National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-119
Author(s):  
Tasos Kalandrakis ◽  
Miguel R. Rueda
Keyword(s):  
Expectation Maximization ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Model Fit ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Proportional Allocation ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
System Configurations

We model the conditional distribution of seats given vote shares induced by national electoral systems using a stochastic threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter that regulates allocation for parties above the threshold. We establish conditions for the parameters of this model to be identified from observed seats/votes data, and develop a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm to estimate them. We apply the procedure to 116 electoral systems used in 417 elections to the lower house across 36 European countries since WWII. We reject a test of model fit in only 5 of those systems, while a simpler model without thresholds is rejected in favor of our estimated model in 49 electoral systems. We find that the two modal electoral system configurations involve higher thresholds with seat allocation for parties exceeding thresholds that does not statistically differ from perfectly proportional allocation (32.76% of all systems); and systems for which we cannot reject the absence of a national threshold but exhibit disproportional seat allocation for parties eligible for seats (38.79% of all systems). We also develop procedures to test for significant changes in electoral institutions and/or the distribution of seats.

Dimensions of Variation in Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Essential Components ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Dimensions Of Variation

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.

On the Absence of Centripetal Incentives in Double-Member Districts

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 714-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC MAGAR ◽  
MARC R. ROSENBLUM ◽  
DAVID SAMUELS
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Modeling ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
New System

In its final months, the Pinochet regime engineered a number of institutional reforms with the intent of bolstering the right side of the spectrum and of promoting centripetal political competition once democratic procedures were reinitiated in 1989. One of the most important reforms created 60 double-member districts for elections to the lower house. Although some analysts have claimed that the new system does in fact promote centrist position taking, using game theory and spatial modeling, the authors demonstrate that the incentives of the Chilean electoral system encourage politicians to take noncentrist positions along a left-right spectrum. The combination of double-member districts with the d'Hondt seat allocation method and open-list voting creates a Rival Partners Game, creating perverse incentives for Chilean candidates. The authors' theoretical results help clarify the debate about the effects of post-authoritarian institutional reforms in Chile and should encourage empirical research on the same issues.

Electoral Systems and Policy Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

Policies as diverse as tariffs, exchange rates, and unemployment insurance vary across democratic countries. In an attempt to explain this cross-national variation, scholars have turned to the institutions that govern countries’ elections. The institutions that regulate elections, also known as an electoral system, vary significantly across democracies. Can these varied electoral institutions explain the diversity of policies observed? This question remains unanswered. Despite a growing body of research, little consensus exists as to precisely how electoral institutions affect policy. Why is it so difficult to untangle the effects of electoral institutions on economic policy? One reason for the confusion may be the imprecise manner in which electoral institutions are often measured. Better measures of electoral systems may improve our understanding of their policy effects. Improved theories that clarify the causal mechanism(s) linking electoral systems to policy outcomes will also help to clarify the relationship between electoral systems and policies. To better understand the policy effects of electoral institutions, both theoretical and empirical work must take seriously contextual factors, such as geography, which likely mediate the effects of electoral institutions. Finally, different types of empirical evidence are needed to shed new light on the policy effects of electoral institutions. It is difficult to identify the effects of electoral systems in cross-national studies because of the many other factors that vary across countries. Examining within-country variations, such as changes in district magnitude, may provide useful new insights regarding the effects of electoral institutions on policy.

Japanese Electoral Systems since 1947

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Reed
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Political Reforms ◽  
Science Theory ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Japanese Diet

This chapter describes and analyzes the electoral systems used to elect members of the Japanese Diet since 1947. The more powerful lower house has used two different electoral systems, and the upper house has used three. The chapter focuses on each system’s effects on the quality of democracy, particularly malapportionment and alternation in power. Electoral systems powerfully influence the quality of democracy. Many of those effects can be predicted by political science theory, but others cannot. The chapter shows that the effects of the first electoral system have long-lasting effects. The institutions and practices developed as the party system develops are not easily changed by later political reforms.

The Spanish Electoral System

2020 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regional Parties ◽  
Lower House ◽  
System P ◽  
The Future ◽  
The One

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 762-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian McAllister ◽  
Toni Makkai
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Secret Ballot ◽  
Compulsory Voting ◽  
Lower House ◽  
System P ◽  
The World ◽  
2016 Election

Australia is often characterized as “a democratic laboratory,” where a wide variety of electoral systems have been designed and implemented. Australia gave the world “the Australian ballot” (or secret ballot), and it is one of the few countries to operate an enforced system of compulsory voting. This chapter examines the evolution of the electoral systems in the lower House of Representatives and in the upper house, the Senate. Particular attention is given to the design of the Senate electoral system, and to the changes that were implemented at the 2016 election to eliminate the proliferation of “micro parties.” The development of compulsory voting is also outlined, and its consequences for the party system evaluated. Finally, the chapter discusses the major challenges to reform of the electoral system.

Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199372
Author(s):  
Marius Radean
Keyword(s):  
Research Design ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Party Switching ◽  
Do So

When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so early in the term to exploit voters’ short retrospective time horizon. These expectations are tested using a quasi experimental research design that estimates the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on party switching. In 2008 Romania changed its electoral system from a closed-list PR to a candidate-centered electoral system, where all candidates compete in single-member districts. Both hypotheses are supported by empirics. This helps weed out competing explanations which now have to account for both the decrease in and the different timing of party switching.

scholarly journals Electoral Institutions and Women’s Representation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael FitzGerald ◽  
Melody E. Valdini
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Gender Quotas ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Women's Representation ◽  
Selection Processes ◽  
Women’S Representation ◽  
The Impact

While there are many factors that drive women’s descriptive representation (i.e., the percentage of women in the legislature) the electoral institutions generate some of the most powerful and consistent effects. In the first breaths of this literature, the focus was firmly on the impact of majoritarian electoral systems versus proportional representation (PR) systems on women’s descriptive representation. Since then, the literature has grown to engage broader ideas regarding the complicated nature of analyzing institutions in different cultural contexts and under different social conditions. Particularly in the later decades of the 20th century, scholars found that structural factors, such as economic disparities between men and women and the balance of women in careers that are typical paths to political office, were important to consider in concert with electoral rules. More recently, as more women gain access to the economic elite, the literature has focused more on cultural factors such as the historical legacies of Communism and the general societal reactions to women’s leadership. These non-institutional factors are now widely engaged as an important component of understanding why and to what extent we can expect an electoral system to generate a certain outcome. Beyond the impact of the electoral system itself, there is also relevant literature that engages how electoral institutions such as gender quotas and candidate selection processes affect women’s descriptive representation. There is wide variation in the design of gender quotas as well as candidate selection processes, just as there is in the design of electoral systems, and therefore a fuller understanding of the relationship between electoral institutions and women’s representation requires consideration of the interaction of candidate selection procedures, gender quotas, and electoral systems. For example, the presence of a placement mandate (i.e., a requirement stipulating where on the list women candidates must be positioned) or a decentralized candidate selection process each has a different effect on women’s representation in an electoral system that includes a preference vote. The sections below highlight some of the existing literature on electoral institutions and their impact on women’s descriptive representation. This is by no means an exhaustive list but does offer insight into the general themes and research areas that are common in this field of study.

Electoral Systems and Ethnic Minority Representation

2017 ◽  
pp. 158-174
Author(s):  
David Lublin ◽  
Shaun Bowler
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Minority ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Minority Representation ◽  
Ethnic Geography

Every democratic process short of unanimity produces opinion minorities. Political divisions along anchored demographic characteristics like language, religion, race, or ethnicity challenge pluralist models of governance by threatening to entrench the exclusion of minority groups from political power. Especially when attuned to ethnic geography, electoral engineering through manipulation of the electoral system and other rules governing the electoral process, such as boundary delimitation, reserved seats, ballot-access requirements, and ethnic party bans, can help promote either inclusion or exclusion of minorities. Ensuring long-term interethnic peace has proved more difficult. Scholars continue to grapple with how to ensure minority inclusion without freezing existing divisions.

Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jude C. Hays
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Labor Market Institutions ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Consumption Taxes ◽  
Empirical Implications

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.

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