scholarly journals The Evolution of Student Free Speech: Tinker and Beyond

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
John Dayton ◽  
Betul Tarhan

There are no secure rights without the right of free speech. Free speech is the right that is necessary to defend all other rights. Student free speech is an essential foundation for societal free speech. We will not have a society that values and protects free speech without valuing and protecting free speech for students. Schools must serve as the essential nurseries of our democracy and as examples of the responsible exercise of rights in a free society including free speech. We cannot expect students to spend most of their waking hours in institutions devoid of meaningful rights to freedom of speech and then emerge as adults prepared to exercise and defend democratic freedoms including free speech. Students who learn to exercise free speech rights in schools are more likely to become adults ready to exercise free speech rights in a civil democracy. This article addresses the ongoing evolution of student free speech rights in the U.S., providing a brief overview of free speech law; a review of student speech law in public K-12 schools and in public higher education institutions; a guide to applying the Tinker test in practice; a discussion of the continuing evolution of student speech law in public educational institutions; a review of freedom of the press in public educational institutions; and conclusions on the evolution of student speech.

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Khalil M. Habib

AbstractAccording to Tocqueville, the freedom of the press, which he treats as an extension of the freedom of speech, is a primary constituent element of liberty. Tocqueville treats the freedom of the press in relation to and as an extension of the right to assemble and govern one’s own affairs, both of which he argues are essential to preserving liberty in a free society. Although scholars acknowledge the importance of civil associations to liberty in Tocqueville’s political thought, they routinely ignore the importance he places on the freedom of the press and speech. His reflections on the importance of the free press and speech may help to shed light on the dangers of recent attempts to censor the press and speech.


Author(s):  
Josh Corngold

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education. Please check back later for the full article. Besides being protected by the First Amendment, the right of students and faculty to express divergent opinions—even discomfiting opinions—is central to the academic mission of schools, colleges, and universities. Two familiar Millian arguments underscore this point. First, the dynamic clash of contrary ideas offers the best prospect we have of arriving at the “whole truth” about any complex subject. Second, unless it is subject to periodic questioning and critique, any established and received bit of wisdom “will be held in the manner of a prejudice with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds.” These arguments notwithstanding, anyone who has ever spent time in classrooms knows that educators sometimes curtail student speech. Can such conduct be justified in educational institutions dedicated to free and open inquiry and the examination of multiple perspectives? In mundane cases, student speech is suppressed for the sake of minimizing disruptions and maintaining order and efficiency in the classroom—as when the teacher cuts off a particularly loquacious student in order to allow others to get a word in, or a tangent-prone student in order to keep the discussion on point and avoid protracted digressions, etc. Even the most ardent defender of free speech must concede that censorship, in such cases, is necessary for the effective functioning of the educational environment. A more complex and philosophically interesting set of cases involves educators who silence students for the sake of civility. Granted, when the speech in question involves personally targeted insults, gratuitous put-downs, and the like, the rationale for censorship seems unassailable. But what about speech that is strictly relevant to the topic under consideration, doesn’t descend to the level of direct, personal invective, and yet, nevertheless, denigrates members of some widely stigmatized group—e.g., a student’s declaration, during a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent same-sex marriage ruling, that homosexuality is aberrant and a legitimate target of deterrent legislation? Is silencing this kind of utterance the appropriate course of action for educators? Or are the interests of all parties better served by permitting such views to be expressed and discussed openly in the classroom?


1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney Kentridge

The title of this article is not intended to disparage the value of freedom of speech in a modern democratic society. The right freely and publicly to criticise the institutions of government, the conduct of public affairs whether by the executive or Parliament, the freedom, indeed, to criticise the performance of the judiciary—that right is one of the glories of the unwritten constitution of this country. Its importance is constantly and forcefully emphasised in our highest courts. In one of the Spycatcher cases Lord Bridge of Harwich said that the right to freedom of speech is one of the fundamental freedoms essential to a free society.1 In the same case Lord Oliver quoted Blackstone's statement that the liberty of the press is essential to the nature of a free State.2 More recently Lord Goff of Chieveley, observing that he could see no inconsistency between English law and the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to freedom of speech, added: “This is scarcely surprising, since we may pride ourselves on the fact that freedom of speech has existed in this country perhaps as long as, if not longer than, it has existed in any other country in the world.”3


Author(s):  
Timothy Zick

This book examines the relational dynamics between the U.S. Constitution’s Free Speech Clause and other constitutional rights. The free speech guarantee has intersected with a variety of other constitutional rights. Those intersections have significantly influenced the recognition, scope, and meaning of rights ranging from freedom of the press to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. They have also influenced interpretation of the Free Speech Clause itself. Free speech principles and doctrines have facilitated the recognition and effective exercise of constitutional rights, including equal protection, the right to abortion, and the free exercise of religion. They have also provided mediating principles for constructive debates about constitutional rights. At the same time, in its interactions with other constitutional rights, the Free Speech Clause has also been a complicating force. It has dominated rights discourse and subordinated or supplanted free press, assembly, petition, and free exercise rights. Currently, courts and commentators are fashioning the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in the image of the Free Speech Clause. Borrowing the Free Speech Clause for this purpose may turn out to be detrimental for both rights. The book examines the common and distinctive dynamics that have brought free speech and other constitutional rights together. It assesses the products and consequences of these intersections, and draws important lessons from them about constitutional rights and constitutional liberty. Ultimately, the book defends a pluralistic conception of constitutional rights that seeks to leverage the power of the Free Speech Clause but also to tame its propensity to subordinate, supplant, and eclipse other constitutional rights.


Author(s):  
Stephen Gardbaum

This chapter describes the structural elements or components of a free speech right. The nature and extent of a free speech right depends upon a number of legal components. The first is the legal source of the right (in common law, statute, or a constitution) and the force of the right having regard to how it is enforced, and whether and how it can be superseded. The second component is the ‘subject’ of free speech rights, or who are the rights-holders: citizens, natural or legal persons. The third is the ‘scope’ of a free speech right, while the fourth is the kind of obligation it imposes on others: a negative prohibition or a positive obligation. The fifth component is the ‘object’ of a free speech right: who is bound to respect a right of freedom of expression and against whom the right may be asserted. Finally, there is the ‘limitation’ of a free speech right.


Author(s):  
Sean Stevens ◽  
Lee Jussim ◽  
Nathan Honeycutt

This paper explores the suppression of ideas within academic scholarship by academics, either by self-suppression or because of the efforts of other academics. Legal, moral, and social issues distinguishing freedom of speech, freedom of inquiry, and academic freedom are reviewed. How these freedoms and protections can come into tension is then explored by a sociological analysis of denunciation mobs who exercise their legal free speech rights to call for punishing scholars who express ideas they disapprove of and condemn. When successful, these efforts, which constitute legally protected speech, will suppress certain ideas. Real-world examples over the past five years of academics who have been sanctioned or terminated for scholarship targeted by a denunciation mob are then explored.


2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Karolina Palka

This article is about the limits of the right to free speech. The first section provides a brief introduction to this topic, primarily in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second section describes the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which was fundamental to the topic of this paper because the United States Supreme Court created the so-called "fighting words" doctrine based on it. In the next two sections, two court cases are presented that perfectly demonstrate the limits of the right to free speech in the United States: Snyder v. Phelps and Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America. The fifth part shows the right to freedom of speech in the context of Polish civil, criminal, and constitutional law, as well as acts of international law binding on Poland. The last part is a short summary.


Author(s):  
Ashutosh Bhagwat ◽  
James Weinstein

This chapter focuses on the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy from both a historical and a theoretical perspective. The term ‘freedom of expression’ includes free speech, freedom of the press, the right to petition government, and freedom of political association. Eighteenth-century proponents of popular government had long offered democratic justifications for freedom of expression. The chapter then demonstrates that freedom of political expression is a necessary component of democracy. It describes two core functions of such expression: an informing and a legitimating one. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of ‘democracy’, noting various ways in which democracies vary among themselves, as well as the implications of those variations for freedom of expression. Even before democratic forms of government took root in the modern world.


This chapter focuses on the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) case – the United States Supreme Court's second review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Bethel test or the Fraser test authorizes schools to censor students' speech if the speech is vulgar, lewd, plainly offensive or obscene. The chapter also discusses the Supreme Court's decision on the scope of students' free speech rights. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser case in order to determine if it empowers schools to censor off-campus student speech.


Author(s):  
Rodney A. Smolla

This chapter introduces the task force created by Governor Terry McAuliffe in Richmond, Virginia that are tasked to study the racial violence in the city of Charlottesville during the summer of 2017. It mentions the violence in Richmond that claimed the life of Heather Heyer when a white supremacist, James Alex Fields Jr., slammed his speeding car into a crowd of counter-protesters confronting a “Unite the Right” rally. This chapter explains the work of the task force, which requires them to deeply investigate the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and the rules of engagement governing what society could or could not do when confronted with racial supremacist groups rallying in a city. It also describes the famous free speech case called Virginia vs. Black involving vicious racist hate speech. The case involved a cross-burning rally of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in rural western Virginia in 1998 and a second cross-burning incident in Virginia Beach in the yard of an African American, James Jubilee.


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