Free Speech, Civility, and Censorship in Education

Author(s):  
Josh Corngold

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education. Please check back later for the full article. Besides being protected by the First Amendment, the right of students and faculty to express divergent opinions—even discomfiting opinions—is central to the academic mission of schools, colleges, and universities. Two familiar Millian arguments underscore this point. First, the dynamic clash of contrary ideas offers the best prospect we have of arriving at the “whole truth” about any complex subject. Second, unless it is subject to periodic questioning and critique, any established and received bit of wisdom “will be held in the manner of a prejudice with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds.” These arguments notwithstanding, anyone who has ever spent time in classrooms knows that educators sometimes curtail student speech. Can such conduct be justified in educational institutions dedicated to free and open inquiry and the examination of multiple perspectives? In mundane cases, student speech is suppressed for the sake of minimizing disruptions and maintaining order and efficiency in the classroom—as when the teacher cuts off a particularly loquacious student in order to allow others to get a word in, or a tangent-prone student in order to keep the discussion on point and avoid protracted digressions, etc. Even the most ardent defender of free speech must concede that censorship, in such cases, is necessary for the effective functioning of the educational environment. A more complex and philosophically interesting set of cases involves educators who silence students for the sake of civility. Granted, when the speech in question involves personally targeted insults, gratuitous put-downs, and the like, the rationale for censorship seems unassailable. But what about speech that is strictly relevant to the topic under consideration, doesn’t descend to the level of direct, personal invective, and yet, nevertheless, denigrates members of some widely stigmatized group—e.g., a student’s declaration, during a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent same-sex marriage ruling, that homosexuality is aberrant and a legitimate target of deterrent legislation? Is silencing this kind of utterance the appropriate course of action for educators? Or are the interests of all parties better served by permitting such views to be expressed and discussed openly in the classroom?

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
John Dayton ◽  
Betul Tarhan

There are no secure rights without the right of free speech. Free speech is the right that is necessary to defend all other rights. Student free speech is an essential foundation for societal free speech. We will not have a society that values and protects free speech without valuing and protecting free speech for students. Schools must serve as the essential nurseries of our democracy and as examples of the responsible exercise of rights in a free society including free speech. We cannot expect students to spend most of their waking hours in institutions devoid of meaningful rights to freedom of speech and then emerge as adults prepared to exercise and defend democratic freedoms including free speech. Students who learn to exercise free speech rights in schools are more likely to become adults ready to exercise free speech rights in a civil democracy. This article addresses the ongoing evolution of student free speech rights in the U.S., providing a brief overview of free speech law; a review of student speech law in public K-12 schools and in public higher education institutions; a guide to applying the Tinker test in practice; a discussion of the continuing evolution of student speech law in public educational institutions; a review of freedom of the press in public educational institutions; and conclusions on the evolution of student speech.


This chapter presents the conclusions to the book. It discusses ideas for the future of the off-campus student-speech jurisprudence. This discussion includes guidance for school officials and students on how to navigate the jurisprudence. The discussion urges school officials to exercise censorship restraint when confronted with off-campus student speech unless the speech constitutes a true threat. It also implores school officials and lower courts to treat students as citizens entitled to the right to free speech under the United States Constitution. Consonantly, the chapter recommends that school officials leave censorship of off-campus speech to law enforcement as well as the civil and criminal judicial processes as obtains for the citizenry at large. The goal of the chapter is to recommend ideas that students, school officials and lower courts can consider in order to minimize the abridgement of students' right to speech in off-campus settings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-210
Author(s):  
Christine Sanderson ◽  
Linda Sheahan ◽  
Slavica Kochovska ◽  
Tim Luckett ◽  
Deborah Parker ◽  
...  

The concept of moral distress comes from nursing ethics, and was initially defined as ‘…when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action’. There is a large body of literature associated with moral distress, yet multiple definitions now exist, significantly limiting its usefulness. We undertook a systematic review of the argument-based bioethics literature on this topic as the basis for a critical appraisal, identifying 55 papers for analysis. We found that moral distress is most frequently framed around individual experiences of distress in relation to local practices and constraints, and understood in terms of power relations and workplace hierarchies. This understanding is directly derived from, and often still seen as specific to, nursing. Frequently the perspective of the morally distressed individual is privileged. Understandings of moral distress have evolved towards an ‘occupational health approach’, with the assumption that moral distress should be measured and prevented. Counter-perspectives were identified, highlighting conceptual problems. Based on our review, we propose a redefinition of moral distress: ‘Ethical unease or disquiet resulting from a situation where a clinician believes they have contributed to avoidable patient or community harm through their involvement in an action, inaction or decision that conflicts with their own values’. This definition is specific enough for research use, anchored in clinicians’ professional responsibilities and concerns about harms to patients, framed relationally rather than hierarchically, and amenable to multiple perspectives on any given morally distressing situation.


This chapter examines the stories of students who have been censored by their schools for exercising their right to free speech off-campus in an offline forum. It discusses offline off-campus student speech in three categories: (a) speech directed at or against school officials or the school; (b) speech directed at or against students; and (c) speech directed at or against persons who are unaffiliated with the school. The chapter per the authors examines the court decisions regarding students' First Amendment rights to free speech under each of these categories. The goal of the chapter is to analyze the various lower court decisions governing the right of students to speak off-campus when they are not using online media. This chapter will highlight the unsettled nature of students' right to free speech in an off-campus offline setting.


Jurnal Akta ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 463
Author(s):  
Muslim Ansori ◽  
Akhmad Khisni

With the enactment of the Education System Act no 20 of 2003 (better known as the Sisdiknas Act), the State has determined that educational institutions should have a legal umbrella in the form of a legal entity, or better known as the Legal Entity Education. As a non-profit organization, the Foundation is the right legal entity that becomes a place for educational institutions, especially private schools. Therefore, of course, Notary has a very crucial role in making notary deed in the form of establishment and deed of change, such as example how in making the right basic budget and not multi interpresatasi for stake holders in the foundation. Therefore, the role of function and authority of the organ of the foundation must be clearly stated in the articles of association, so as not to cause a dispute in the future.KEYWORDS: Notaries, Foundation, Organ Foundation,


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Ashley Floyd Kuntz

Abstract Student protests have developed on campuses throughout the country in response to controversial speakers. Overwhelmingly, these protests have been framed as conflicts over the right to free speech and the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. This essay reframes conflicts like these as moral disagreements over the role of individuals and institutions in producing and disseminating knowledge that supports or undermines justice within a pluralistic, democratic society. Using the specific case of Charles Murray’s visit to Middlebury College in spring 2017 and drawing insight from social moral epistemology, the essay aims to clarify the moral concerns at stake in clashes over controversial speakers and to identify possibilities to advance the moral aims of institutions of higher education in response to such events.


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

This book examines the relational dynamics between the U.S. Constitution’s Free Speech Clause and other constitutional rights. The free speech guarantee has intersected with a variety of other constitutional rights. Those intersections have significantly influenced the recognition, scope, and meaning of rights ranging from freedom of the press to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. They have also influenced interpretation of the Free Speech Clause itself. Free speech principles and doctrines have facilitated the recognition and effective exercise of constitutional rights, including equal protection, the right to abortion, and the free exercise of religion. They have also provided mediating principles for constructive debates about constitutional rights. At the same time, in its interactions with other constitutional rights, the Free Speech Clause has also been a complicating force. It has dominated rights discourse and subordinated or supplanted free press, assembly, petition, and free exercise rights. Currently, courts and commentators are fashioning the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in the image of the Free Speech Clause. Borrowing the Free Speech Clause for this purpose may turn out to be detrimental for both rights. The book examines the common and distinctive dynamics that have brought free speech and other constitutional rights together. It assesses the products and consequences of these intersections, and draws important lessons from them about constitutional rights and constitutional liberty. Ultimately, the book defends a pluralistic conception of constitutional rights that seeks to leverage the power of the Free Speech Clause but also to tame its propensity to subordinate, supplant, and eclipse other constitutional rights.


Author(s):  
R.V. Vaidyanatha Ayyar

This chapter elaborates the shifting case law over the 24 year period from 1982 to 2006 in regard to the right of private individuals and organisations to establish educational institutions, the regulation of admissions to private-unaided institutions (self-financing institutions), and the regulatory power of AICTE. It offers a theoretical explanation of these shifts by elaborating two major reinforcing factors. The first is the adoption of an interpretational philosophy that legitimates judges going beyond the express wording and original intent of Constitution makers, discerning the purpose underlying a constitutional provision, and applying the purpose so discovered to rectify failures of public policy and governance types. The second factor is the inbuilt trait to expand as a result of a generous policy of admitting appeals. Given that judges differ considerably in the judicial philosophy they hold, and their perception of policy problem and solutions case law has bene fluid, creating uncertainty for institutions which are regulated as well as regulators like the AICTE.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989606
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Emir Efendic ◽  
Marek A. Vranka

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action—thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias—people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document