scholarly journals Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Gelman ◽  
Gary King
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Methods ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
The Relationship

We demonstrate the surprising benefits of legislative redistricting (including partisan gerrymandering) for American representative democracy. In so doing, our analysis resolves two long-standing controversies in American politics. First, whereas some scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting incumbents, others, that the relationship is spurious, we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases responsiveness. Second, while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases partisan bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering biases electoral systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting reduces partisan bias as compared to an electoral system without redistricting. Incorrect conclusions in both literatures resulted from misjudging the enormous uncertainties present during redistricting periods, making simplified assumptions about the redistricters' goals, and using inferior statistical methods.

The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 540-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward R. Tufte
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Relationship

An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The “cube law” is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts, the extent of the “nationalization” of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.

scholarly journals Thinking about elections and about democratic representation

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
LH ◽  
GvdS ◽  
WTE
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Democratic Representation ◽  
Modern Representative

[Political representation] is the basis of modern representative democracy. Older and less sophisticated forms, such as direct democracy, subsist marginally, even if they keep exerting a certain attraction. But representative democracy does not carry the self-evident authority it once had. Like every modern institution it is under challenge and consequently needs to be defended. In actual politics, the defence often takes the form of discussion of the merits of one system over the other and of proposals for change. The part of this defence appertaining to constitutional scholarship is not concerned primarily with proposals and changes. It is, before all, to brush up the fundamentals underlying representative democracy, on the basis of topical issues.There are three current issues upon which we would like to draw attention. They are: equality in structuring electoral systems, the processes of electoral reform and the rise of non-majoritarian institutions versus parliamentary democracy.

Electoral Systems and Policy Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

Policies as diverse as tariffs, exchange rates, and unemployment insurance vary across democratic countries. In an attempt to explain this cross-national variation, scholars have turned to the institutions that govern countries’ elections. The institutions that regulate elections, also known as an electoral system, vary significantly across democracies. Can these varied electoral institutions explain the diversity of policies observed? This question remains unanswered. Despite a growing body of research, little consensus exists as to precisely how electoral institutions affect policy. Why is it so difficult to untangle the effects of electoral institutions on economic policy? One reason for the confusion may be the imprecise manner in which electoral institutions are often measured. Better measures of electoral systems may improve our understanding of their policy effects. Improved theories that clarify the causal mechanism(s) linking electoral systems to policy outcomes will also help to clarify the relationship between electoral systems and policies. To better understand the policy effects of electoral institutions, both theoretical and empirical work must take seriously contextual factors, such as geography, which likely mediate the effects of electoral institutions. Finally, different types of empirical evidence are needed to shed new light on the policy effects of electoral institutions. It is difficult to identify the effects of electoral systems in cross-national studies because of the many other factors that vary across countries. Examining within-country variations, such as changes in district magnitude, may provide useful new insights regarding the effects of electoral institutions on policy.

The Spanish Electoral System

2020 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regional Parties ◽  
Lower House ◽  
System P ◽  
The Future ◽  
The One

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems and Legislative Organization

2017 ◽  
pp. 302-320
Author(s):  
Shane Martin
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Legislatures are a cornerstone of representative democracy at the local, subnational, national, and even supra-national levels. Electoral systems determine how votes are transformed into legislative seats. Because of this, what legislators must do to get re-elected is shaped by electoral rules. The impact of electoral incentives goes beyond behavior, potentially shaping the rules and procedures of the legislature itself. This chapter analyzes theories and evidence that link legislative organization to members’ electoral incentives. However, not all legislative structures have a clear electoral basis. As this chapter suggests, the relationship between electoral systems and how a legislature chooses to organize itself is a conditional one.

The Impact of Mixed-member Districts on Legislators' Behavior: The Case of Bolivia

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Corral ◽  
Francisco Sánchez ◽  
Cristina Rivas Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Personal Assistants ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractMany studies suggest that mixed-member electoral systems produce different attitudes and behaviors among representatives. This article assesses how this type of electoral system shapes Bolivian legislators' perceptions of their roles as representatives, their district activities, and their relationships with their political parties. It examines these dimensions using elite survey data and interviews with legislators and their personal assistants. The results show that the electoral system does not produce a uniform impact. It shapes how legislators perceive their role as representatives and the nature of the relationship they build with their political parties, but it does not produce differences in the kinds of activities that both types of legislators carry out in their districts.

The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution

1999 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Choice Sets ◽  
The Uk

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Survey Period ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Electoral Mobilization ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems And The Autocrat's Trade-Off: Evidence From The Russian Duma

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Woller
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The Other ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Legislative Control

Legislative elections sustain authoritarian regimes. However, properties of any electoral system may simultaneously benefit and hurt regimes’ political prospects. We propose a trade-off between electoral systems facilitating parliamentary bargaining and electoral systems maintaining legislative control. While an electoral system can achieve either, it cannot solve both. We investigate this theory by studying Russian federal deputies, half of which are elected in a first-past-the-post single-member district, the other half on a nationwide closed-party list. Candidates can register on both lists, and district results determine final list affiliation. We exploit that electoral incentives change abruptly for deputies barely winning/losing the district, to identify effects of list affiliation on pro and anti-regime parliamentary behavior. Results support a trade-off: while district deputies bargain more for local amendments in parliamentary speeches, they also more often seek to obstruct legislation. How autocrats weigh this trade-off determines the electoral system, and illuminates electoral system reform in autocracies.

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