6. Charles de Gaulle’s Uncertain Idea of Europe

Author(s):  
Jeffrey Vanke

This chapter examines how policy towards the European Economic Community (EEC) fitted in with French leader Charles de Gaulle's broader European and international objectives and how the international constraints on his certain vision of France gave rise to his evolving, uncertain idea of Europe. Having denounced the Treaty of Rome before coming to power in 1958, de Gaulle ensured the EEC's survival by undertaking financial reforms in France and warding off Britain's effort to negotiate a wider free trade area. He linked these initiatives to implementation of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The chapter also considers de Gaulle's proposal for an independent and intergovernmental European Union and his role in the so-called Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–6. Finally, it discusses the impact of de Gaulle on the course of European integration.

2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moravcsik

The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965–1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.


Author(s):  
Fernando Guirao

This book explores how the governments of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, acting collectively via the European Communities, assisted in the consolidation of the Franco regime. The Six (the Nine after 1973) provided the Spanish economy with a stable supply of raw materials and capital goods and with outlet markets for Spain’s main export commodities. Through both mechanisms, the European Communities assisted Spain’s development and supported the stabilization of its non-democratic régime. From 1950 to the mid-1960s, the Six avoided every sign of discrimination against Spain. By the mid-1960s, they became conscious of the need to promote Spanish exports in order to expand their own exports on the Spanish market. By 1970, Madrid obtained an arrangement with the EEC that, free of any political conditionality, provided ample access to the Common Market while keeping the Spanish market essentially closed. After 1972, the Nine negotiated Franco Spain’s integration into a pan-European industrial free-trade area, in exchange for access to the Spanish market. It was the Spanish cabinet, at the last minute, for protection reasons, who decided to derail the offer. The Franco regime was never threatened by European integration and the Six/Nine managed to isolate negotiations with Spain from mounting political disturbance. In sum, without unremitting material assistance from Western Europe, it would have been considerably more challenging for the Franco regime to attain the stability that enabled the dictator to maintain his rule until dying peacefully at 82 years old.


2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATHIEU SEGERS

AbstractWhy did de Gaulle veto the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community in 1963? This article addresses the interlinked struggles over British accession and European political union in the early 1960s. The focus is on the crucially conflicting relations between de Gaulle and the Netherlands, his main opponent on both issues. Who won the Franco-Dutch battle and why? This article assesses these questions on the basis of new multi-archival material and highlights a hitherto largely unnoticed rhetorical battle, which explains the course of events and reveals a previously largely unnoticed logic behind de Gaulle's manoeuvring in the intertwined negotiations over European political union, the Common Agricultural Policy and the UK membership bid.


Author(s):  
António Lopes

This article aims to shed some light on the political and ideological agendas of both London and Lisbon during the process leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, on 25 March 1957. It focuses on four main questions. The frst one is on how the colonial issue still influenced their attitudes towards the process of European integration. The second one explores how the risks of isolation conditioned their understanding of the commercial and economic potential of a European common market. The third question addresses their inability to identify themselves with the principles and values of the European project. The fourth one seeks to ascertain the views exchanged between the British and Portuguese governments on issues such as the customs union, the common market and the free trade area.


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-263 ◽  

The twelfth session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was held in Geneva, October 17-November 30, 1957, under the chairmanshipof Shri L. K. Jha (India). According to the press, one of the most important aspects of the meeting was the discussion of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community. A committee which had been created by a GATT ministerial meeting, October 28–30, 1957, to examine the relevant provisions of the treaty and of GATT and to consider methods of implementing the interrelated obligations which governments had assumed in the two instruments reported to the Contracting Parties that its four subgroups had examined the treaty with respect to tariffs, the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, trade in agricultural products, and the association of certain overseas countries and territories with the Community. Agreeing that the preliminary examination had been useful but that a number of important questions remained unsolved, the Contracting Parties decided that the Intersessional Committee, with representation from all contracting parties, should continue the work begun at the session. Following its discussion of the trade aspects of the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) the Contracting Parties decided that further consideration could take place together with examination of the European Economic Community treaty. On another aspect of European economic integration, the Contracting Parties agreed that the Intersessional Committee should follow developments concerning the proposed European free trade area being negotiated in Paris.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-178 ◽  

The European Parliamentary Assembly met in ordinary session from October 21 to 24, 1958, at the House of Europe in Strasbourg. After M. Robert Schuman, President of the Assembly, had opened the proceedings, statements were made on the activities of the European Economic Community (EEC or common market) during the first nine months of its existence and on the activities of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In regard to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Assembly heard a statement by M. Pierre Wigny, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in which he noted the present coal crisis in Europe, and the differences between the common market and the free trade area—the one aiming for progressive integration, the other only for facilitating trade. This speaker was followed by M. Paul Finet, President of the High Authority of ECSC, who set out the present situation concerning coal in the common market area. He stated that the situation was undeniably serious and pointed out that pithead stocks had more than trebled, rising from 7 million metric tons in 1957 to 22 million tons in 1958. Belgium and Germany had been particularly hard-hit. He reviewed the action taken by the High Authority in trying to make the marketing rules more flexible and to stabilize production and imports, and appealed to the Parliament for support in these proposals, which had been made to the Council of Ministers of ECSC. A debate ensued on the general subject of the European communities.


Author(s):  
Wendy Asbeek Brusse

This chapter examines how the European Payments Union resolved the problem of currency convertibility and unlocked the potential of trade liberalization, thereby paving the way for the European Economic Community (EEC), which in turn spurred further intra-European trade. It first provides an overview of trade and payments before and immediately after World War II and goes on to discuss postwar approaches to convertibility and liberalization. It then considers the degree, speed, and commitment with which countries opened up their domestic markets to each other's exports under the Trade Liberalization Programme. It concludes with an assessment of Britain's efforts to join a wider free trade area with the members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances M. B. Lynch

Within one week of his election to the presidency of the Fifth Republic de Gaulle had taken a number of decisions which were to lay the basis for the foreign and economic policies pursued throughout his tenure of office. Contrary to all expectations de Gaulle confirmed his support for the European Economic Community, against the initial advice of his ministers he devalued the franc, and at variance with his partners in the EEC he vetoed Britain's plans to set up a free trade area in Europe. This article examines the reasons for de Gaulle's critical policy choices.


1982 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecil Rajana

The primary purpose of this article is to offer a critical, multifaceted evalution of the economic assistance extended by the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of states (A.C.P.s) under the terms of the Convention of Lomé. The first agreement was concluded in 1975, followed by the second in 1979, which runs until March 19852. Both, of course, were signed in the capital of Togo. The Lomé Convention is largely a product of the E.E.C. association policy, included as Articles 131–136 in the Treaty of Rome3, primarily at the insistence of France. This led to the Implementing Convention of 1958 which governed the aid and trade ties between the E.E.C. and the 17 colonial dependencies of member states. Specifically, the Implementing Convention instituted a free-trade area between the associated dependencies and the Community, and created the European Development Fund (E.D.F. or Fund) as a source of supplementary aid.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAURENT WARLOUZET

AbstractThe failure of the Free Trade Area (FTA), a British ‘Greater Europe’ free-market project, has often been contrasted with the European Economic Community (EEC)'s rapid success. However, this article claims that the EEC's success was neither logical nor automatic. The FTA project was not bound to failure, but could easily have become the principal institution for European co-operation. Moreover, the French leader, Charles de Gaulle, played such a prominent role in the EEC that he could be described as a new ‘Father of Europe’. Without the EEC, France would certainly have been forced to reach agreement on the FTA, but conversely, without de Gaulle, the EEC would probably have been diluted into a larger FTA.


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