Beyond an Anxiety Logic: A Critical Examination of Language Rights Cases before the European Court of Human Rights

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-119
Author(s):  
Dana Schmalz

Abstract Language rights have traditionally been codified and discussed in the context of minority protection. The identification of language rights with questions of national minorities can, however, confound the analysis. This article explores the freedom of using a language and argues that the individual dimension of language rights must not be ignored beside the group dimension. The argument proceeds along a reading of three recent cases from the European Court of Human Rights, which concerned the use of Kurdish in Turkey. The Court’s reasoning illustrates the risk of an ‘anxiety logic’, which sees any language rights in connection with political claims of groups, thereby introducing additional conditions for the right and disregarding the significance a specific language can have for an individual, being more than a medium of conveying and receiving information. Conceptualising language use as an individual freedom is necessary also to account for situations other than national minorities, most importantly for the language rights of immigrants.

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid Leijten

This article discusses recent developments concerning the right to minimum subsistence as a matter of property protection under the European Convention on Human Rights. It starts with two recent cases: Bélané Nagy v. Hungary and Baczúr v. Hungary. In its judgments in these cases, the European Court of Human Rights emphasised that, in determining whether an interference with a benefit is proportional, an important consideration is whether the individual still receives a subsistence minimum. It moreover held that a right to a (minimum) benefit can exist even if the conditions for receiving this benefit have not been met. Read together, Bélané Nagy and Baczúr flag an increasingly social interpretation of the property right enshrined in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR involving positive obligations and a focus on the neediest. On a closer look, however, the Court’s interpretation is not a very straightforward one. Judgments rendered after Bélané Nagy and Baczúr show that, although there is a clear trend to protect claimants’ means of subsistence, the relationship between property and a right to such means remains opaque, and the potential of a property right to guarantee the latter, limited. In this article, I present the recent case law against the background of the increasing significance of Article 1 P1 in the field of social security as well as the obstacles to protecting a subsistence minimum. I will delineate the questions that promise to haunt the Court in the cases to come and explore some of the answers it could formulate in this regard. It is argued that a positive right to a subsistence minimum is, for various reasons, unlikely to be developed as a matter of property protection under the Convention.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first explains the background and rationale for the formation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), tracing its roots to the Council of Europe that was formed in 1949 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) established a year later. It then looks at the different kinds of human rights embedded in the ECHR, including the right to life, right to a fair trial, freedom of expression, right to property, and right to free elections. The chapter also provides an overview of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), along with the major changes made to its complaints system and how it interprets the Convention rights. Finally, it considers the ECtHR’s use of proportionality and margin of appreciation doctrines to find the balance between the rights of the individual and the community when deciding upon qualified rights.


Author(s):  
Daria Lazareva

The scientific article draws attention to the subject of the right to liberty and security of person and its place in the science of legal law. The content of this right in terms of its components is also studied. Particular attention is paid to the structure of the right to liberty and security of person, namely: the division into two independent structural elements: the right to liberty and the right to personal integrity. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is studied through the prism of guarantees of the right to liberty and security of person contained in Art. 5 of the Convention. Freedom and personal inviolability are personal human rights, which in the theory of legal and philosophical thought are defined as natural rights that belong from birth and, according to the generally accepted classification, belong to the first generation of (civil and political) human rights. The right to liberty and security of person is a fundamental right of every person and citizen, inalienable and personal, and belongs to the list of natural rights and is perceived by civil society through the prism of the theory of natural law, which has existed for several centuries. The article forms a certain position on the approach to the study of the right to liberty and security of person, its structural elements, it is important to follow a systematic approach, to consider this right as a set of interrelated elements on the principles of integrity, structure, plurality and equality. «Freedom» and «personal inviolability», which in close cooperation form a single complex. These categories should be considered the subject of the right to personal inviolability in the narrow sense, but the freedom of the individual from unlawful encroachment on property, honor, dignity, from unauthorized interference in private and family life is the subject of the right in the broadest sense.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-363
Author(s):  
Aistė Mickonytė

This article examines national regulations relating to the recognition of names in official documents by focusing on Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, having particular regard to the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the case of Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn. It also assesses the potential impact that this and other cases before the ecj and the European Court of Human Rights may exert on national minorities. The recognition of names is not regulated in European Union law; thus, the eu member states may freely determine the usage of names in official documents, as the state language represents a constitutional value and part of the national identity of many eu member states. Therefore, only regulation of names that causes excessive interference with the exercise of freedom of movement or respect for private and family life is unlawful under eu law. This issue will also be discussed in light of Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, by which the ecj assesses these types of interference with the eu’s duty to respect the national identities of its member states.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
David LLoyd Jones

The Procedural guarantees laid down in Article 6, European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the fairness and expedition of legal proceedings would be meaningless if the Convention did not protect the right of access to the courts which is a precondition to the enjoyment of those guarantees. As a result, the European Court of Human Rights has laid down the principle that Article 6(1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court. The right of access to the courts is not absolute. The Strasbourg case law acknowledges that it may be subject to limitations. Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this regard. However, national courts must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Moreover a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.


Author(s):  
Natalya OPOLSKA

The article examines the main criteria for the legitimacy of restriction the right to freedom of creation in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, legitimacy (legality) – the restriction of the right to freedom of creation should be provided for by international and national legislation, the purpose of which is to restrict the right to freedom of creation to be justified, coherent purpose, consistent with the principle proportionality and not to go beyond the bounds of necessity; content – restrictions on the freedom of creation can not be interpreted expanded, correspond to the basic content of freedom of creation and its social purpose. It has been determined that in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights there are various legal positions regarding the restriction of the right to freedom of creation. In order to streamline the practice of applying the Convention, since compliance with the precedent not only meets the requirements of the independence and impartiality of the Court, but also reflects the very essence of judicial policy, consider the most typical decisions of the ECtHR in complaints about limiting the right to freedom of creation. It is concluded that in each case dealt with by the ECtHR, there are grounds for making a decision both in favor of the complainants and in support of governments for limiting the freedom of creativity. The importance of the above mentioned restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that: - first, they relate to pressing issues concerning the restriction of freedom of creation, as the competence of the right to freedom of expression, which is enshrined in Art. 10 of the Convention; - second, in the cases cited above, the ECtHR ruled that convictions were not in these cases in violation of Article 10 of the Convention and supported the position of national courts in interfering with freedom of expression of the arts; - Thirdly, the decision of the ECHR points to the absence of a single international concept of "public morality", from which it can be concluded that it is expedient to determine the general tendencies in the development of modern morals of mankind; - fourthly, the decision of the ECtHR in complaints concerning the restriction of the right to freedom of creativity, which infringes religious feelings of the population, norms of social ethics and morals, provided that the state intervention was carried out with a high degree of conviction in its expediency, the court turns to the side national courts. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers in protecting the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children) if there is a danger that they may have access to this information. However, we are talking about well-considered decisions, since under the same slogans censorship and other undemocratic institutions can be introduced, and here the important point of the ECHR as a guarantor of the Convention is considered. It is determined that in the European legal tradition, the freedom of creativity is closely connected with the restrictions, the need for which must be proved with a high degree of their legitimacy (legality), proportionality and expediency (purpose). The analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the violation of Article 10 of the Convention made it possible to summarize the case law of the ECHR in the area of restricting the right to freedom of creation and to divide it into three groups, depending on the grounds for interference of the states in the freedom of creativity: Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect health; Restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes; Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the reputation or rights of others. When restricting the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the health or morals of others, the case law of the ECtHR recognizes a broad discretion by the states. In resolving the question of the limits of state intervention in order to protect public morality, the Court proceeds from the absence of a single coherent international concept of "public morality". The limits of freedom of creativity are set by the states in accordance with the norms of social ethics and morals. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers, to protect the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children), etc. (“Müller and Others v. Switzerland”, "Handyside v. Great Britain", "Otto Preminger v. Austria"). The restrictions on creativity in the practice of the ECHR in cases involving encroachments on the democratic foundations of society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes are relatively narrower. The precedent of such decisions in assessing the validity of government actions, their determinants of urgent social need, proportionality and compliance with the legitimate aim. When interfering with the right to freedom of creativity, an analysis of the balance between the restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society and the right to freedom of expression are considered. Summing up the practice of the ECHR concerning restrictions on the freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Leloup

According to Article 3 CRC, the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. This article examines how the European Court of Human Rights applies this principle in expulsion cases that have an impact on the right to family life. A distinction is made between the cases where the expulsion measure is aimed at one of the parents and the cases where the child itself is the subject of the impugned decision. A critical examination of the available case law proves that the Court’s use of the principle is inconsistent in several areas. It is argued that the Court should adopt a procedural approach towards the principle. This would make the case law more consistent, while simultaneously increasing the children’s protection.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela PÎRVU

This article aims to clarify the relationship between human rights and the environment, as it results from the jurisprudence of the two supranational institutions at the level of the European Union (the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice). It can be said that, to date, the jurisprudence covered by this article reflects the most important principles that the Court has applied in environmental case law. The article sets out the three most important principles regarding the individual rights that could be affected by environmental damage. On the one hand, the human rights that are protected by the Convention may be directly affected by harmful environmental factors, which may lead to a substantial violation of those rights. On the other hand, harmful environmental factors can lead to procedural violations of these rights. It is important to note here that the procedural aspects of these rights relate to the information and communication duties that national authorities have in the event of any damage brought to the environment. Finally, national authorities may also use environmental protection as a legitimate aim to justify possible interference with certain individual human rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 162-168
Author(s):  
Muzyka I.

The genesis of rights and freedoms in the history of Ukrainian state-building is closely linked to the activities of Ukrainian political parties and their leaders. Today, in the face of the global economic crisis and the coronavirus epidemic, the concept of human and citizen rights and freedoms is subject to skepticism and criticism. Reassessing the experiences of previous generations can help find ways to overcome a crisis. The concept of the human rights of the UPSR can be characterized as a collectivist, which, in accordance with the idea of prioritizing the interests of the dominant class of workers over the interests of the individual, significantly limited the political and economic rights and freedoms of a large part of the population. At the same time, the concept contained, at the time, quite advanced provisions on equal rights between men and women and national minorities, the provision of equal suffrage, the right to free education and the use of cultural and economic institutions, etc. The concept did not contain a clear division of human rights and citizens into their types. In particular, some economic, social and cultural rights were included in the list of political rights. A significant influence on the formation of the list of rights and freedoms and their content was made by the model of the future socialist Ukrainian state M. Hrushevsky, who was in fact the ideological inspirer of the leadership of the UPSR throughout the party's existence. The basic principles of the concept of human rights of the UPSR were reflected in the Constitution of the UNR in 1918. Keywords: Ukrainian Party of Revolutionary Socialists, Human Rights and Freedoms, M. Hrushevsky, Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), Constitution of the UNR in 1918.


Author(s):  
Yevhen Bilousov ◽  
◽  
Nataliia Kordii ◽  

Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights is called "the right to respect for private and family life", thus establishing at the international level the legal basis for the exercise of the right to privacy. From the content of this article it follows that this right has four components: private and family life, correspondence and housing. The scientific article is devoted to the study of the right to respect for correspondence under Art. 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. From the literal interpretation of the convention provisions and as evidenced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the implementation of the studied law goes beyond the private life of the individual and acquires special features of its implementation in other spheres of life, such as professional activities. The author analyzes the case law of the European Court in order to identify, generalize and structure the components (content) of the concept of "correspondence", given the possibility of practical use of such information due to the fact that when considering a particular application, the Court assesses whether and types of applied means of communication. This scientific article examines the implementation of the right to correspondence in civil and criminal law, which indicates the gradual expansion of the relevant regulations to different types of legal relations. In examining this issue on the basis of convention provisions and analysis of the case law of the Court, the author has studied and presented in a generalized form the grounds for lawful interference with the right to respect for correspondence.


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