of the other acceding countries had—slowed down the process of democratization and, consequently, hampered the EU accession process. All these reasons are why Croatia had the most comprehensive and longest accession negotiations, including the most extensive body of pre-accession conditions. Although the extent and duration of negotiations, as well as the lack of expected support from the EU (especially during the war) have led to an increase in Euroskepticism and criticism of the EU—and consequently to the low turnout in the referendum for accession—the pro-European orientation remained dominant in Croatia. In general, public support for EU accession in Croatia was based on a set of mutually connected factors: identity-based (cultural affiliation), institutional-political (democracy), and utilitarian (socioeconomic benefits). In the period after joining the EU, due to insufficient preparation, Croatia has relatively slowly used the opportunities (especially economic) provided by EU. Nevertheless, EU membership has accelerated the increase in institutional capacity and better use of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). At the same time, the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services, and the opportunities brought by the open EU market, had a double impact: strengthening the economy due to greater orientation toward the EU market, but also slower economic growth, due to structural problems (the lingering power of the state, and regulations to the economy and the market) and increased emigration of the highly educated younger population (chronic labor-force deficit). Nonetheless, through Croatia’s participation in the EU institutions, the real benefits of full membership are becoming increasingly visible, and the sense of integration in the EU’s social, political, cultural, and economic space is growing stronger. At the same time, EU membership affects further improvement of the normative-institutional framework of Croatia.

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luděk Urban

The Czech economy is undergoing two dominant processes: on the one hand transformation process which is far from being finished, on the other hand the Czech Republic is preparing its legislation and takes other measures to be ready for accession to the EU. The process of EU accession is a relationship of two partners who are not in quite an equal position. One party, an associated country aspiring to join the EU, tries to demonstrate that it fulfills the laid down conditions of accession and that it is ready for this act.


Author(s):  
John Erik Fossum

Norway has applied for membership of the European Union (EU) four times but is not a member. The two first applications were aborted because of de Gaulle’s veto against the U.K.’s application. The two latter were turned down by Norwegian citizens in popular referenda (1972 and 1994). Why did a majority of Norwegian citizens reject EU membership? A survey of the literature identifies a range of historical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic factors. In addition, it cannot be discounted that there were specific features about the referendums and the referendum campaigns that help account for the decisions to reject EU membership, given that all Nordic states except Iceland have held EU membership referendums. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Norway is not an EU member, it has opted for as close an EU association as is possible for a nonmember. In order to understand Norway’s EU relationship, the following paradox must be addressed: whereas the question of EU membership has long been a highly controversial and divisive issue, Norway’s comprehensive incorporation in the EU through the EEA Agreement and a whole host of other arrangements has profound constitutional democratic implications and yet has sparked surprisingly little controversy. What then are the distinctive features of the “Norway model,” in other words, Norway’s EU affiliation? In order to clarify this, it is necessary to compare and contrast Norway’s affiliation with other relevant types of affiliation that nonmembers have to the EU. Thereafter, the distinctive features of Norway’s EU affiliation can be outlined: the internal market through the EEA Agreement; justice and home affairs through the Schengen and Dublin conventions; as well as defense cooperation and the institutional apparatus regulating Norway’s relationship with the EU. A distinctive feature of the Norway model is its comprehensiveness: Norway’s various EU affiliations amount to it incorporating roughly 75% of all EU laws and regulations. What are the domestic mechanisms and arrangements that enable Norway to adapt so closely to the EU when the EU membership issue continues to be so controversial? There is public support for the present arrangement, but how robust and resilient that is can be questioned. The arrangement depends on specific mechanisms that ensure that Norway’s EU affiliation remains depoliticized. In explicating these mechanisms, a clearer conception emerges of how Norway balances the challenges associated with global economic integration, national sovereignty, and democracy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652110327
Author(s):  
Sara B Hobolt ◽  
Sebastian Adrian Popa ◽  
Wouter Van der Brug ◽  
Hermann Schmitt

What are the effects on public support for the European Union (EU) when a member state exits? We examine this question in the context of Britain's momentous decision to leave the EU. Combining analyses of the European Election Study 2019 and a unique survey-embedded experiment conducted in all member states, we analyse the effect of Brexit on support for membership among citizens in the EU-27. The experimental evidence shows that while information about the negative economic consequences of Brexit had no significant effect, positive information about Britain's sovereignty significantly increased optimism about leaving the EU. Our findings suggest that Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership across EU-27, and that it may not continue to act as a deterrent in the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Konitzer

AbstractThis article critically examines contemporary narratives which frame Serbian politics as a conflict between supporters of a pro-European Union (EU) policy and supporters of closer ties with Russia. Contrary to this narrative, contemporary Serbian political actors increasingly present policies and platforms oriented towards both the European Union and Russia. These developments reflect the contradictory legacies arising from the history of Serbian and Russian diplomatic relations along with the sometimes ambivalent implications of Russia's stance on the issue of Kosovo's independence, Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, and recent developments in Serbian-Russian economic relations. Given the long time frame for EU membership and the current impasse over issues like Kosovo and Serbia's potential NATO membership, Serbia's leaders currently enjoy the luxury of simultaneously deepening ties with both the EU and Russia. However, a future linkage between Kosovo's independence and EU membership and/or the possibility of Serbia's joining NATO will likely present Serbian political elites with mutually-exclusive choices bearing important implications for their relations with either Russia or the EU.


Author(s):  
Milenko Petrovic

Despite an initial delay in post-communist reforms and opening the EU accession process, Bulgaria and Romania have already succeeded in becoming EU members while Croatia is just a ‘step away’ from full membership status. Although considerably behind these three, the remaining (Western) Balkan states have been progressing fairly well in the association negotiations (i.e. Stabilisation and Association Process) with the European Union since the early 2000s and expect to officially open negotiations for accession (as is the case with FYR Macedonia) or get full candidate status by the end of 2009 or in 2010 at the latest. However, on their way to Europe, these countries have still to overcome some challenges which the previous EU membership candidates from post-communist Europe faced to a significantly lesser extent or not at all. Focusing on the problems of the increased toughness of EU accession criteria due to the declining public support in the ‘old’ EU member states for further EU enlargement and on the interior political instability in the countries of the Western Balkans, caused primarily by their still ‘undefined’ statehood status, this paper investigates the character and strength of the remaining obstacles for further enlargement of the European Union into the Balkan region.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor D. Bojkov

The article analyses the process of EU enlargement with reference to the progress that Bulgaria and Romania have made within it. It is argued that leaving them out of the wave of accession finalised in May 2004 for ten of the candidate states, has placed them in a situation of double exclusion. Firstly, their geographical belonging to the region of Southeast Europe has been rendered non-essential by their advanced position within the EU enlargement process. Secondly, their achievement in economic and political transition has been removed from the progress of the ten states, which joined the EU in May 2004 by delaying the time of their accession. As a result, any efforts in regional cooperation and integration between Bulgaria and Romania on one hand, and other Southeast European states on the other, have been effectively cancelled. Moreover, in current European politics, the two countries have come to serve the unenviable role of exemplifying on the part of the European Union how progress is being awarded and hesitation punished.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-91
Author(s):  
L. S. Voronkov

The paper is dedicated to the differences between the classical instruments for regulating interstate political and trade-economic relations from those used in the development of regional integration processes. Traditionally, the Eurasian Economic Union is compared with the European Union, considering the EU as a close example to follow in the development of integration processes. At the same time, there exist the other models of integration. The author proposes to pay attention to the other models of integration and based on the analysis of documents, reveals the experience of Northern Europe, which demonstrates effective cooperation without infringing on the sovereignty of the participants. The author examines the features of the integration experience of the Nordic countries in relation to the possibility of using its elements in the modern integration practice of the Eurasian Economic Union.


2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-195
Author(s):  
Andreas P. Kyriacou

Abstract The enlargement of the European Union generates socio-economic costs and benefits for the citizens of new members and as such it is bound to affect their perceived legitimacy of the whole enterprise. The legitimacy of EU accession is likely to be enhanced by the inclusion of compensatory transfers and transition periods in the terms of accession, by the perception that EU membership represents the most favorable terms of exchange available and by the linking of accession to a sustained period of economic growth, a favorable movement in prices, improving relative incomes and the consolidation of a level playing field across new members.


Author(s):  
Markus Patberg

This chapter presents an institutional proposal for how citizens could be enabled—in the dual role of European and national citizens—to exercise constituent power in the EU. To explain in abstract terms what an institutional solution would have to involve, it draws on the notion of a sluice system, according to which the particular value of representative bodies consists in their capacity to provide both transmission and filter functions for democratic processes. On this basis, the chapter critically discusses the proposal that the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) should transform itself into an inter-parliamentary constitutional assembly. As this model allows constituted powers to continue to operate as the EU’s de facto constituent powers, it cannot be expected to deliver the functions of a sluice system. The chapter goes on to argue that a more convincing solution would be to turn the Convention of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union into a permanent constitutional assembly composed of two chambers, one elected by EU citizens and the other by member state citizens. The chapter outlines the desirable features of such an assembly and defends the model against a number of possible objections.


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