Portugal’s Resistance to Decolonization and the “White Redoubt” (1950–1974)

Author(s):  
Luís Barroso

Portugal’s resistance to decolonization lasted from the mid-1950s until the fall of the regime in April 1974, and it helps to explain why Portugal fought thirteen years of war in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. Contrary to other colonial powers, the Portuguese rulers were not willing to accept the winds of change nor to meet the demands for the self-determination of its overseas territories that had swept Africa and Asia from the early 1950s. Several factors can explain the inflexibility of Lisbon to accept them, ranging from the ideological nature of the New State; from the strategic context of the Cold War due to the importance of the Azores islands for the United States and NATO; or from Portugal’s alliance with Great Britain. When the war broke out in Angola, and the Indian Union seized the “Portuguese India” territories in 1961, prime-minister Salazar did not receive the political support he expected from Washington and London as traditional allies. In early 1962, Salazar decided to strengthen relations with South Africa and Rhodesia in an attempt to maintain white rule in its overseas territories amidst a drive for independence by African nationalists, so-called “white redoubt,” that was the terminology used by the Kennedy administration to refer to the set of African countries and territories dominated by white minority governments: Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Strengthened ties would aid his strategy to keep the war effort in Africa by taking advantage of the importance of Angola and Mozambique to the security of South Africa. In 1964, Salazar encouraged Ian Smith to unilaterally declare independence from Great Britain to link Angola and Mozambique to the Southern Africa Security Complex led by South Africa, despite widespread criticism of the apartheid in the United Nations (UN). Concurrently, Lisbon tried to seduce Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda in expelling the liberation movements from Malawi and Zambia in exchange for granting transit facilities to ease the international pressure with regards to its colonial policy. Following several years of military collaboration, in October 1970, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia established a military alliance codenamed “Exercise ALCORA,” which aimed to coordinate the global efforts against the insurgency in Southern Africa. Portugal used the ALCORA to obtain substantial aid in the form of military equipment and financial support, which Portugal needed to keep the war effort in the three African territories. In early 1974, Caetano channeled the South African loan to prevent a significant setback in Guinea, because if it were lost, Mozambique and Angola would follow, and consequently the regime.

English Today ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid Fandrych

ABSTRACTAn account of the need for appropriate language skills in a developing multilingual context.Language issues in Southern Africa have always been marked by political struggle. In South Africa, these were sometimes violent, as with, for example, the 1976 Soweto uprisings, in which protests over the medium of education were prominent. One of the priorities of the first democratically elected government of 1994 was to democratise the situation by making eleven languages official, in contrast to the two prior to that, namely Afrikaans and English. In other Southern African countries, language issues have also been characterised by debates and struggles. A prime example is the decision by the Namibian government to make English the official language of the country, even though English had never even been a colonial language in Namibia. Another example is Lesotho, a former British protectorate, with two official languages, English and Sesotho. In the last two decades, there have been numerous debates about the status of English as a subject necessary for a pass in schools and as a prerequisite for admission to university. Kramsch's observation that ‘[l]inguistic wars are always also political and cultural wars’ captures the situation well. Language issues are still on many speakers' minds and influence their sense of self and identity. As Baugh observes, ‘[i]n societies like the United States and South Africa, where race and language development have strongly been influenced by racial strife, many students do not aspire to “talk like Whites”’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Victorovna Khudaykulova

The need to protect citizens and investments abroad is placing tremendous pressure on China’s traditional foreign policy strategy and noninterference principle. Instability in most of BRI countries form new security conditions, pushing China to be more flexible in engaging in missions it had previously opposed, including political engagement in intrastate conflicts in the developing world. Following the formula “politics is a big economy”, China starts rethinking its security interests. As a result, China has smoothly adopted the transition strategy from non-intervention into internal affairs to a more proactive non-indifference approach, that Chinese academics are describing as “creative” or “constructive” engagement. Many new elements contribute to this new constructive engagement - conceptual narrative, political support, geopolitical competition, growing capacities and new security conditions. The key point of the article is to analyze China’s strategy in defending national interests overseas, including the rescue and peacekeeping operations, mediation, political envoys, etc. The special focus is done on proactive peacekeeping policy of China and its new role in the security environment. Obviously, in future China will follow implementing the overseas missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuation operations, defense of sea lanes, stabilization operations, peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions. After launching in 2017 its first overseas military base in Djibouti, there is little evidence to predict that in the near future China intends to construct more bases. But nevertheless the geopolitical rivalry with the United States might push China to convert three deep-water ports - Gwadar (Pakistan), Salalah (Oman), and Seychelles ports into naval bases. The degree of the China’s involvement in global security landscape will depend on the level of its responsibility, since Beijing is undergoing through a higher degree of international pressure in order to take more obligations. Responding to overseas security crises through military actions would be mostly shaped by events (case-by-case approach), inspired by political motivations and organized as small-scale and low-intensity missions.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Deborah Toler

No one is happy with the Reagan Administration’s southern Africa foreign policy strategy known as constructive engagement. Liberals object to the tilt towards South Africa, to the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to the Namibian negotiations; to the resulting moribund state of those negotiations; and to the deemphasis of human rights and development issues in favor of increased emphasis on military and security issues. Conservatives object to economic assistance packages for African socialist and self-styled states; to the declining U.S. support of Jonas Savimbi’s ostensibly pro-Western UNITA forces in Angola; to Administration efforts to improve relations between the United States and the Marxist states of Angola and Mozambique; and to the Administration’s apparent willingness to accept a SWAPO (i.e., communist guerrilla) outcome in Namibia.


Author(s):  
Clinton Gahwiler ◽  
Lee Hill ◽  
Valérie Grand’Maison

Since the 1970s, significant growth globally has occurred in the related fields of sport, exercise, and performance psychology. In Southern Africa, however, this growth has occurred unevenly and, other than isolated pockets of interest, there has been little teaching, research, or practice. South Africa is an exception, however, even during the years of apartheid. A number of international sport psychology pioneers in fact visited South Africa during the 1970s on sponsored trips. Virtually all this activity took place in the economically advantaged sectors of the country, and it is only since the end of apartheid in 1994 that applied services have been extended to the economically disadvantaged areas through both government and private funding. The 2010s have also seen a growing awareness in other Southern African countries, which have begun sporadically using (mainly foreign-based) sport psychology consultants. Among these countries, Botswana is currently leading the way in developing locally based expertise. Throughout the Southern African region, sport, exercise, and performance psychology remain organizationally underdeveloped and unregulated. Local researchers and practitioners in the field face unique challenges, including a multicultural environment and a lack of resources. In working to overcome these challenges, however, they have the potential to significantly add value to the global knowledge base of sport, exercise, and performance psychology.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENT FEDOROWICH

For most of the Second World War, German and Italian agents were actively engaged in a variety of intelligence gathering exercises in southern Africa. The hub of this activity was Lourenço Marques, the colonial capital of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). One of the key tasks of Axis agents was to make links with Nazi sympathizers and the radical right in South Africa, promote dissent, and destabilize the imperial war effort in the dominion. Using British, American, and South African archival sources, this article outlines German espionage activities and British counter-intelligence operations orchestrated by MI5, MI6, and the Special Operations Executive between 1939 and 1944. The article, which is part of a larger study, examines three broad themes. First, it explores Pretoria's creation of a humble military intelligence apparatus in wartime South Africa. Secondly, it examines the establishment of several British liaison and intelligence-gathering agencies that operated in southern Africa for most of the war. Finally, it assesses the working relationship between the South African and British agencies, the tensions that arose, and the competing interests that emerged between the two allies as they sought to contain the Axis-inspired threat from within.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevwe Omoragbon

<p>Specialist law clinics now operate both in the developed and developing world. The historical background of these specialist law clinics can be traced to the United States. They also abound in South Africa, Europe and are fast emerging in several African countries. It is however outside the scope of this paper to describe the wide variety of specialist law clinic models that exist in other countries.</p><p><br />At present in Nigeria, there are seven Nigerian Universities with law clinics. These law clinics in enhancing the social justice frontier have developed projects addressing specific problems; making them specialists in service delivery, but the Women’s Law Clinic, is the only gender specialist law clinic.</p>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubembe D. Mukolwe ◽  
David O. Odongo ◽  
Charles Byaruhanga ◽  
Louwtjie P. Snyman ◽  
Kgomotso P. Sibeko-Matjila

AbstractEast Coast fever (ECF) and Corridor disease (CD) caused by cattle- and buffalo-derived T. parva respectively are the most economically important tick-borne diseases of cattle in the affected African countries. The p67 gene has been evaluated as a recombinant subunit vaccine against East Coast fever (ECF), and for discrimination of T. parva parasites causing ECF and Corridor disease (CD). The p67 allele type 1 was first identified in cattle-derived T. parva parasites from east Africa, where parasites possessing this allele type have been associated with ECF. Subsequent characterization of buffalo-derived T. parva parasites from South Africa where ECF was eradicated, revealed the presence of a similar allele type, raising concerns as to whether or not allele type 1 from parasites from the two regions is identical. A 900 bp central fragment of the gene encoding p67 was PCR amplified from T. parva DNA extracted from blood collected from cattle and buffalo in South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, followed by DNA sequence analysis. Four p67 allele types previously described were identified. A subtype of p67 allele type 1 was identified in parasites from clinical cases of CD and buffalo from southern Africa. Notably, p67 allele type 1 sequences from parasites associated with ECF in East Africa and CD in Kenya were identical. Analysis of two p67 B-cell epitopes (TpM12 and AR22.7) revealed amino acid substitutions in allele type 1 from buffalo-derived T. parva parasites from southern Africa. However, both epitopes were conserved in allele type 1 from cattle- and buffalo-derived T. parva parasites from East Africa. These findings reveal detection of a subtype of p67 allele type 1 associated with T. parva parasites transmissible from buffalo to cattle in southern Africa.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrikas Bartusevicius ◽  
Florian van Leeuwen ◽  
Michael Bang Petersen

Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized, specifically, that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries (N = 51,587) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared to democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, action intent, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa (N = 2,170), Denmark (N = 1,012), and the United States (N = 1,539) indicated that the autocratic orientation-political violence link reflects individual differences in dominance orientations, and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values.


Author(s):  
Theodore J. Stein

Civil liberties refer to certain freedoms granted to all citizens. They have been established as bills of rights in the constitutions of such countries as the United States, India, South Africa, and Great Britain. Civil rights differ from civil liberties in that the former are expressed in statutes enacted by legislative bodies. Civil liberties limit the state's power to interfere in the lives of its citizens, whereas civil rights take a more proactive role to ensure that all citizens have equal protection. Civil liberties are most endangered during national emergencies when governments infringe on individual liberties to safeguard the nation.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mybes S. McDougal ◽  
W. Michael Reisman

Locked in south central Africa by Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia comprises a land mass of over 150,000 square miles and a population of about four million blacks and 220,000 whites. From 1889 until 1922 the area was administered by a chartered company formed by Cecil Rhodes. In 1922 the white settlers opted for the status of a self-governing colony, and in 1923 Southern Rhodesia was annexed by Great Britain. In 1953 it joined, with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a federation, still under the United Kingdom; the venture proved unsuccessful and was terminated in 1963.


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