Clarifications of the Russian Supreme Court on General Aspects of Intellectual Property Protection: A Summary

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (9) ◽  
pp. 925-927
Author(s):  
Natalia Kapyrina

Abstract Since April 2019, Russian intellectual property law has been enriched by an interpretative Resolution of the highest judicial instance, the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, which performs, among other prerogatives, the task to ensure the correct and uniform application of law.** The last time a judicial instrument of an equivalent scale was adopted was in 2009 (the Joint Resolution No. 5/29 of 26 March 2009 of the Plenary Sessions of the Supreme Court and of the Supreme Arbitration Court ‘On certain issues arising in connection with the enactment of Part Four of the CCRF’). Back then a significant number of issues deriving from the introduction in 2006 of Part Four of the Civil Code (dedicated to Intellectual Property) were identified, solved and converted into guidance for courts and other legal professionals. Now, subsequent revisions of the legislation, primarily aimed at its ‘modernisation’, as well as the adoption of other modifying instruments (such as the Ruling of the Constitutional Court n° 28-P of 13 December 2016), pushed by a growing IP practice and disparate case law, have provided a fertile ground for this new supreme judicial effort. The outcome is generous – useful to those wishing to acquire a global overview of Russian IP law. It slightly resembles a Prévert’s inventory, as many issues are touched upon with a varying depth, length and degree of sophistication. Although some observers have deplored the avoidance of this or that issue, the document is comprehensive and lengthy (182 paragraphs), and generally lauded by the Russian IP community.1

Author(s):  
Carmen CHINCHILLA MARÍN

LABURPENA: Sektore Publikoaren Araubide Juridikoari buruzko 40/2015 Legeak arau berria sartu du zigorrak preskribitzeko epearen zenbaketaren inguruan, zigorren aurka jarritako gora jotzeko errekurtsoak administrazioaren isiltasunaren bidez ezesten diren kasuetarako. Hala, lege horren 30.3. artikuluan ezarritakoaren arabera, errekurtsoa ustez ezesten bada, errekurtso horren ebazpena emateko legez aurreikusi den epea amaitu eta hurrengo egunetik aurrera hasi behar da zenbatzen zigorra preskribitzeko epea. Preskripzioari buruzko arau berri horrek, zentzuzkoa denez, ondorioak eduki behar ditu zigorrak betearazteko araubidearen gainean, zigorra bete behar izatea baita zigorra preskribatzeko oinarria. Artikulu honetan, bi berritasun horien berri ematen da, eta kontraesan-arazoa aztertzen, Konstituzio Auzitegiak eta Auzitegi Gorenak errekurtso-bideko isiltasunaren eta isiltasun horrek zigorren preskripzioaren eta bete behar izatearen gainean dituen ondorioen —hobeto esanda, «ondorio-ezaren»— inguruan duten jurisprudentziari dagokionez. RESUMEN: la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen jurídico del Sector público, ha introducido una nueva regla sobre el cómputo del plazo de prescripción de las sanciones en los casos en los que el recurso de alzada interpuesto contra las mismas se desestima por silencio administrativo. Así, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 30.3 de esta ley, en el caso de desestimación presunta del recurso, el plazo de prescripción de la sanción comenzará a computarse desde el día siguiente a aquel en el que finalice el plazo legalmente previsto para la resolución de dicho recurso. Esta nueva regla sobre la prescripción lógicamente tiene que producir consecuencias sobre el régimen de ejecutividad de las sanciones, pues la ejecutividad de la sanción constituye el presupuesto de la prescripción de la misma. En este artículo se da cuenta de ambas novedades y se analiza el problema de su contradicción respecto de la jurisprudencia —del Tribunal constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo— sobre el silencio en vía de recurso y sus efectos (más bien, sus «no efectos») sobre la prescripción y la ejecutividad de las sanciones. ABSTRACT: The Act 40/2015 of the legal regime of the Public Sector has introduced a new rule on the calculation of the limitation period to be applied to sanctions in cases where hierarchichal appeal filed against them had been rejected by administrative silence. Thus, within the meaning of section 30.3 of this Act, in case of implied rejection of the appeal, the calculation of the limitation period of the sanction shall begin from the day following the deadline legally established to resolve that appeal. This new rule about the limitation period has logically to have consequences over the enforceability of sanctions, since enforceability of the sanction as such is a prerequisite for the limitation period of it. This article deals with both novelties and analyzes the problem of their contradiction with the case law —by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court— regarding the silence within the appeal and its effects (or rather lack of effects) about the limitation period and enforceability of sanctions.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kysela ◽  
Marek Antoš

AbstractThe Constitutional Court used the case of a constitutional complaint filed by a former member of the Chamber of Deputies to provide a comprehensive view of the scope of parliamentary immunity. Indirectly overruling previous case law of the Supreme Court, this Court adhered to a more restrictive interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. According to this decision, members of parliament can rely on their constitutional protection only with regard to the communication of information or expression of an opinion verbally, in writing, visually, or in another way at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, their committees, subcommittees, and commissions or their bodies, that is aimed at the participants of the meeting rather than just at the television audience or radio listeners.


Author(s):  
Iñaki LASAGABASTER HERRARTE

LABURPENA: Lan honek Konstituzio Auzitegiaren 10/2013 Epaia du aztergai. Epai horrek Auzitegi Gorenak emandakoa berresten du, zeinaren arabera organo konstituzional gorenak ez duen ezagutzen alderdi politikoen eta udal-taldeen arteko aldeari buruzko jurisprudentzia, finkatuta dagoena. Auzitegiek, lege-gaikuntzarik gabe, udal-taldeen erregulazioari eta existentziari buruzko erabakiak hartzea tokiko autonomiaren aurkakoa da. RESUMEN: En el trabajo se analiza la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 10/2013, que confirma la dictada por el Tribunal Supremo, precisando que el Alto órgano constitucional desconoce su jurisprudencia, ya consolidada, sobre la diferenciación entre partidos políticos y grupos municipales. La intervención de los tribunales, sin habilitación legal, resolviendo sobre la regulación y existencia de grupos municipales es contraria a la autonomía local. ABSTRACT: In this work, we analyze the Constitutional Court judgement 10/2013, which upholds the Supreme Court ruling specifying that the Higher Constitutional body does not know its case law, already well-established, about the distinction between political parties and municipal political groups. The intervention of courts, without legal authorization, solving the regulation and existence of municipal political groups is contrary to local autonomy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
María del Mar Navas Sánchez

Resumen:Este artículo aborda el probablemente más controvertido supuesto relativo a la relación dialéctica entre las libertades de expresión e información y el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen. El que tiene como titular de este último derecho a quien puede ser considerado, en general, como un personaje público. Lo hace, además, desde una doble perspectiva. Por un lado, se muestra la evolución experimentada en el régimen jurídico del derecho a la propia imagen de este tipo de personas desde que en 1978 y de manera novedosa nuestra Constitución reconociera por vez primera el derecho a la propia imagen comoun derecho fundamental autónomo y diferenciado de la intimidad en el artículo 18.1 CE hasta nuestros días. Se trata de un proceso que ha venido marcado por varios hitos: la aprobación en 1982 de una norma (la Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la propia imagen) en la que el legislador establece pautas muy concretas acerca del modo en que han de resolverse este tipo de conflictos; la intensidad con la que esta Ley ha condicionado la jurisprudencia de los jueces y tribunales de la jurisdicción ordinaria, particularmente del Tribunal Supremo; y, finalmente, el importante papel desempeñado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional que, prescindiendo de las prescripciones legislativas y operando conforme a categorías constitucionales, ha terminado por erigir, en un proceso que, a su vez, hemos diferenciado en dos etapas, al interés público presente en las imágenes controvertidas, en el elemento decisivo para resolver este tipo de conflictos. Pero por otro, además, se presta especial atención a las recíprocas relaciones que a propósito de este supuesto se han establecido a lo largo de estas décadas entre las jurisprudencias de los Tribunales Constitucional,  Supremo y de Estrasburgo. En este sentido, nos ha parecido especialmenteinteresante fijarnos no solo en el modo en que el Tribunal Constitucional se ha servido del canon europeo (art. 10.2 CE) para construir su propia doctrina sobre el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen de los personajes públicos, sino también y muy particularmente, en la forma en que esta doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional ha sido seguida o no por el Tribunal Supremo y, por tanto, en el modo en que este último se ha sentido vinculado, si es que lo ha hecho, a la misma, dando así cumplimiento a su obligación constitucional (art. 5.1 LOPJ).Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The little, but adequate, express influence of the european canon in the first constitutional case law on the fundamental right to own´s image. 3. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the constitutional case law prior to STC 19/2014. Its almost null follow-up by the supreme court. 4. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the latest constitutional case law. Its —now yes— reception by the supreme court. 5. The relationship of constitutional case law with that of the European Court of Human Rights on this specific right, seen through STC 19/2014. 6. Conclusions.Abstract:This paper tackles the probably more controversial case concerning the dialectical relation between the freedoms of expression and information and the fundamental right to the own image. The one that refers to so-called «public figures». It does so from a dual perspective. On the one hand, it shows the evolution experienced in the right to their image of this type of people since Spanish Constitution, in 1978, recognized for the first time the right to own image as a fundamental right autonomous and different from the right to a private life (art. 18.1) to the present day. This is a process that has been marked by several landmarks: the adoption in 1982 of a rule (Organic Law 1/1982, of May 5, on civil protection of the right to reputation, privacy and own image) inwhich the legislator lays down very specific guidelines as to how such conflicts should be resolved; the intensity with which this Law has conditioned the case law of judges and courts of ordinary jurisdiction, particularly the Supreme Court; and finally, the important role played by the case law of the Constitutional Court, which, regardless of the legislative requirements and taking constitutional categories as references, has finally established, in a process that we have differentiated in two stages, the public interest of the images (or, in other words, the contribution made by photos to a debate of general interest) in the decisive element to solve this type of conflicts. But on the other hand, special attention is also paid to the reciprocal relations that have been established over these decades among the case law of the Constitutional, Supreme and Strasbourg Courts. On this regard, we have found particularly interesting to look not only at the way in which the Constitutional Court has used the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Article 10.2 Spanish Constitution) to establish its own doctrine on the fundamental right to their image of public figures, but also, especially, in the way in which this doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been followed or not by the Supreme Court and therefore if the latter has fulfilled its constitutional obligation (Article 5.1 Organic Law of the Judiciary).


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-205
Author(s):  
Tomasz Woś

The article discusses the issue of the Constitutional Court’s and other courts’ application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the practice of issuing rulings. Based on the analysis of the case law, it presents the Constitutional Court’s standpoint concerning the role of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the Polish system of law and its application in the Constitutional Court’s case law. At the same time, it discusses other courts’ application of this principle, i.e. its influence on the decision-making processes of the application of law by the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and administrative courts. The analysis of the case law show that the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet plays a special role in the Polish system of law. In their decisions, both the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned emphasise that the Polish system of law, like other contemporary systems of law, is based on this principle, and its violence would lead to unpredictable results in the practice of issuing rulings. There are no major differences between the application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet by the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned. In cases involving the ignorance of the law, both the Constitutional Court and other courts commonly recognise and apply, within the scope of their competence, the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet. Administrative law takes a particular stance on the application of this principle. In the Supreme Administrative Court’s judicature, a jurisdictional approach has been adopted that recognises that the operation of this principle is reduced in administrative procedure. In turn, the study of the case law of provincial administrative courts shows that these courts still have not adopted a uniform jurisdictional pattern in this respect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...


Author(s):  
V.C. Govindaraj

In deciding cases of private international law or conflict of laws, as it is widely known, judges of the Supreme Court in India generally consult the works of renowned English jurists like Dicey and Cheshire. This volume argues that our country should have its own system of resolving inter-territorial issues with cross-border implications. The author critically analyses cases covering areas such as the law of obligations, the law of persons, the law of property, foreign judgments, and foreign arbitral awards. The author provides his perspectives on the application of law in each case. The idea is to find out where the judges went wrong in deciding cases of private international law, so that corrective measures can be taken in future to resolve disputes involving complex, extra-territorial issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


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