3. Who Should Rule?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
General Will ◽  
Common Assumption

This chapter considers the question of what sort of state and government we should have. A common assumption is that only a democracy is ever fully justifiable. Anything else — a tyranny, an aristocracy, an absolute monarchy — lacks justification. But what is a democracy? Is it really so attractive? The chapter explores some of the most fundamental problems in formulating democratic theory before looking at arguments for and against democracy itself. It first examines the tension between the idea of democracy as a system of ‘majority rule’, and the idea of democratic ‘consideration for individuals’. It then analyses Plato's arguments against democracy, focusing on his use of the so-called craft analogy to defend his position, along with his concept of guardianship. It also discusses Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of the general will and concludes with an overview of representative democracy.

La distinction rousseauiste entre volonté de tous et volonté générale : une reconstruction mathématique et ses implications pour la théorie démocratique

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 467-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radu Dobrescu
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Theory ◽  
General Will ◽  
Mathematical Argument ◽  
Mathematical Analogy

Résumé. Se situant à mi-chemin entre l'exégèse rousseauiste et la théorie démocratique, cet article vise à éclairer l'analogie mathématique mobilisée par Rousseau pour illustrer la distinction entre volonté de tous et volonté générale et à réévaluer, à la lumière de cette analogie, les débats contemporains autour de la démocratie (libérale, épistémique, délibérative). Il s'agit de régler trois problèmes qui subsistent après la restitution par Philonenko de cet argument mathématique jugé irrécupérable et de montrer que la distinction rousseauiste ainsi reconstruite peut impulser significativement les tentatives actuelles de dépasser la volonté de tous libérale pour retrouver une volonté générale épistémique ou/et délibérative.Abstract. Halfway between Rousseauian exegesis and democratic theory, this article aims at clarifying the mathematical analogy that Rousseau used to illustrate the distinction between will of all and general will, and at reassessing in the light of this analogy the contemporary debates on democracy (liberal, epistemic, deliberative). Three problems that remain after Philonenko's restitution of this mathematical argument considered unrecoverable are solved herein. It is argued that the Rousseauian distinction thus reconstructed can give significant new impetus to current attempts to go beyond the liberal will of all in order to reach an epistemic or/and deliberative general will.

scholarly journals Speaking for Nature: Hobbes, Latour, and the Democratic Representation of Nonhumans

2017 ◽  
pp. 31-51
Author(s):  
Mark B. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Constructivist Theory ◽  
Democratic Representation ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Promising Avenue

Environmental theorists have often considered how best to represent nature's interests. This essay develops an approach to the democratic representation of nonhuman nature by examining the relation between Bruno Latour’s account of representation and that of Thomas Hobbes. Both Hobbes and Latour develop a constructivist theory of representation as an ongoing process that partly constitutes what it represents. In this respect, Latour’s account complements the “constructivist turn” in recent democratic theory, and it suggests a promising avenue for representing nonhumans. However, Latour also follows Hobbes in viewing representation as a matter of unifying and replacing the represented. This aspect of Latour’s approach obscures certain key features of representative democracy in pluralist societies. The last part of the essay takes up an aspect of Hobbes’s theory neglected by Latour, the notion of “representation by fiction,” which suggests a way of representing nonhumans that offers more support for representative democracy than other approaches

Power‐sharing versus Majority Rule: Patterns of Cabinet Formation in Twenty Democracies

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Ideal Type ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Westminster Model ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
The Ideal

THE TERM ‘MAJORITY RULE’ IS OFTEN USED EITHER AS A synonym of democracy or as one of its defining characteristics. An important contribution that the scholars belonging to the consociational school have made to democratic theory is to point out that this close identification of majorit rule and democracy is fallacious. Majoritarian democracy, of which the Westminster model is the ideal type, is not the only form of democracy; the major alternative is consociational democracy. Furthermore, majority rule is not necessarily the best form of democracy; especially in plural societies - that is, societies deeply divided by religious, ideological, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or racial cleavages into separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of communication - consociational democracy is the more suitable democratic model.

A Postscript to Professor Dahl's “Preface”

1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 1040-1052
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Minority Rights ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Important Sense

An exhilarating breath of fresh air has blown into the musty halls of political theory with the publication of Robert Dahl's Walgreen lectures, A Preface to Democratic Theory. We now know that discussion of minority rights and majority rule can be carried on with lucidity and serious attention to some of the intriguing intellectual puzzles which arise, as well as with reasonable rigor and a genuinely remarkable economy of expression.For all his clarity and conciseness, however, Professor Dahl has paid a fourfold philosophical price:1. His case against “Madisonian” democracy is procedural and perhaps more peripheral than profound.2. The neo-Spinozistic endeavor to formalize political ideology appears premature.3. His confessed epistemological perplexity over the ground of “intensity” judgments is peculiar.4. His refusal to wrestle with ethical issues—a refusal he shares with most “empirically oriented” political scientists—leaves them not only open and unresolved, but even unexplored. Yet, in an important sense, these issues seem to be the central ones.Following Dahl's example, I shall try to set forth these caveats as concisely as possible, leaving aside qualifications and positive theory construction.

scholarly journals El significado de la deferencia en el discurso republicano : de la «deference» a la «influence»

2011 ◽  
pp. 361
Author(s):  
John G. Pocock
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
Preparatory Work ◽  
Current Systems

John Pocock analyzes in this preparatory work of the Machiavellian Moment, the meaning of the concept of deference for the republican discourse constructed by Harrington. Deference is the natural recognition of a man of the superiority of other one, without resigning for it to his own esteem and to the independence that leads him to play a role in the society. For the classical democratic theory of deference is an exigency of the democratic game that allows that everyone occupies a place in the political life depending on his qualities. Deference is not the same thing that influence and must not be confused with patronage, two categories that are in the base of our current systems of representative democracy, constructed from the democratic egalitarianism prophesied by Tocqueville.John Pocock analiza en este trabajo preparatorio del Momento Maquiavélico, el significado del concepto de deferencia para el discurso republicano construido por Harrington. Deferencia es el reconocimiento natural de un hombre de la superioridad de otro, sin renunciar por ello a su propia estima y a la independencia que le lleva a desempeñar un rol propio en la sociedad. Para la idea democrática de los Antiguos, la deferencia es una exigencia del juego democrático que permite que todos ocupen un lugar en la vida política en función de sus particulares cualidades. Deferencia no es lo mismo que influencia y no debe confundirse con patronazgo, dos categorías que están en la base de nuestros actuales sistemas de democracia representativa, construida desde el igualitarismo democrático profetizado por Tocqueville.

Revolutionary Attitudes in Democratic Regimes

2019 ◽  
pp. 003232171987436
Author(s):  
Abel François ◽  
Raul Magni-Berton ◽  
Simon Varaine
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Positive Effect

Contrary to a classic prediction of democratic theory, empirical studies do not find that democratic systems produce internal peace. This absence of relationship does not mean that democratic theory is entirely wrong. Indeed, democratic systems may have a negative effect on the support for revolution, as predicted by democratic theory, but a positive effect on opportunities for revolutions on the other part. Focusing on the support for revolution in 15 European democracies, this article re-examines the classic prediction that democratic systems reduce political grievances. This rests on three arguments: that (1) majority rule guarantees that the number of dissatisfied people is relatively low, (2) periodic elections allow dissatisfied people to hope for a change in the leadership within a reasonable period of time, and (3) power-sharing institutions diminish the negative impact of an unwanted government on people. We find empirical support for all arguments. In addition to shedding light on the reasons why democracy weakens revolutionary attitudes, our analysis provides some clues to understand the recent increase in the support for revolution in democratic countries.

Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1317-1340 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Estlund ◽  
Jeremy Waldron ◽  
Bernard Grofman ◽  
Scott L. Feld
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Collective Consciousness ◽  
General Will ◽  
The Public ◽  
Condorcet’S Jury Theorem ◽  
Marquis De Condorcet ◽  
Jury Theorem

Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld argued in the June 1988 issue of this Review that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's contributions to democratic political theory could be illuminated by invoking the theorizing of one of his eighteenth-century contemporaries, the Marquis de Condorcet, about individual and collective preferences or judgments. Grofman and Feld's claims about collective consciousness and the efficacy of the public interest provoke debate. One focus of discourse lies in the application of Condorcet's jury theorem to Rousseau's theory of the general will. In this controversy David M. Estlund and Jeremy Waldron in turn raise a variety of issues of theory and interpretation; Grofman and Feld then extend their argument, and propose clarifications.

Plato against Democracy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Kraut
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Athenian Democracy ◽  
System P ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
Political Office

This essay examines the Republic’s most important argument against democracy, and claims that it remains, even amidst the dominance of democratic theory, a powerful critique not only of Athenian democracy but also of representative democracy. Plato’s basic idea is that a regime is inherently defective if it gives people a right to participate in political office whether or not they have demonstrated any qualifications for doing so. I examine several ways in which modern and contemporary democratic theorists respond to Plato’s critique, and argue that they are problematic. Perhaps Plato was right, then: democracy is not the best possible political system.

Rethinking Party Reform

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Normative Account

The functioning of representative democracy crucially depends on political parties that mediate between citizens and the state. It is widely doubted, however, that contemporary parties can still perform this connective role. Taking seriously the ensuing challenges for representative democracy, this book advances a normative account of party reform, drawing on both democratic theory and political science scholarship on parties. Moving beyond purely descriptive or causal-analytical perspectives on party reform, the book clarifies on theoretical grounds why party reform is centrally important for the sustainability of established democracies, and what effective party reforms could look like in an age where most citizens look to parties with scepticism and distrust. In doing so, the book underlines in distinctive fashion why scholars and citizens should care about re-inventing and transforming political parties, resisting widespread tendencies of either declaring parties unreformable or theorizing them out of the picture.

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