Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (7) ◽  
pp. 905-927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames ◽  
Martin S. Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Institutional Differences

The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed-member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Geographic Dispersion ◽  
Proportional Systems

There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.

Electoral Systems and Policy Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

Policies as diverse as tariffs, exchange rates, and unemployment insurance vary across democratic countries. In an attempt to explain this cross-national variation, scholars have turned to the institutions that govern countries’ elections. The institutions that regulate elections, also known as an electoral system, vary significantly across democracies. Can these varied electoral institutions explain the diversity of policies observed? This question remains unanswered. Despite a growing body of research, little consensus exists as to precisely how electoral institutions affect policy. Why is it so difficult to untangle the effects of electoral institutions on economic policy? One reason for the confusion may be the imprecise manner in which electoral institutions are often measured. Better measures of electoral systems may improve our understanding of their policy effects. Improved theories that clarify the causal mechanism(s) linking electoral systems to policy outcomes will also help to clarify the relationship between electoral systems and policies. To better understand the policy effects of electoral institutions, both theoretical and empirical work must take seriously contextual factors, such as geography, which likely mediate the effects of electoral institutions. Finally, different types of empirical evidence are needed to shed new light on the policy effects of electoral institutions. It is difficult to identify the effects of electoral systems in cross-national studies because of the many other factors that vary across countries. Examining within-country variations, such as changes in district magnitude, may provide useful new insights regarding the effects of electoral institutions on policy.

Replacing FPTP

Federalism-E ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Alberto Di Candia
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Inherent Stability ◽  
Opposition Parties

Canada’s use of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system has been defended due to its simplicity, constituency representation, and inherent stability. Arguments have been raised, however, that the system does not sufficiently represent Canadian demographics in parliament, it renders opposition parties ineffective, smaller parties have trouble or are unable to win seats in parliament, and regionally-concentrated parties are encouraged over national based ones. It has been suggested that adding an element of proportionality would address some of these issues. This paper seeks to consider this claim by examining the political outcomes of proportional electoral systems. The literature review outlined that the use of proportional systems increased descriptive as well as geographic representation, and was positively linked to voter turnout.

Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1000
Author(s):  
Brendan J Connell
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Foreign Credit

Abstract Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are dependent on how the borrowing state's electoral system aggregates competing domestic economic interests. Internationally oriented economic interests prefer to minimize creditor losses since sizeable debt reductions are more likely to compromise access to foreign credit. Conversely, workers and domestic-oriented economic interests prefer to maximize losses faced by foreign creditors in order to ease the costs of austerity at home. By shaping the political incentives of policymakers, I argue that democracies with candidate-centric electoral systems should be associated with sovereign defaults that are less costly for foreign creditors. Under these electoral systems, governments hold incentives to cater primarily to internationally oriented economic interests that are best able to overcome the costs of collective action. Statistical evidence from 53 sovereign debt restructurings between 1978 and 2012 supports the main argument.

scholarly journals Building a Case for Reforming the Electoral System of Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38
Author(s):  
Akhtar Hussain ◽  
Sikandar Hussain Soomro ◽  
Zohra Khatoon
Keyword(s):  
Research Finding ◽  
Political System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Present System ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
General Elections

Electoral systems are set of rules and procedures which determine how voters cast their votes and how the votes are converted into representative seats. Beyond this, each electoral system has its own impact on how the political system functions. From this perspective, the author has tested the discontents of the Pakistani electoral system, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) taking the election data of 2002, 2008, 2013 and 2018. The research finding showed that the FPTP electoral system is ill devised to the Pakistan’s current needs and realities. In view of such discontents, there is a genuine concern of reforming the Pakistan electoral system. The question remains, however, which electoral system best suits the Pakistani situation from the bulk of alternatives? The current paper is an attempt to build a case for introducing reforms with a focus on how to translate the votes into seats in a more representative way. For this purpose the article in its first part deals with the problems the FPTP is having in translatingthe votes into seats. In the second part data from the last four general elections are analysed to show how some of the parties having more votes and less seats and vice versa. Building the argument on this analysis the recent concerns shown by the politicians and critics of the present system are supported to build a strong case for the decision makers to bring in such changes in the system where minimum of the votes are wasted so that a true representative democracy is established in Pakistan.

scholarly journals An italic obsession: electoral reforms

2020 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Alessandro Chiaramonte
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Specific Time ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
History Of ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
Mixed Systems

The history of Italy is plenty of reforms of the electoral system. Many are those implemented since the country’s unification: from the majority system to the limited vote, from proportional representation to the majority premium in the liberal era; and, again, in the Republican era, the return to proportional representation and then the use of mixed systems, combining PR with plurality or majority premium. And many other are the reforms which, discussed and sometimes even approved, as in the case of the italicum, have remained dead letter or never saw the light. What explains this Italic obsession with the electoral systems? Why have their reforms been on the parties’ and governments’ political agenda for so long? The goal of this article is to answer these questions. In the end, electoral reforms have played as instruments of coordination and adaptation in the political strategies pursued by the parties in specific time periods and also as substitute instruments of institutional engineering in the absence of broader agreements on major constitutional reforms.

scholarly journals El sistema electoral italiano y su reforma: el desafío de la consolidación

2020 ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Francesco Clementi
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Rapid Change ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Political ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Intense Activity

En los veintiséis años que caracterizan a las seis últimas legislaturas italianas (1994-2020) ha habido una intensa actividad político-institucional, acompañada de una fuerte modificación del sistema de los partidos políticos. En este contexto, el sistema electoral y sus continuas modificaciones con nuevas leyes electorales ha influido fuertemente en la forma de gobierno, marcando su dinámica, tanto directa como indirectamente. Sin embargo, el rápido cambio de los diferentes sistemas electorales en los últimos años no ha estado acompañado de reformas parejas en el texto constitucional, produciéndose una asimetría en el funcionamiento de los nuevos sistemas electorales que se iban adoptando gradualmente, que los hacía sustancialmente incompletos, incoherentes y, en definitiva, frágiles. Todo ello ha terminado degradando el sistema a ojos de la ciudadanía. Las presentes notas tienen por objeto poner de relieve las transformaciones que se han producido sobre el sistema electoral, tratando de subrayar las dificultades de su consolidación, en el marco de la llamada Segunda República (1994-2020) y de su nuevo sistema de partidos políticos.In the twenty-six years that characterize the last six Italian legislatures (1994-2020) Italy has seen, from the political-institutional point of view, an intense activity that was accompanied by a very similar vitality of the political party system. In this context, the electoral system and its continuous modifications with new electoral laws has strongly influenced the form of government, marking, by the decisive conditioning factor that represents the party system, its dynamics, both directly and indirectly. However, the rapid change of the different electoral systems in recent years has not been accompanied by an equal change in the constitutional text, so there has been an asymmetry in the functioning of the new electoral systems that were being adopted gradually, making them substantially incomplete, inconsistent and ultimately fragile. Faced with an immutability of the constitutional system, this continuous mutability in the electoral system has not only made the whole political-institutional system very weak, but also degraded it in its function in the eyes of the voters, as it seemed a clearly inefficient tool with respect to the needs of the constitutional system. Therefore, the present contribution aims to highlight the transformations that have taken place on the electoral system, trying to underline the difficulties of its consolidation, within the framework of the so-called Second Republic (1994-2020) and its new system of political parties.

scholarly journals The Effect of Government Expenditures on Economic Growth. the Case of Albania

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 242
Author(s):  
Lorena Çakerri ◽  
Migena Petanaj ◽  
Oltiana Muharremi
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
National Income ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
Global Crisis ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

One of the main issues of economic policy and government is to ensure a sustainable economic growth of a country.Economic growth has been at the center of every government in place since at least year 2000.Though for this teen-year ,growth values were satisfactory in Albania, the macroeconomic situation changed in 2009,when appeared the elements of the global crisis. Economic global crisis has awakened interest in the case of fiscal policy.Fiscal policy and monetary policy as well, are two basci components of state economic policy which are used for macroeconomic purposes:influence of gross domestic product, the level of enmployment, income and price level. The two main instruments of fiscal policy are government expenditures and taxes. Government expenditures are considered as the most powerful weapon available to fiscal policy makers, especially in developing countries such as Albania. During the last century , governments have spent more and more in relation to their national income. This increase in government spending can be explained by the impact that this variable can have on the economic growth of a country? In fact ,about the connection between the government spending and the economic growth of a country various studies seem full of contradictions.This conflict is explained by changes in terms of definitions and from the differencies of the various countries included in these studies. The objective of this study is to give an appropriate answer to the question : Can government spending have the potential to impact and stimulate economic growth? How the changes of the size of the fiscal policy instruments have affected indicators of economic growth in Albania? This article will focus on the role that the fiscal policy has on economic growth , especially in our country, reviewing economic growth theories, debates about the effectiveness of fiscal policy , and active fiscal policy. Finally some suggestions for the future addressing the government expenditures towards priority sectors.

scholarly journals Legal aspects of formation and development of electoral systems in Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 6-10
Author(s):  
Ivan VINNYK
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Constant Change ◽  
Long Time ◽  
History Of ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

Introduction. The history of the Ukrainian Parliament functioning counts many electoral systems. The constant change of one kind or another was supposed to eliminate the shortcomings that were revealed during the preparation and carrying out the last elections. For a long time elections were holding under a mixed electoral system, but the combination of proportional and majoritarian components in it did not allow to provide the real expression of the citizens’ will and the effective parliament functioning. Therefore the legislator has been tasked with introducing a more optimal voting model. The result in this area was the adoption the Electoral Code of Ukraine in 2019. The purpose of the paper is to identify the main disadvantages of a mixed electoral system. to carry out the comparative analysis of the activity of deputies, which elected by different components of the mixed electoral system, to investigate the key points of the Electoral Code of Ukraine that will form the basis of legal regulation of the preparation and holding the elections to the Ukrainian Parliament and to compare them with the previous electoral system features. Results. Despite the combination of proportional and majoritarian electoral systems, theirinherent negative features remained relevant. We are talking about the lack of opportunity to select specific candidates from the electoral lists of parties, whose votes were not supported by another candidate in the single-member district etc. At the same time there was a pronounced preference for the proportional system over the majority one, because thanks to the popularity of the political party candidates could obtain a mandate without “special” effort. It is determined, that the points of the new Electoral Code of Ukraine provide the introduction of a new electoral system that will allow citizens to independently determine the priority of a candidate on the list during the distribution of mandates. At the same time the analysis of the Electoral Code shows that in some cases it will still be possible to keep "closed" lists. Conclusion. The Electoral Code of Ukraine, approved by the People's Deputies, is another testimony to the prudence of their political will and readiness to take into account the demands of society. During the analysis of the codified act it was found out that it will promote the political will of the citizens in the elections and ensure the efficiency of the deputies themselves.

scholarly journals Gerrymandering and Malapportionment, Romanian Style: The 2008 Electoral System

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurelian Giugăl ◽  
Ron Johnston ◽  
Mihail Chiru ◽  
Ionut Ciobanu ◽  
Alexandru Gavriș
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Qualitative Investigation ◽  
Data Set ◽  
The Right ◽  
Main Factor

Varieties of gerrymandering and malapportionment can appear not only in electoral systems where all legislative seats are allocated to plurality winners in single-member districts but also in proportional Single-Member District (SMD)–based electoral systems and in settings where multi-partisan committees draw the district boundaries. This article investigates such a case, in which the main parliamentary parties collaborated in order to minimize the uncertainty regarding intra-party allocation of seats. The 2008 electoral reform in Romania created such opportunities, and both the SMD maps and the electoral results at the parliamentary election held in the same year indicate that the parties collaborated to design a number of safe seats for each of them. We draw on a novel data set that measures the degree to which the newly created SMDs reflect natural or artificial strongholds of concentrated partisan support in otherwise unfavorable political territories, and also assess the malapportionment of these districts. All three types of mechanisms were frequently used, and our logistic regression analyses indicate that nomination from the “right” type of SMD was the main factor deciding which of each party’s candidates got elected. The statistical analyses are complemented by a qualitative investigation of the political composition and design of 9 SMDs.

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