scholarly journals The Brexit deterrent? How member state exit shapes public support for the European Union

2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652110327
Author(s):  
Sara B Hobolt ◽  
Sebastian Adrian Popa ◽  
Wouter Van der Brug ◽  
Hermann Schmitt

What are the effects on public support for the European Union (EU) when a member state exits? We examine this question in the context of Britain's momentous decision to leave the EU. Combining analyses of the European Election Study 2019 and a unique survey-embedded experiment conducted in all member states, we analyse the effect of Brexit on support for membership among citizens in the EU-27. The experimental evidence shows that while information about the negative economic consequences of Brexit had no significant effect, positive information about Britain's sovereignty significantly increased optimism about leaving the EU. Our findings suggest that Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership across EU-27, and that it may not continue to act as a deterrent in the future.

Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This chapter analyses the European Union during Brexit, explaining how the EU institutions and Member States reacted to the UK’s decision to leave the EU. It outlines how they went about this in the course of the withdrawal negotiations. The EU institutions and Member States managed to adopt a very united stance vis-à-vis a withdrawing state, establishing effective institutional mechanisms and succeeding in imposing their strategic preferences in the negotiations with the UK. Nevertheless, the EU was also absorbed during Brexit by internal preparations to face both the scenario of a ‘hard Brexit’—the UK leaving the EU with no deal—and of a ‘no Brexit’—with the UK subsequently delaying exit and extending its EU membership. Finally, during Brexit the EU increasingly started working as a union of 27 Member States—the EU27—which in this format opened a debate on the future of Europe and developed new policy initiatives, especially in the field of defence and military cooperation.


Author(s):  
Pero Maldini

Croatia’s accession to the European Union (EU) meant, in political terms, the recognition of its political and normative-institutional achievements in the establishment of a nation state and the democracy. At the same time, for the vast majority of Croatian citizens EU membership also had a symbolic meaning: a departure from the troubled past and a return to the Western, European cultural circle, which they have always felt they belong to. This feeling is the source for the strong pro-European orientation, which, as state independence was being achieved, and democracy established—as an expression of the strong political will of Croatian citizens for freedom and autonomy—helped achieve those historical and political goals. The EU was perceived as a framework that would enable those goals to be realized, so there was a general political consensus about joining it among all relevant political actors, and the vast majority of Croatian citizens granted their consent. The path to full EU membership was long and arduous, primarily because of the specific conditions that marked the process of establishing a Croatian state and a democratic order. On the one hand, these are endogenous structural and socio-cultural factors: the structure and activity of political actors and the functioning of institutions, which were significantly marked by their authoritarian political and historical legacy. On the other hand, was a war of aggression and a struggle for freedom and independence with long-lasting and difficult social and political consequences. These specific conditions—which none of the other acceding countries had—slowed down the process of democratization and, consequently, hampered the EU accession process. All these reasons are why Croatia had the most comprehensive and longest accession negotiations, including the most extensive body of pre-accession conditions. Although the extent and duration of negotiations, as well as the lack of expected support from the EU (especially during the war) have led to an increase in Euroskepticism and criticism of the EU—and consequently to the low turnout in the referendum for accession—the pro-European orientation remained dominant in Croatia. In general, public support for EU accession in Croatia was based on a set of mutually connected factors: identity-based (cultural affiliation), institutional-political (democracy), and utilitarian (socioeconomic benefits). In the period after joining the EU, due to insufficient preparation, Croatia has relatively slowly used the opportunities (especially economic) provided by EU. Nevertheless, EU membership has accelerated the increase in institutional capacity and better use of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). At the same time, the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services, and the opportunities brought by the open EU market, had a double impact: strengthening the economy due to greater orientation toward the EU market, but also slower economic growth, due to structural problems (the lingering power of the state, and regulations to the economy and the market) and increased emigration of the highly educated younger population (chronic labor-force deficit). Nonetheless, through Croatia’s participation in the EU institutions, the real benefits of full membership are becoming increasingly visible, and the sense of integration in the EU’s social, political, cultural, and economic space is growing stronger. At the same time, EU membership affects further improvement of the normative-institutional framework of Croatia.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-805
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

The CJEU held that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is allowed to unilaterally revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the European Union (EU) as long as the revocation is submitted in writing to the European Council before the UK's withdrawal takes effect, and as long as the revocation is “unequivocal and unconditional, that is to say that the purpose of that revocation is to confirm the EU membership of the member state concerned under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a member state, and that revocation brings the withdrawal procedure to an end” (para. 74).


Author(s):  
John Erik Fossum

Norway has applied for membership of the European Union (EU) four times but is not a member. The two first applications were aborted because of de Gaulle’s veto against the U.K.’s application. The two latter were turned down by Norwegian citizens in popular referenda (1972 and 1994). Why did a majority of Norwegian citizens reject EU membership? A survey of the literature identifies a range of historical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic factors. In addition, it cannot be discounted that there were specific features about the referendums and the referendum campaigns that help account for the decisions to reject EU membership, given that all Nordic states except Iceland have held EU membership referendums. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Norway is not an EU member, it has opted for as close an EU association as is possible for a nonmember. In order to understand Norway’s EU relationship, the following paradox must be addressed: whereas the question of EU membership has long been a highly controversial and divisive issue, Norway’s comprehensive incorporation in the EU through the EEA Agreement and a whole host of other arrangements has profound constitutional democratic implications and yet has sparked surprisingly little controversy. What then are the distinctive features of the “Norway model,” in other words, Norway’s EU affiliation? In order to clarify this, it is necessary to compare and contrast Norway’s affiliation with other relevant types of affiliation that nonmembers have to the EU. Thereafter, the distinctive features of Norway’s EU affiliation can be outlined: the internal market through the EEA Agreement; justice and home affairs through the Schengen and Dublin conventions; as well as defense cooperation and the institutional apparatus regulating Norway’s relationship with the EU. A distinctive feature of the Norway model is its comprehensiveness: Norway’s various EU affiliations amount to it incorporating roughly 75% of all EU laws and regulations. What are the domestic mechanisms and arrangements that enable Norway to adapt so closely to the EU when the EU membership issue continues to be so controversial? There is public support for the present arrangement, but how robust and resilient that is can be questioned. The arrangement depends on specific mechanisms that ensure that Norway’s EU affiliation remains depoliticized. In explicating these mechanisms, a clearer conception emerges of how Norway balances the challenges associated with global economic integration, national sovereignty, and democracy.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This introductory chapter provides an overview of how the European Union has been affected by the United Kingdom’s decision to leave, and what this means for the future of European integration. The departure of a large, rich, and influential Member State must prompt a rethink of the EU constitutional settlement. Immediately after the Brexit referendum, the EU and its Member States started a debate on the future of Europe—and this process is now moving from rhetoric to reality with the institution of the Conference on the Future of Europe. The Conference on the Future of Europe can serve as an innovative means to reform the EU, tackling the transitional issues left by the UK’s withdrawal and addressing the more structural, substantive, and institutional weaknesses dramatically exposed by the plurality of other crises the EU has recently weathered. In fact, the Conference on the Future of Europe is made all the more urgent by Covid-19, and the exigencies of the EU post-pandemic recovery plan, which will entail important adjustments to the EU structure of powers and responsibilities. Ultimately, this book utilizes Brexit as a prism to shed light on the necessity and urgency of constitutional reforms in the EU.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-157
Author(s):  
Violetta M. KUZMINA ◽  
Arina V. SVETIKOVA

Introduction. Today Brexit is one of the most pressing issues of world politics, due to the acquisition of global proportions. Of course, this process is a phenomenon at the regional level, but the very fact of the voting and the efforts being made to exit the UK economy from the EU created many questions around themselves, thereby giving rise to the idea in the minds of the population of other countries that the EU cannot cope with the main functions there is the possibility of holding a referendum and a decision to leave the union. The UK and the European Union have never been partners for each other from a historical perspective. Multiple prerequisites, which originated in the last century almost immediately after the signing of the decision on the accession of the Kingdom to the EU, tended to develop and grow. Disputes among members of parliament have always existed, but were not as pronounced as today. In this sense, the country's policy was divided into 2 camps: those who spoke and advocate for the measures of “tough” Brexit, and those who believed and believe that the exit process should be smooth and measured in order not to spoil relations with the EU point of no return.Methods. As the materials of the study were taken data presented in monographic studies and journalistic articles of domestic, but mostly foreign experts in the field of international law, the General modern history, the history of the UK, macroeconomics. The article is written on the basis of sociological research conducted by Western European agencies and Brexit research centers using the analytical type of research and its forms: sociological and expert surveys. The analysis of statistical economic information regarding the real GDP of the EU countries is presented using a comparative historical research method.Results and conclusions. Economic consequences for the European Union from Brexit will become noticeable after some time has passed since the date of the official UK secession from the European Union. Also a minus will be the reduction of anti-crisis programs that the European Union is trying to implement. Attention is deserved by the attitude of other European countries to the membership in the European Union. In this case, more and more we are talking about opposition movements, parties that develop the theme of Euroscepticism. This is especially true in drawing a parallel with the critical eurodirection, which has been traced in EU policy lately. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 209-222
Author(s):  
Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk ◽  
Dominika Anna Rosłoń ◽  
Yaryna Turchyn

Poland’s eastern policy focused on three interrelated issues: Polish-German reconciliation; the recognition of the first declaration of independence of the Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania and their new borders, with emphasis on the strategic importance of these declarations for Polish sovereignty; and the attempts to establish strong relations with these countries. One of the goals of Poland’s eastern policy was to establish a free and democratic Poland in a democratic and peaceful Europe, and these efforts paved the way to reconciliation with Germany and Poland’s admission to the NATO and the European Union. Poland’s eastern policy before and after Poland’s accession to the EU was shaped by several factors. Firstly, Poland had to fulfil the requirements for EU membership, whereas the EU had to meet Poland’s demands. Secondly, Poland had made several attempts to initiate institutional changesin the EU before it became an EU Member State. Thirdly, Poland’s eastern policy was influenced by the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 and its outcome, in particular Polish involvement in the Orange Revolution (2004) in the Ukraine. According to most Polish observers, the EU’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis testified to the absence of a cohesive eastern policy in the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mihaela Simionescu

Abstract The recent enlargement of the EU (since 2004) and the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union have prompted a growing research interest in the political and academic environment because of the causes and consequences of migration between the CEE countries and those in the Western Europe. In this study, the effects of European economic integration on the number of EU-15 immigrants from the newly integrated EU countries were assessed by econometric techniques. According to panel data models, in the period 2000-2015, the number of migrants from the new member states of the EU has increased, in average, with more than 2200 people only due to their EU membership. This result reflects the positive impact of European economic integration on the number of emigrants from the CEE countries that chose the EU-15 states as destination countries. Moreover, according to some ridge Bayesian regressions, during the period 2004-2015, the EU-15 immigrants coming from the EU-13 states did not negatively affect the economic growth of the EU-15 countries.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-71
Author(s):  
Maciej Etel

Abstract The European Union and its member-states’ involvement in the economic sphere, manifesting itself in establishing the rules of entrepreneurs’ functioning – their responsibilities and entitlements – requires a precise determination of the addressees of these standards. Proper identification of an entrepreneur is a condition of proper legislation, interpretation, application, control and execution of the law. In this context it is surprising that understanding the term entrepreneur in Polish law and in EU law is not the same, and divergences and differences in identification are fundamental. This fact formed the objective of this article. It is aimed at pointing at key differences in the identification of an entrepreneur between Polish and EU law, explaining the reasons for different concepts, and also the answer to the question: May Poland, as an EU member-state, identify the entrepreneur in a different way than the EU?


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document