Czech Constitutional Court: Twists and Turns of Recent Judgments of the Highest Courts in Cases of Parliamentary Immunity

ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kysela ◽  
Marek Antoš

AbstractThe Constitutional Court used the case of a constitutional complaint filed by a former member of the Chamber of Deputies to provide a comprehensive view of the scope of parliamentary immunity. Indirectly overruling previous case law of the Supreme Court, this Court adhered to a more restrictive interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. According to this decision, members of parliament can rely on their constitutional protection only with regard to the communication of information or expression of an opinion verbally, in writing, visually, or in another way at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, their committees, subcommittees, and commissions or their bodies, that is aimed at the participants of the meeting rather than just at the television audience or radio listeners.

Jurnal Hukum ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 612
Author(s):  
Widayati

Indonesia is a sovereign country folk. One implementation of the sovereignty of the people is the election that followed by political parties for members of Parliament and members of parliament and individuals for DPD.Political parties are the main pillars of democracy. Establishment of political parties must meet the requirements in accordance with legislation. Terms of founding a political party regulated under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties.As the main pillar of democracy, political parties should be able to carry out its functions properly. There are some restrictions on political parties, among others, are prohibited from engaging in activities contrary to the Constitution of 1945 NRI and legislation; engage in activities that endanger the integrity and safety Homeland. If the ban is violated, then the government may ask the parties to the freezing of the District Court. If the parties do not accept the decision of freezing the District Court, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the PN, then the Government may propose the dissolution of the parties to the Court.The procedure by which parties to the Court daitur dissolution under Article 68 paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court's decision regarding the request for the dissolution of political parties must be decided upon within a period of 60 (sixty) days after pemoohonan recorded in the Register of Case Constitution.Keywords: Parati dissolution of political, constitutional systemIndonesia


Author(s):  
Carmen CHINCHILLA MARÍN

LABURPENA: Sektore Publikoaren Araubide Juridikoari buruzko 40/2015 Legeak arau berria sartu du zigorrak preskribitzeko epearen zenbaketaren inguruan, zigorren aurka jarritako gora jotzeko errekurtsoak administrazioaren isiltasunaren bidez ezesten diren kasuetarako. Hala, lege horren 30.3. artikuluan ezarritakoaren arabera, errekurtsoa ustez ezesten bada, errekurtso horren ebazpena emateko legez aurreikusi den epea amaitu eta hurrengo egunetik aurrera hasi behar da zenbatzen zigorra preskribitzeko epea. Preskripzioari buruzko arau berri horrek, zentzuzkoa denez, ondorioak eduki behar ditu zigorrak betearazteko araubidearen gainean, zigorra bete behar izatea baita zigorra preskribatzeko oinarria. Artikulu honetan, bi berritasun horien berri ematen da, eta kontraesan-arazoa aztertzen, Konstituzio Auzitegiak eta Auzitegi Gorenak errekurtso-bideko isiltasunaren eta isiltasun horrek zigorren preskripzioaren eta bete behar izatearen gainean dituen ondorioen —hobeto esanda, «ondorio-ezaren»— inguruan duten jurisprudentziari dagokionez. RESUMEN: la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen jurídico del Sector público, ha introducido una nueva regla sobre el cómputo del plazo de prescripción de las sanciones en los casos en los que el recurso de alzada interpuesto contra las mismas se desestima por silencio administrativo. Así, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 30.3 de esta ley, en el caso de desestimación presunta del recurso, el plazo de prescripción de la sanción comenzará a computarse desde el día siguiente a aquel en el que finalice el plazo legalmente previsto para la resolución de dicho recurso. Esta nueva regla sobre la prescripción lógicamente tiene que producir consecuencias sobre el régimen de ejecutividad de las sanciones, pues la ejecutividad de la sanción constituye el presupuesto de la prescripción de la misma. En este artículo se da cuenta de ambas novedades y se analiza el problema de su contradicción respecto de la jurisprudencia —del Tribunal constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo— sobre el silencio en vía de recurso y sus efectos (más bien, sus «no efectos») sobre la prescripción y la ejecutividad de las sanciones. ABSTRACT: The Act 40/2015 of the legal regime of the Public Sector has introduced a new rule on the calculation of the limitation period to be applied to sanctions in cases where hierarchichal appeal filed against them had been rejected by administrative silence. Thus, within the meaning of section 30.3 of this Act, in case of implied rejection of the appeal, the calculation of the limitation period of the sanction shall begin from the day following the deadline legally established to resolve that appeal. This new rule about the limitation period has logically to have consequences over the enforceability of sanctions, since enforceability of the sanction as such is a prerequisite for the limitation period of it. This article deals with both novelties and analyzes the problem of their contradiction with the case law —by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court— regarding the silence within the appeal and its effects (or rather lack of effects) about the limitation period and enforceability of sanctions.


Author(s):  
Iñaki LASAGABASTER HERRARTE

LABURPENA: Lan honek Konstituzio Auzitegiaren 10/2013 Epaia du aztergai. Epai horrek Auzitegi Gorenak emandakoa berresten du, zeinaren arabera organo konstituzional gorenak ez duen ezagutzen alderdi politikoen eta udal-taldeen arteko aldeari buruzko jurisprudentzia, finkatuta dagoena. Auzitegiek, lege-gaikuntzarik gabe, udal-taldeen erregulazioari eta existentziari buruzko erabakiak hartzea tokiko autonomiaren aurkakoa da. RESUMEN: En el trabajo se analiza la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 10/2013, que confirma la dictada por el Tribunal Supremo, precisando que el Alto órgano constitucional desconoce su jurisprudencia, ya consolidada, sobre la diferenciación entre partidos políticos y grupos municipales. La intervención de los tribunales, sin habilitación legal, resolviendo sobre la regulación y existencia de grupos municipales es contraria a la autonomía local. ABSTRACT: In this work, we analyze the Constitutional Court judgement 10/2013, which upholds the Supreme Court ruling specifying that the Higher Constitutional body does not know its case law, already well-established, about the distinction between political parties and municipal political groups. The intervention of courts, without legal authorization, solving the regulation and existence of municipal political groups is contrary to local autonomy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
María del Mar Navas Sánchez

Resumen:Este artículo aborda el probablemente más controvertido supuesto relativo a la relación dialéctica entre las libertades de expresión e información y el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen. El que tiene como titular de este último derecho a quien puede ser considerado, en general, como un personaje público. Lo hace, además, desde una doble perspectiva. Por un lado, se muestra la evolución experimentada en el régimen jurídico del derecho a la propia imagen de este tipo de personas desde que en 1978 y de manera novedosa nuestra Constitución reconociera por vez primera el derecho a la propia imagen comoun derecho fundamental autónomo y diferenciado de la intimidad en el artículo 18.1 CE hasta nuestros días. Se trata de un proceso que ha venido marcado por varios hitos: la aprobación en 1982 de una norma (la Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la propia imagen) en la que el legislador establece pautas muy concretas acerca del modo en que han de resolverse este tipo de conflictos; la intensidad con la que esta Ley ha condicionado la jurisprudencia de los jueces y tribunales de la jurisdicción ordinaria, particularmente del Tribunal Supremo; y, finalmente, el importante papel desempeñado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional que, prescindiendo de las prescripciones legislativas y operando conforme a categorías constitucionales, ha terminado por erigir, en un proceso que, a su vez, hemos diferenciado en dos etapas, al interés público presente en las imágenes controvertidas, en el elemento decisivo para resolver este tipo de conflictos. Pero por otro, además, se presta especial atención a las recíprocas relaciones que a propósito de este supuesto se han establecido a lo largo de estas décadas entre las jurisprudencias de los Tribunales Constitucional,  Supremo y de Estrasburgo. En este sentido, nos ha parecido especialmenteinteresante fijarnos no solo en el modo en que el Tribunal Constitucional se ha servido del canon europeo (art. 10.2 CE) para construir su propia doctrina sobre el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen de los personajes públicos, sino también y muy particularmente, en la forma en que esta doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional ha sido seguida o no por el Tribunal Supremo y, por tanto, en el modo en que este último se ha sentido vinculado, si es que lo ha hecho, a la misma, dando así cumplimiento a su obligación constitucional (art. 5.1 LOPJ).Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The little, but adequate, express influence of the european canon in the first constitutional case law on the fundamental right to own´s image. 3. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the constitutional case law prior to STC 19/2014. Its almost null follow-up by the supreme court. 4. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the latest constitutional case law. Its —now yes— reception by the supreme court. 5. The relationship of constitutional case law with that of the European Court of Human Rights on this specific right, seen through STC 19/2014. 6. Conclusions.Abstract:This paper tackles the probably more controversial case concerning the dialectical relation between the freedoms of expression and information and the fundamental right to the own image. The one that refers to so-called «public figures». It does so from a dual perspective. On the one hand, it shows the evolution experienced in the right to their image of this type of people since Spanish Constitution, in 1978, recognized for the first time the right to own image as a fundamental right autonomous and different from the right to a private life (art. 18.1) to the present day. This is a process that has been marked by several landmarks: the adoption in 1982 of a rule (Organic Law 1/1982, of May 5, on civil protection of the right to reputation, privacy and own image) inwhich the legislator lays down very specific guidelines as to how such conflicts should be resolved; the intensity with which this Law has conditioned the case law of judges and courts of ordinary jurisdiction, particularly the Supreme Court; and finally, the important role played by the case law of the Constitutional Court, which, regardless of the legislative requirements and taking constitutional categories as references, has finally established, in a process that we have differentiated in two stages, the public interest of the images (or, in other words, the contribution made by photos to a debate of general interest) in the decisive element to solve this type of conflicts. But on the other hand, special attention is also paid to the reciprocal relations that have been established over these decades among the case law of the Constitutional, Supreme and Strasbourg Courts. On this regard, we have found particularly interesting to look not only at the way in which the Constitutional Court has used the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Article 10.2 Spanish Constitution) to establish its own doctrine on the fundamental right to their image of public figures, but also, especially, in the way in which this doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been followed or not by the Supreme Court and therefore if the latter has fulfilled its constitutional obligation (Article 5.1 Organic Law of the Judiciary).


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (9) ◽  
pp. 925-927
Author(s):  
Natalia Kapyrina

Abstract Since April 2019, Russian intellectual property law has been enriched by an interpretative Resolution of the highest judicial instance, the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, which performs, among other prerogatives, the task to ensure the correct and uniform application of law.** The last time a judicial instrument of an equivalent scale was adopted was in 2009 (the Joint Resolution No. 5/29 of 26 March 2009 of the Plenary Sessions of the Supreme Court and of the Supreme Arbitration Court ‘On certain issues arising in connection with the enactment of Part Four of the CCRF’). Back then a significant number of issues deriving from the introduction in 2006 of Part Four of the Civil Code (dedicated to Intellectual Property) were identified, solved and converted into guidance for courts and other legal professionals. Now, subsequent revisions of the legislation, primarily aimed at its ‘modernisation’, as well as the adoption of other modifying instruments (such as the Ruling of the Constitutional Court n° 28-P of 13 December 2016), pushed by a growing IP practice and disparate case law, have provided a fertile ground for this new supreme judicial effort. The outcome is generous – useful to those wishing to acquire a global overview of Russian IP law. It slightly resembles a Prévert’s inventory, as many issues are touched upon with a varying depth, length and degree of sophistication. Although some observers have deplored the avoidance of this or that issue, the document is comprehensive and lengthy (182 paragraphs), and generally lauded by the Russian IP community.1


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


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